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Introduction: What is philosophy?
Two philosophers walk into a bar. If they weren’t so lost in thought, they would
have seen the bar before they walked into it. That is the stereotype of the philosopher:
head in the clouds, detached from reality, overthinking everything and thereby doing
stupid stuff no normal person would ever do. This stereotype is not entirely true….not
entirely.
Now, it is true that philosophers do think differently about things, but that is
because they often do something that is quite abnormal – they think about things. Most
of us go through life just accepting things the way that they are. Indeed, whenever
someone suggests changing things – even if it would be a change to our benefit – we
naturally become agitated and try to stop the change. Humans are wired that way. And
THAT is one of the reasons why philosophers are so darned annoying. (…one of the
reasons.)
Philosophers ask “why?” about things that everyone else simply accepts. We don’t
defer to tradition. We don’t defer to power. We don’t defer to laziness. We authentically
want to know why and whether there could be another way of thinking about things.
An old friend once said that if you ask “why?” once – “why is the sky blue?”, “why
do we have two arms?”, “why do we think we know more about things we actually know
less about?” – then you are a scientist. If you ask “why?” twice – “why is that the
answer?”, “why is that how we go about determining the answer?”, “why do we all think
that?” – now you are a philosopher. If you ask “why?” more than twice, then you are just
a three-year-old annoying your mother. Philosophy is the study of the second “why?”
questions.
A second stereotype about philosophy is that when trying to answer these second
“why?” questions, just say whatever you think. It’s philosophy, no one is wrong. It’s just
your opinion.
If you believe that, YOU are wrong. Philosophy is not just about believing
whatever you happen to believe. It is about determining what reasons we have in
support of various beliefs. Philosophy is about rational belief, that is, figuring out why
we should believe claims we may or may not want to believe. It is the giving of strong
reasons in support of our beliefs that makes it philosophy. While philosophy may force
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you to challenge some of the things you believe (even things you believe deeply), it will
bolster other beliefs by showing you not only that you do believe it, but why you should
believe it. If you simply want to spout unsupported opinions…that’s why we invented the
internet. If you want to question your beliefs, if you want to determine whether there are
legitimate grounds for believing what you believe, if you want to subject each and every
one of your beliefs to rigorous critical scrutiny, then you are philosopher.
So, what is philosophy? Let’s answer this question by doing something
philosophers do all the time – drawing a distinction. The word “philosophy” can mean
two different, but related things. Philosophy is both an activity (something you do) and a
subject (something that is).
Philosophy as an activity is the giving and assessing of reasons in support of the
claim that everyone should believe some particular proposition. To philosophize is not
to simply come up with ideas. To philosophize is to try to justify those ideas or to
determine whether someone else’s proposed justification actually works.
In this way, what philosophers do is argue. The term argument here does not
mean what we usually take it to mean. In philosophy, an argument is not some kind of
disagreement or confrontation. The term argument, for us, is a technical term. An
argument is a set of sentences such that one sentence, what we call the conclusion, is
claimed to follow from the other sentences, what we call the premises. The conclusion
is the claim that is being argued for. It is what someone is trying to convince you of. The
premises are the reasons being given why you should believe the conclusion.
Consider the following argument:
All U.S. Presidents have been Martians.
Lyndon Baines Johnson was a U.S. President
Therefore, Lyndon Baines Johnson was a Martian
The conclusion here is “Lyndon Baines Johnson was a Martian.” That is the point of the
argument. That is what the argument is trying to get you to believe. Why should you
agree with that? According to the argument, because LBJ was President of the United
States of America and all U.S. Presidents have ben Martians. Those reasons are the
premises.
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Do those premises give you good reason to believe the conclusion? No. Lyndon
Baines Johnson was NOT a Martian (he was a Texan). But, at the same time, there does
seem to be something right about that argument. What is it? THAT takes us to our
second meaning of “philosophy.”
Philosophy as an activity is the framing and evaluating of arguments. But lots of
studies give and evaluate arguments. Scientists do it. Historians do it. What makes the
activity an instance of philosophy is the sort of question.
Scientists and historians are interested in empirical questions. A question is
empirical if it says something about an observable aspect of the world. Consider the
claim, “You have a nose.” That is an empirical claim. If you want to know whether it is
true or false, there are several sorts of routes you could take to gaining evidence. You
could look in a mirror. You could reach up with your hand and feel your face. These are
observations. Any question that can be answered through making observations is
empirical.
While empirical questions will matter in philosophy, philosophical questions are
not themselves straightforwardly empirical. We leave those to the scientists and
historians. Philosophical questions are ones for which we give arguments that do not
depend completely upon observation. The technical term we use for such questions is a
priori. “A priori” simply means before experience.
Suppose you turn on the television and see the local news weather report
featuring staff meteorologist Karl Popper. Karl guarantees that his forecast is 100%
accurate. He says, “Tomorrow it will rain or it won’t. Back to you, Bob.” Is Karl correct?
Is his forecast 100% accurate? Well…yes. But only because it was an a priori truth. We
don’t need to look out the window tomorrow to know whether the sentence is true or not
because it is always true no matter what. We thought he was going to make an empirical
claim, maybe “tomorrow, it will rain.” That would be empirical because we would have
to check outside to see if it was the case or not.
“Tomorrow, it will rain or it won’t” is an a priori claim that is a priori because it is
trivial. But not all a priori claims are vacuous like this. Consider the sentence, “It is
morally wrong to set your roommate on fire for fun.” That is a sentence that is a priori
and not vacuous – especially for your roommate. This is the sort of proposition that
philosophers study. We want to know whether it is true. (It is.) But more importantly,
4

we want to know WHY it is true. What makes that sentence true? It is not an empirical
matter. This is why you don’t have a lab section in your philosophy class where you have
to bring your roommate, lighter fluid, and a match. We don’t have an ethic-o-meter. We
need something else. What we need is a priori argumentation.
These sorts of questions and arguments fall into four general categories: logic,
metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. These are the four branches of philosophy.
This is the second meaning of philosophy – philosophy as a subject.
Logic is the study of rational argumentation. It examines the nature of arguments
themselves and what propositions follow from what propositions. Metaphysics is the
study of reality. What exists? Epistemology is the study of knowledge. What can we
know? How do we gain knowledge? Axiology is the study of value judgements. It has two
subfields. Ethics is the study of value judgements concerning the rightness and
wrongness of free human acts. Aesthetics is the study of value judgements concerning
art. Is this beautiful? Is that a work of high quality?
These five categories (logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics)
will form the structure of this book. In each section, we will explain in detail what each
study is and then we will examine contrasting arguments around a question in each field
that is a philosophical question raised by humor.
Philosophy may be difficult, but it is also fun. Especially when the topics you
consider are themselves fun. Philosophy may be no joke, but it does not mean there are
no jokes in philosophy.
How many philosophers does it take to screw in a lightbulb? Don’t ask me, I’m a
philosopher and that’s an empirical question. (Now, you get that joke. See, you’re
learning.)
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Logic
People are trying to get you to believe things all the time. Whether it is
commercials during your favorite show, politicians trying to get your vote, or someone
trying to convince you to go out with them for a cup of coffee, people want you to believe
what they think will benefit them. But what benefits you is believing what is most likely
to be true.
Humans are psychological beings, we have minds that are wired funny. There are
ways to get us to believe things that are not true…but we will be absolutely certain that
they are. These tricks can lead us to think and do things that are not the best for us,
those we care about, or the world as a whole. Logic is the study that allows us to cut
through these rhetorical tactics, courtroom tricks, and cognitive biases.
In philosophy, logic is the study of rational argumentation. Notice what just
happened – we took one word “logic” that we didn’t know the meaning of and we
defined it in terms of two words, “rational” and “argumentation” that we don’t know the
meanings of. In philosophy, we call that progress.
A belief is rational if we have good reason to believe it is at least probably true.
There are lots of ways to acquire beliefs. Some of them are rational and some of them
are not. One may believe something because of coercion. “Logicians are cool – believe
this or I will fail you this semester.” Effective (perhaps), but not rational. What we need
is not incentive to believe (or, at least to act as if we do), we need actual support for the
claim. For a belief to be rational is to have evidence that it is probably the case. This is
where arguments come in.
Again, an argument is a set of sentences such that one sentence, the conclusion,
is claimed to follow from the other sentences, the premises. Arguments thus have two
parts, a conclusion and premises. The conclusion is the point of the argument. It is
the thing being argued for, that which we are trying to convince ourselves or others of.
We give arguments in order to provide legitimate reasons to believe the conclusion. The
premises are those reasons. The premises are the grounds that are being proposed to
support rational belief in the conclusion.
Every argument has one and only one conclusion. Conclusions are like noses –
everyone has one. More than one conclusion, more than one argument. No conclusion,
6

no argument. Premises, on the other hand, can come in any number – one, two,
eighteen…. There are mathematical arguments with an infinite number of premises and
weird logical arguments that have no premises. Conclusion – one and only one,
premises – any number.
Consider the old chestnut: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore,
Socrates is mortal. In this case, the conclusion is “Socrates is mortal.” That is what the
argument is trying to convince us of. Why should we believe that Socrates is mortal?
Because he is a man and all men are mortal. The first thing you do when you approach
an argument is to find the conclusion and then set out the premises. It is crucially
important that you do this correctly.
Consider what would happen if we misidentified the conclusion in this case – if it
is true that all men are mortal and that Socrates is one of these guys, then it turns out
that it is absolutely the case that Socrates is mortal. But suppose we wrongly thought
that the conclusion is “all men are mortal” and that the premises are “Socrates is a man”
and “Socrates is mortal.” Just because one man is mortal, it doesn’t necessary follow
that they all are. By misidentifying the conclusion and premises, we have taken a good
argument, one that gives us good reason to believe something and turned it into a
flawed argument that does not.
So, the first tasks that are necessary for us to develop are (1) figuring out when we
have an argument, and (2) determining what the conclusion is and what the premises
are. We often have help with these tasks, what we call indicator words. There are certain
words we use to point out conclusion and there are certain words we use to point out
premises.
Think about what a conclusion is supposed to do, it is supposed to be the thing
that is established by the argument, so we use words that indicate this. The most
obvious one is “therefore,” but we use other words for this function as well: thus, hence,
and so.
We do need to be careful, though, in that not every use of these words indicates a
conclusion. Take the word “so.” Sometimes, it does function this way – I haven’t eaten
today, so I am hungry. That I have not yet eaten gives you good reason to believe that I
am, in fact, hungry. But in the sentence “I am so hungry,” now “so” is not an indicator
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word. “Hungry” is not a conclusion. This is a different meaning of “so,” instead of
synonymous with “therefore,” it is synonymous with “very.”
We have premise indicator words as well. We use words and phrases like
“because,” “since,” and “given that.” Again, not every use of these words is an indication
of a premise in an argument. “I am hungry since I haven’t eaten all day” is a case where
“since” points out a reason for belief. Why should you believe I am hungry, because I
haven’t eaten today. But in the sentence “I haven’t eaten since yesterday,” we see since
used just to signal time, not as an indicator word. “Yesterday” is not a premise.
Indicator words are the easiest way to determine whether we have an argument
and if so, what the conclusion is and what the premises are. But we don’t always have
indicator words. How then do we determine if we are looking at an argument? The
easiest way is to try to insert your own indicator words. I prefer “therefore” and
“because.” If you look at a passage and the word “therefore” can be naturally inserted in
a way that maintains the meaning of the passage, you are probably looking at an
argument and what immediately follows “therefore” is your conclusion. Similarly, if you
can insert “because” into a passage without changing the meaning, you are likely looking
at an argument and what comes right after your inserted “because” is probably a
premise.
Arguments have two parts – a conclusion that we are trying to be convinced of
and premises which are trying to do the convincing, that is, trying to provide good
reason for belief. Recall that we defined an argument as “a set of sentences such that one
sentence, the conclusion, is claimed to follow from the other sentences, the premises.”
Notice that we do not need the conclusion to actually follow from the premises to have
an argument, we just need the claim that it does. This claim is that there is an
inference between the premise set and the conclusion, that is, that the premises do
logically lead to reason to believe the conclusion. All that is necessary for the existence
of an argument is the claim of an inference. Good arguments will have an actual
inference and bad arguments will lack an inference despite the claim. How do we
determine which is which? That is the central question of logic.
An argument has two parts, a conclusion and premises, and that there is the
claim of an inference from the premises to the conclusion. Not all texts contain
arguments, that is, not all communication – even those that are trying to convince us of
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something – will contain a claim of an inference, that is, independent reason why we
should believe what is trying to be conveyed. So, the first skill we will need to develop is
to spot when there is an argument and when there is not. The second is to find the
conclusion and lay out the premises.
Consider the following: You are dehydrated. You need to drink more water. The
human body does not function properly when it is not appropriately hydrated and you
need to maintain full function. Argument? Yes. What is the conclusion? Where does the
word “therefore” fit naturally in a way that maintains the meaning and where does
“because” fit naturally to maintain the meaning?
1. You are dehydrated.
2. The human body does not function properly when it is not appropriately
hydrated.
3. You need to maintain full function.
 You need to drink more water.
How about the following: “I did turn in my homework. I swear. Believe me, I’m telling
the truth.” Argument? Clearly, there is someone trying to convince someone of
something. But is this person giving independent reason for thinking it is true? No. The
student is simply pleading for the person to believe the claim, not giving evidence for it.
This is not an argument.
Determining if something is an argument and finding the parts are the first two
steps for us. The third step is determining what kind of argument it is. Arguments
primarily come in two types: deductive and inductive. An argument is deductive if and
only if the conclusion does not contain information that is not already contained in the
premises. (Logicians call this property being “non-ampliative”.) A deductive argument
argues from broad to narrow, that is, the content of its conclusion does not outrun the
content of its premises. The following argument is deductive:
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
 Socrates is mortal.
The premises talk about all men, but the conclusion only mentions a subset, one guy.
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The other sort of argument we’ll consider is inductive. An argument is inductive
if and only if its conclusion does contain information not contained in its premises. An
inductive argument argues from narrow to broad, that is, the content of its conclusion
does outrun the content of its premise set. (Logicians call this being “ampliative.”) The
following argument is inductive:
1.
2.
3.
4.


The first paper I submitted in this class got an A.
The second paper I submitted in class got an A.
The third paper I submitted in this class got an A.
There are five papers I have to write for this class.
All my papers in this class will get an A

The evidence is six of the ten papers and the conclusion is all ten. The conclusion is
broader than the premises, that is, not fully contained in the premises and that makes
the argument inductive.
This is the form of induction called an “inductive generalization,” but we could
also make an inductive argument to a single, as of yet unobserved instance. This is
called “inductive analogy.” It would look like this:
1.
2.
3.
4.


The first paper I submitted in this class got an A.
The second paper I submitted in class got an A.
The third paper I submitted in this class got an A.
There are five papers I have to write for this class.
The fourth paper I am about to submit will get an A

This is inductive because the premise set discusses six papers and the seventh paper is
not one of them. The inference goes beyond the data on which it is based. Deductive
arguments milk content out of their premises, while inductive arguments extend their
scope beyond their premises.
So, we now know to (1) determine if it is an argument, (2) find the conclusion and
premises, and (3) determine the type of the argument. The last step is the most
important – evaluating the argument. Does the argument contain a legitimate
inference? Does it provide us good reason to believe its conclusion?
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Consider the following three arguments and determine which are good arguments:
I.

1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
 Socrates is mortal

II.

1. All politicians are Martians.
2. Lyndon Baines Johnson is a politician
 Lyndon Baines Johnson is a Martian

III.

1. All Presidents of the United States have been human
2. This newborn baby is human
 This newborn baby is President of the United States

Which of the above provide you with good reason to believe the conclusion? Only the
first one. What is wrong with the other two?
The second argument should strike you as good in some way, but surely we don’t
have reason to believe its conclusion. Similarly, the third argument does seem to have a
virtue. Its premises are true. All Presidents of the United States have been humans and
all newborn children – given that by children, we mean the offspring of humans – are
also humans. But, again, surely the conclusion is false. So, what is right about the first
example, and what goes wrong with the second two?
To evaluate arguments, we use two criteria: validity and well-groundedness.
Validity concerns the form of the argument. An argument is valid if and only if,
assuming the truth of the premises for the sake argument, the conclusion follows from
them. The important thing to notice here is that we are assuming the premises are true
for the sake of argument. Maybe they are true, maybe they are false, we don’t care.
Validity does not concern the content of the premises. All we are looking at is whether
the premises, IF true would lead you to the conclusion. Validity is not about the content
of the argument, but about the form of the argument. Validity looks at the skeleton of
the argument and determines if it is strong enough to support the weight of the
conclusion.
Let’s look at the first argument. If we take it as true that all men are mortal, and if
we take it as true that Socrates is one of those men, then it necessarily follows that
Socrates is mortal. This is a valid argument.
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Similarly, with the second argument. If we assume it to be true that all politicians
are Martians, and if we take it as true that LBJ was a politician, then again it necessarily
must follow that LBJ was a Martian. This, too, is a valid argument.
Indeed, from a validity standpoint, it is the same argument as the first.
Remember that validity only cares about the structure of the argument, not the content.
Both of the first two arguments have the same form: All A’s are B, C is an A, therefore, C
is a B. All arguments of this form will be valid. Let’s play Madlibs. If I ask for a plural
noun, a proper noun, and an adjective and put them into this form, we get a valid
argument. All cats are purple. Pee Wee Herman is a cat. Therefore, Pee Wee Herman is
purple. Valid argument. Validity is a function of form – any conclusion of that form will
be true if the premises of that form are also true.
Consider the third argument. This one is invalid. It is true that newborn babies
are human and it is true that all Presidents of the United States are and have been
humans, but just because they are true, it does not follow that all newborn children are
Presidents of the United States. All A’s are B and all C’s are B, but that does not mean
that all A’s are C. The truth of the premises does not lead to the truth of the conclusion.
The problem is not with the premises, but with the form of the argument.
That we are assuming the truth of the premises in our first criterion should
bother you a little bit. After all, that is a huge assumption to make. What justifies our
ability to make such an assumption? The answer is our second criterion – wellgroundedness. An argument is well-grounded if and only if all of its premises are true.
Well-grounded arguments have true premises. Maybe the conclusion is true, maybe it is
false, but what is important for us in looking at the well-groundedness of an argument is
just the truth or falsity of the premises.
Our first argument? Well-grounded. All men are, in fact, mortal and Socrates is
(or at least was) a man.
The third argument. Also well-grounded. All newborn children are, in fact,
human and all Presidents of the United States have actually been human.
But the middle one? Not well-grounded. LBJ was indeed a politician, but not all
politicians are Martians (certainly, no more than half). It is a valid argument; that is, if
the premises were true, the conclusion would be, but not all of the premises are true. As
such, we have no good reason to believe the truth of the conclusion.
12

An argument that satisfies both of our criteria, that is, an argument that is both
valid and well-grounded, is called sound. (valid + well-grounded = sound) A sound
argument gives us good reason to believe its conclusion. What we want are sound
arguments.
If an argument is sound, then the conclusion is supported. But how strongly it is
supported depends on the type of argument. If you have a deductive argument that is
both valid and well-grounded, then the conclusion must be true – 100%, absolutely, no
doubt about it true. If, on the other hand, you have an inductive argument that is sound,
then the conclusion is probably true and gives us a degree of belief in the truth of the
conclusion. Stronger inductive arguments give us reason to think the conclusion is more
probably true, whereas sound, but weak inductive arguments give us reason to think the
conclusion is probably true, but does not give us the same degree of belief.
But suppose the argument is not sound. If the argument – deductive or inductive
– is flawed, that is, if it is invalid or not well-grounded, then we know nothing of the
truth or falsity of the conclusion. There are always bad arguments that can be built for
true conclusions. Consider the following:
1. The moon is made of green cheese.
2. Only people twelve feet tall can join the Boy Scouts.
 1+1=2
It is, of course, absolutely true that 1+1=2, but not for the reasons that are given in the
premises – premises that are, obviously, false. So, if an argument satisfies both criteria,
the conclusion should be believed; but if either or both criteria are not satisfied, we have
no reason to believe anything about the truth or falsity of the conclusion.
In order to determine which arguments are sound, we need to develop tests for
validity and well-groundedness. Validity looks at the structural elements of the
argument and its study is called “formal logic,” not because you need to dress up to do
the work, but because it is an examination of the form of arguments. Validity for
deductive and inductive arguments are completely different matters and we need
different tools – like standard and metric wrenches. We will delve into both of these in
turn. Well-groundedness concerns look at the acceptability of the argument other than
the form and are called “informal logic” or “critical thinking.”
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Examples
Do the following passages contain arguments? If so, identify the conclusion and
premises.
1. Jokes are effective if the audience laughs at them. You can’t have two emotions at
the same time. Amused and insulted are different emotions. Your joke insults the
audience. So, your joke is not effective.
2. That joke is not funny. I get it, I just don’t think it works.
3. “Gumpy’s” is funnier than “Frumpy’s” as the name of a potato chip because the
sound the letter g makes is funnier than the sound the letter f makes.
Are the following arguments deductive or inductive?
4. Roberta loves everything Aparna Nancherla does. Her last special came out last
month. Roberta loved it.
5. Roberta has loved everything Aparna Nancherla has done. Her next special
comes out next month. Roberta will love it.
Are the following arguments valid?
6. If you find a joke funny, you have a working brain. You found that joke funny. So,
you must have a working brain.
7. If you find a joke funny, you have a working brain. You didn’t find that joke
funny. So, you must have a problem with your brain function.
8. If you find a joke funny, you have a working brain. You have a working brain. So,
you find that joke funny.
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Answers
1. This is an argument. The conclusion indicator word “so” picks out the conclusion,
“That joke is not funny.” The other sentences are the premises.
2. This is not an argument. A person is stating an opinion about a joke, but is not
providing reasons why one should believe the opinion is true.
3. This is an argument. The indicator word “because” picks out the premise “the
sound the letter g makes is funnier than the sound the letter f makes” which is
offered in support of the conclusion “‘Gumpy’s’ is funnier than ‘Frumpy’s’ as the
name of a potato chip.”
4. This is a deductive argument. The premises are “Roberta loves everything Aparna
Nancherla does” and “Her last special came out last month.” The conclusion is
“Roberta loved it.” The first premise is a universal claim, that Roberta has loved
all of Aparna Nancherla’s work, while the conclusion refers to one special, that is,
a part of the whole. As such, the argument proceeds from broad to narrow and is
therefore deductive.
5. This is an inductive argument. The premises are “Roberta has loved everything
Aparna Nancherla has done” and “Her next special comes out next month.” The
conclusion is “Roberta will love it.” The first premise only includes Roberta’s
opinion about the work that has already been done, whereas the conclusion
makes a claim about the upcoming special which is not covered by that premise.
That means that the argument is ampliative, the content of the conclusion goes
beyond the content of the premises.
6. This is a valid argument. The premises are “If you find a joke funny, you have a
working brain” and “You found that joke funny.” The conclusion is “You have a
working brain.” The first premise states that finding a joke funny is sufficient to
indicate a working brain, that is, if you are capable of processing a joke and
determining it to be funny, such cognitive processes would indicate a working
brain. You did find this joke funny, that is, you did all the neurological work
necessary for the outcome we deemed sufficient to indicate a working brain. So, it
does follow that the conclusion must be true, if the premises are. In other words,
if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. The truth of the
conclusion does follow from the truth of the premises making this a valid
argument
7. This argument is invalid. The premises are “If you find a joke funny, you have a
working brain” and “You didn’t find that joke funny.” The conclusion is “You
must have a problem with your brain function.” The first premise states that
finding a joke funny is sufficient to indicate a working brain, that is, if you are
capable of processing a joke and determining it to be funny, such cognitive
processes would indicate a working brain. In this case, you did not find this joke
funny, that is, you still did all the neurological work necessary to determine
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whether a joke was funny or not, but you found it to not be funny. The first
premise tells you what is sufficient, that is, what would be enough by itself, to
demonstrate a working brain; but it does not say it is necessary, that is,
something that must be the case to demonstrate a working brain. It is perfectly
possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. Therefore, the
argument is invalid.
8. This argument is invalid. The premises are “If you find a joke funny, you have a
working brain” and “You have a working brain.” The conclusion is “You find that
joke funny.” The first premise states that, if you find a joke funny, that by itself is
enough to indicate that your brain is working; but the converse does not follow,
that if your brain is working then you will find some joke funny. It is perfectly
possible for both of the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. So, this
is an invalid argument.
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Thinking Critically
There are lots of ways that an argument can go wrong. Some of the mistakes that
can logically tank an argument are repeated often enough that we give them names.
Unfortunately, many of these bad arguments strike us intuitively as good arguments
despite their irrationality and we often find ourselves (even those of us who know
better) employing them in conversation as if they were good ways of thinking (which
they are not). We call these reasoning errors fallacies and they come in quite a variety.
In this section, we will introduce some of these fallacies and teach you how to spot them.
Equivocation
Arguments have to be set out in terms of language – you can’t do logic through
interpretive dance. But words can be ambiguous, that is, they can have more than one
meaning. This can lead to logical problems.
Equivocation: the reasoning error wherein an operative word is used in two different
ways in an argument.
Consider the following argument. “Tables are furniture. There are tables in my statistics
book. Therefore, there is furniture in my statistics book.” Is it a good argument? Of
course not. But at first glance, it seems valid and well-grounded. If the premises are
true, they seem to lead to the conclusion. And those premises are both true. So, what’s
the problem? The word “table” is ambiguous. It means both a flat raised surface for
placing things on and a rectangular array of numbers. The word “table” is used in two
completely different ways and we changed which way we were using it in the middle of
the argument. The word “table” in the first premise does not mean the same thing as the
word “table” in the second premise. But for the argument to work structurally, they have
to mean the same thing. Therefore, we equivocated on the word “table,” and the
argument is unsound.
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Ad Hominem
Arguments are made by people. Arguments can be valid or invalid, well-grounded
or not well-grounded. People can be kind or mean, smart or dumb, powerful or
powerless, rich or poor, cool or nerdy, objective or self-interested, well-dressed or
analytic philosophers. The logical status of the argument depends solely upon the
internal structure of the argument and whether the premises are true or not. The
kindness, intelligence, power, wealth, coolness, objectivity, or ability to match pants and
shirts have absolutely nothing to do with the structure of an argument or the truth of its
premises. Arguments stand or fall on their own merits, not on whose mouth they come
out of. To argue against the arguer and not the argument is what we call ad hominem.
Ad hominem: the reasoning error wherein one tries to undermine an argument by
attacking the person who made the argument and not the validity or well-groundedness
of the argument itself.
The phrase “ad hominem” is Latin for “to the man.” The idea being that you are
not addressing your concerns with the idea, with the argument, but directly to the
person. You could take a perfectly good argument and put it in the mouth of Abraham
Lincoln and Adolf Hitler, Mother Teresa and Jeff Bezos, Bill Nye and Kanye West. No
matter who says it, if it is a good argument it is a good argument. To focus on the arguer
and not the argument is to miss the logical point and to commit a fallacious ad hominem
attack.
Anytime you hear (1) name calling, (2) labelling, or (3) an appeal to the arguer’s
self-interest, you are probably looking at an ad hominem attack. “Don’t listen to that
moron” – ad hominem. “That’s exactly what you would think, you’re a conservative/
liberal/male/female/Christian/Muslim/Jew/atheist…” – ad hominem. “The only reason
you are arguing that is that if it were true, you would benefit” – ad hominem. Ad
hominem attacks can be very effective. If you can tear down the person making the
argument, people think that what they have to say cannot be that valuable. But the fact
that it works does not make it good reasoning.
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Circular Argument
A good argument has to be valid, but not every valid argument is a good one.
Consider the following argument: It is Monday, therefore it is Monday. It is certainly
valid. If we assume the truth of the premise, we are led to the truth of the conclusion.
But does it give us reason to believe the conclusion? No. The reason we need an
argument is to provide support for an uncertain conclusion. If the premise and the
conclusion say the same thing, and one is uncertain, then so is the other. This means
that while the argument is valid, it is not well-grounded. You cannot support a claim
simply by repeating it. No matter how many times you say it, it doesn’t make it more
true. We call this a circular argument.
Circular argument: The reasoning error in which the premise contains the same
information as the conclusion.
The most obvious case of the circular argument is the one above, where the premise and
the conclusion are the same sentence. The trickier version is where you have two
different sentences that express the same proposition in different words. Consider the
argument: It is morally wrong to kill animals because you shouldn’t take the life of
anything that can feel pain. The only things that can feel pain are things with a central
nervous system. The only things with a central nervous system are animals. So, while
the two parts of the argument seem different, they turn out to be just different ways of
saying the same thing. It is a circular argument.
It could be rescued from circularity by adding content to the premise about why
feeling pain gives rise to interests that are morally relevant. But doing so would be to
add premises. It would add information that would make the conclusion and the
premise say different things. That is what a good argument does. But in its naïve current
form, it is a complex form of circular argument.
Slippery Slope Fallacy
A common reasoning error is what is called the slippery slope or domino fallacy.
It involves chains of cause and effect relations. The reason this error is often called the
domino fallacy is that it resembles the tipping of dominoes. Set them up on edge and
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knock down the first and it will tip the second which hits the third and in a row they all
go down. It is a metaphor for a causal (not casual) chain, that is a chain of events which
cascade from some initial happening.
There are, of course, such chains. If you forget your homework one day, it could
be the difference between an A and a B. Not getting that A might be the thing that keeps
you out of medical school. Getting rejected from mad school causes you to despair. The
despair leads you to drink. You become an alcoholic. You drink away all of your money
except for a single dollar bill. With that dollar bill, you buy a lottery ticket. It turns out to
be the winner and you become a multi-millionaire all because you forgot your
homework that day.
It could happen. Probably won’t. But, it could. But, it probably won’t. If you want
to assert the existence of a whole chain of events like this, you have to justify each and
every link in the causal chain. The slippery slope fallacy is where you simply assert that
once you take the first step, you will necessarily slide all the way down the hill.
Slippery Slope Fallacy: the reasoning error wherein one asserts a chain of causally
interconnected events without providing cause and effect arguments for each link in the
chain.
Again, these sorts of chains of events do happen, but if you want to claim that any given
situation is like this, you must provide full evidence for each and every step.
Faulty Analogy
Arguing by analogy is a perfectly fine way of arguing. If two things are like each
other in relevant ways, then you can infer something about the other from the first. We
reason like this in science all the time. We think of current through a wire as if it was
water moving through a hose. The equations governing them are similar enough that the
analogy works.
But for such an argument to work, the two things need to be alike in the relevant
ways. If they are not properly analogous, then any inference you try to draw from one to
the other will not be legitimate. To do so, is to commit the fallacy of faulty analogy.
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Faulty analogy: The reasoning error wherein an argument by analogy is based on two
things that are not analogous.
A while back, when anti-smoking campaigns were aimed at children, they had posters in
classrooms that read “kissing a smoker is like licking an ashtray.” About a decade later,
the messages were about drug use and featured a television commercial of a young lady
putting an egg on a counter saying, “This is your brain.” She then hit the egg with a pan,
splattering it everywhere, saying, “This is your brain on drugs. Any questions?” Now, it
is true that cigarettes and heroin are bad for you. (Do not smoke. Do not shoot up
heroin.) But in both cases, the arguments by analogy fail because they are bad analogies.
Smoking does yellow teeth and give bad breath. But kissing a smoker is not like sticking
your tongue in an ashtray. Drugs do cause neurological damage, but their use does not
smash the brain beyond recognition. If you want to argue by analogy, use good
analogies.
Taking a Quotation Out of Context
In academic work, we often use quotations from other authors as premises in the
arguments we make. It is important to refer to the work of others in order to make our
points. There have been lots of smart people who have thought about the sorts of
questions we are still thinking about and we need to work from their insights in order to
make progress. Isaac Newton, perhaps the most important thinker in human history
wrote that the reason he was able to see so far was that he thought of himself as standing
on the shoulders of giants.
However, there are two ways that using someone else’s good ideas can go horribly
logically wrong. The first is that we can misrepresent the meaning of their words by
taking a quotation out of context. What words mean is often a matter of who is saying
them, why they are saying them, to whom they are saying them, and how they are saying
them. The same sentence can mean completely different things, if any of these
contextual factors are changed.
Suppose Jack asks his roommate Rob whether he is going to ask out Rhonda,
whom Jack knows has a thing for Rob, and Rob replies, “Yeah, sure, I’ll ask out Rhonda,
when my dog writes a dissertation on Hegel.” Jack then says to Rhonda, “I ask Jack and
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he literally said the words ‘I’ll ask out Rhonda.’ He said it. I swear.” Did he say it?
Well…yes and no. Those words did leave his lips, but that was not what he was saying.
Rob took the quotation out of context.
Quotation taken out of context: the reasoning error wherein someone uses as
support the words of another person, but changes the meaning of those words by
changing the context in which they are reported.
Quotations are important in scholarship, just make sure the words as you write them
mean what the author meant.
Faulty Authority
The second way a quotation can go wrong is if the person quoted does not offer
the support you need in making your argument. We quote experts because their words
can be taken as likely true. But it is important when citing the work or ideas of an
authority, that the person is a legitimate authority. If not, it is an example of the fallacy
“faulty authority.”
Faulty authority: the reasoning error in which someone uses a quotation from an
authority as a premise for an argument, but the purported authority is not a legitimate
authority.
Legitimate authorities have three properties. The first, and this may seem trivial,
is that they actually have to exist. A real authority needs to be both real and an authority.
This is the problem when people say things like, “You know, I read somewhere that…”
Where? If you want me to believe this on the basis of someone’s authority, you need to
tell me who the authority is. By simply saying that you read it somewhere or heard it
somewhere, you are asserting that I should agree with this because the place you read or
heard it is authoritative, but to justify that I need to know who the purported authority
is.
The second condition for being an authority is that the person is actually an
expert in this field. Your uncle Murray the dry cleaner may be an authority in stain
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removal, but not whether homeopathic remedies are effective treatments for bacterial
infections.
The final condition is that the person cited as an authority has to be objective,
that is, not have a direct interest in your believing one way or another. If you go to your
doctor and he prescribes an expensive medication to treat some symptoms you are
having and you later learn he is receiving kick-backs from the drug company that makes
it, you have every right to wonder if there was a better or less expensive alternative that
was ignored because of the doctor’s personal financial interests. The doctor exists and is
an expert in the relevant field, but to be fully satisfied that this is a legitimate authority,
their claim has to not have effects on them personally.
Fallacy of the Mean
Contrasting arguments are the hallmark of philosophy. Smart people disagree
over hard questions with smart arguments on different sides. This often flusters
students. If both sides gave strong arguments, who’s to say? Students throw up their
arms and declare the matter “subjective,” it must just be whatever you think it is. NO! It
just means you have to think harder.
The other move students tend to take when coming across strong and opposing
arguments is to try to split the difference, find a way that makes them both true, assume
the truth is in between the two positions. There are certainly times when this is the case.
Sometimes it is best to compromise, to split the difference. But sometimes it is not. The
middle path is itself a position that requires independent argumentation. To simply
assert that a view is correct because it is the mean between two extremes is to commit
the fallacy of the mean.
Fallacy of the mean: the reasoning error wherein one contends that a moderate
viewpoint must be correct because it is the moderate view.
The idea of a big logical group hug is warm and fuzzy, but that is not the way the world
always is. Sometimes the truth does lay in the extreme. Does it? Doesn’t it? Everything
needs an argument…and not just any argument, but the strongest argument. Which
argument is the strongest? THAT is what philosophy is all about.
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Exercises
Name the fallacy in the joke:
1. Why did the chicken cross the road? To get to the other side.
2. James Randolph Worthington III was waiting for the subway when a young man
wearing ripped jeans and a t-shirt stands next to him on the platform. With an air
of indignation, Worthington checks his watch and the young man asks, “Excuse
me, sir, do you have the time?” Worthington ignores him. The young man says, “I
saw you look at your watch. I don't have one. I asked politely for the time. Why
can't you tell me?” Worthington turns and says, “Look, if I tell you the time, we'll
have a conversation. We'll get to know each other and become friends. I'll invite
you to my house for dinner. You'll meet my lovely daughter who is your age.
You'll ask her out on a date and fall in love. You'll ask her to marry you, and she'll
accept.” The younger man said, “…and what is wrong with that?” Worthington
replied, “My daughter will not be married to a man who can't afford a watch!”
3. Son: Dad, global warming is real. The scientists all say so.
Dad: You’re so stupid, you’d climb a glass wall to see what was on the other side.
4. A man walks in an optometrist and says, “Doc, I think I’m a moth.” The eye
doctor, says, “What?” “I think I’m a moth.” The eye doctor says, “I’m an
optometrist. You need a psychiatrist.” The man says, “I know.” “Then why did
you come to see me?” The man says, “Your light was on.”
5. Frogs are green and bounce. Tennis balls are green and bounce. Your check is
green. I don’t think I’ll accept it.
6. “Susan, I heard you got a cancer diagnosis. I’m so sorry.” “Well, Karen, it’s a little
more complicated. I have this tumor. The first doctor said it was cancer and had
to come out immediately. So, I went to get a second opinion. The next doctor said
it was benign and should stay because the surgery itself is dangerous.” “So, what
are you going to do? Which doctor should you listen to?” “They are both
professionals, so I’m going to listen to both and have them only remove half of it.”
7. Today at the bank, on old lady asked me to check her balance. So, I pushed her
over.
8. A man walks into a bar and orders a drink with a big smile on his face. The
bartender asks, “Why so happy, Joe?” “Well,” the Joe says, “You know how I was
worried that my wife was being unfaithful?” “Yeah, so?” the bartender asks.
“Well, now I know she isn’t.” “How do, you know that, Joe?” “Well, last week, I
was sick and had to stay home from work a couple days and every time she would
see the mailman, she would run out waving her arms, yelling ‘My husband is
home! My husband is home!’ How could someone so proud to have me around be
unfaithful?”
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Answers
1. Circular argument. “Crossing the road” and “getting to the other side of the road”
are different ways of saying the same thing. What makes this a joke is that it asks
for the goal that the chicken was trying to accomplish by crossing the road but
answers with a restatement that the chicken crossed the road in different words.
2. Slippery Slope. Worthington sets out an entire chain of events that he contends
will result from his giving the young man the time without justifying any of the
steps.
3. Ad hominem. The father responds with an insult rather than addressing the
argument made.
4. Faulty authority. The man went to see a doctor about his condition, but it was the
wrong sort of doctor.
5. Faulty analogy (and equivocation). The speaker is drawing an analogy between
frogs, tennis balls, and checks. This analogy clearly does not hold. (There is also
an equivocation here as bouncing a tennis ball and bouncing a check are different
meanings of “bounce” – either answer is acceptable since both fallacies are
committed.)
6. Fallacy of the mean. Susan got medical advice to both have surgery to remove the
tumor and not have surgery to remove the tumor. By seeking the middle ground,
Susan does not get the best of both worlds, but will rather have both the danger of
a possibly of a cancerous tumor and the danger of the surgery.
7. Equivocation. You are psychologically primed by setting the joke in a bank to
interpret the word “checking one’s balance” as determining the amount of money
ne has in a checking account. But the punch line changes the meaning of
“checking one’s balance” to testing the ability to stay on one’s feet.
8. Taking a quotation out of context. Joe takes his wife’s words “My husband is
home!” to be a statement of her adoration of him instead of a warning to the
mailman that their usual activities would have to be postponed.
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Metaphysics
The word “metaphysics” is one of the most misused terms in philosophy. In its
ordinary usage, it refers to things like E.S.P., pyramid power, and channeling. But that is
not what philosophers mean by the term. Metaphysics is the study of reality. Its
subfield ontology examines what exists. Ontology asks, “What is the furniture of the
universe?”, while metaphysics asks “What is the furniture of the universe and what do
we know about its upholstery?” Ontological questions would include: Does God exist?
Do other people exist? Metaphysical questions beyond ontology would include: Is there
a difference between the mind and the brain? Is the world really in color or is that just a
function of how we perceive it? Are humans free to choose our actions or is everything
predetermined?
The central question of metaphysics is “How do I know that the real world
resembles the world I perceive.” Look at a chair. What do you see? A chair. (Deep, I
know. This is philosophy.) So, if one were to ask you if there really was a chair in front of
you, you would certainly say, “Of course, I see that chair.” The question is, “Where is
your vision of the chair?” It isn’t out there in the world. It is in your mind. The central
question of metaphysics is “What justifies your move from the vision in your mind to a
reality outside of your mind?” How do you know the world as you perceive it is the real
world?
Immanuel Kant called the pictures in your mind the phenomena and the things
in the real world outside of your mind the noumena. To use this new terminology, the
central question of metaphysics is “How do we know that the noumena resembles the
phenomena?”
You perceive things in your dreams, when you imagine, or when you have
hallucinations. In these cases, there are phenomena – you do have images in your mind
– but in these cases there is no reality to them. These images in the mind do not connect
to anything outside of the mind. So, how do you know that the images in your mind do
connect to something outside of your mind when you are perceiving normally?
You have experiences. That much you know. And if you have experiences, then
you must exist. This is the point of René Descartes’ famous dictum “I think, therefore I
am.” Descartes was trying to figure out if there was anything at all he could know with
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absolute certainty, anything he could not possibly doubt. The one thing he realized was
absolutely certain was the metaphysical claim that “I exist.” How do you know this? Try
to doubt it. Who is doubting this? I am. So, you must exist. To doubt is to think. To think
is to do. And you cannot have doing without a doer.
But what kind of thing are you? Not the full you. All Descartes has given you is
that you know you are because you act, you think. But thinking only requires a mind. So,
all you know is that you exist as a thing that thinks, a disembodied floating thinking
thing.
What about your body? Can we get there? Kant says we can’t (or “Can’t says we
Kant,” one of the two). He argues that this is where the metaphysical questioning has to
end. Try to go further and you run into contradictions.
But other philosophers disagree. (Yeah, surprising, I know.) Other philosophers
have argued that we do know we have a body separate from the mind. Not only is it
separate, it is a completely different kind of thing. Metaphysical dualism is the view
that the world is made up of two kinds of completely different sorts of basic substance:
mind or soul and body. Picture in your mind a burrito. Got it? Is it real? Yes and no. The
idea is a real idea, but it is not a physical burrito. The idea is mind stuff where a physical
burrito would be body stuff.
Metaphysical dualism is the common sense ontology. There are two kinds of
things and humans are lucky to be comprised of both mind and body. The big problem
with this common sense view is “the problem of interaction.” If mind and body are
different kinds of things, they should not be able to affect one another. To move a chair,
you have to push it. Physical action requires a physical force. You cannot move the chair
by thinking at it. Yet, that seems to be what happens when you decide to raise your
hand. The desire in your mind causes a physical occurrence. How does that happen?
How does a mind, something without size, shape, or mass move something like your
arm that has size, shape, and mass? In the other direction, what happens when you stub
your toe? It hurts. There was a body to body interaction when your toe hit the chair leg,
but how does a body to body interaction give rise to a mental state, pain? How could a
purely material interaction cause a mind event? If you want to be a dualist – and lots of
people do – then you need a good answer to this question.
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But there aren’t any universally accepted good answers. So, many philosophers
give up the common sense ontology of dualism. Metaphysical monism is the view
that there is only one sort of substance.
Metaphysical monism comes in two varieties. Materialism is the view that the
only sort of substance in reality is body, matter, physical stuff. If you think that all that
exists are atoms, then you are a materialist. The difficult question for materialists is
understanding consciousness, the nature of mind. It is demonstrable that there is a
correlation between brain states and mind states. When you stub your toe, there is a
portion of the brain that lights up. That section only lights up when your toe is in pain.
The excited state of the brain, with certain neurons firing and certain neurochemicals
released is the brain state. The experienced pain, the ouchie, is the mind state. These are
correlated. There is no doubt that they always appear at the same time. But they
certainly seem like different sorts of things. Materialists have to contend that either the
brain state is the same exact thing as the mind state or that the mind state is somehow
emerges from the brain state. Many philosophers hold this view and are working on this
project.
The other sort of metaphysical monism is idealism, the view that there is no
matter only mind. Some idealists argue that there is only one mind – the mind of God –
and everything is some aspect of it. Others argue that there are many minds all having
their own experiences and what the philosopher needs to do is to understand the nature
of these experiences and what makes them up. Since Kant called these internal
experiences “phenomena,” the philosophical movement that takes the central project of
metaphysics as trying to make sense of the nature of these phenomena is called
phenomenology.
This part of metaphysics we’ve been discussing, ontology, is figuring out the
building blocks of reality. But another part tries to understand the nature of the stuff we
all acknowledge exists. Many metaphysicians live for categories. They want to be able to
differentiate the stuff that exists into distinct classes. That means coming up with
criteria that distinguish one group of things from another. Some of these groups are
going to be natural kinds, that is, groups of things in nature that belong together.
Species, for example, are natural kind terms. A person and a box turtle belong to
different natural groups. Artificial kinds are coherent groups of created things. To say
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that there is a difference between one kind of thing and another is to draw a
distinction. Drawing distinctions is a major move in philosophy because it allows you
to explain why different things should be treated differently.
Drawing distinctions requires setting out conditions. Conditions come in two
important types. Necessary conditions are those properties that something must
have to be a member of the group. Having a pulse is a necessary condition for being a
living human. No pulse, not a living human. A pulse is necessary, that is, it is needed.
Sufficient conditions are the properties that by themselves are enough to
grant you membership in the group. Inheriting ten million dollars is sufficient to make
someone a millionaire. By itself, that’ll do it. It is sufficient, that is, enough, to become a
millionaire even though it is not necessary – you could win the lottery or build a
company that you sell for over a million dollars.
Sufficient conditions are by themselves enough to put you in the group, although
they are not the only way. Necessary conditions are needed to get in the group,
everything in the group must have them, but they are not by themselves enough to be
included in the group. It is a needed part, but not all you need.
When you have a set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient, we call that a
definition. Definitions completely describe all and only the properties that makes
something a member of the group. Notice that this is different from a dictionary
definition. A dictionary definition is a description of how people ordinarily use a word in
normal conversation. A philosophical definition is something more rigorous. Dictionary
definitions are the result of lexicographers studying how the language is spoken and
documenting that. Philosophical definitions are the result of philosophers trying to
come up with clear, rigorous accounts that draw absolute lines, even if most people use
the word differently (or, as philosophers call it, “wrong”).
In philosophy, a proposed definition is called a theory. We test theories against
the world. If someone has a theory, it could go wrong in two ways. Their conditions
might be too narrow, that is, there might be things that belong in the group that do
not satisfy their conditions. Consider the classical definition of humans as “featherless
bipeds,” that is, to be human is to have two feet and no feathers. If someone loses a leg
in an accident, that person is still human, but does not satisfy the conditions.
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“Featherless biped” is therefore too narrow of a theory to be a legitimate definition of
the group “human.”
Alternatively, a theory can be too broad, that is, there are things that satisfy the
conditions, but do not belong in the group. If I tried to define the notion of a chair as a
thing people sit on, this would be too broad. We sit on things that are not chairs. We sit
on the floor. The floor is not a chair. I would need additional necessary conditions to
narrow down the group of things to have a successful definition.
In this part of metaphysics, the goal is to come up with a theory of some concept
that is not too broad and is not too narrow. When you have that, you have a definition.
We will look at attempts by philosophers to define the concept of humor. What is it for
something to be an act of humor? What are the essential characteristics? Can there be a
definition? Some argue yes, some argue no. Let’s see the grounds on which these cases
are made.
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Why You’re Not Worthy: The Superiority Theory of Humor
Sophia Stone

There are few theorists of humor today who hold the view that whenever we
laugh at someone or something, it is because we feel superior to the person or situation
who is the target of the joke or humorous narrative. But people are stupid and of course
we laugh at their stupidity; in doing so we elevate ourselves, if even a little, in our
laughter. The superiority theorist of humor would argue that we laugh precisely because
we recognize the stupidity or even the incongruity of the situation and we have this
sudden “vainglory” as Thomas Hobbes famously described it—that feeling of
confirmation that we are in some sense better than the target or butt of the joke. Plato
describes it as a sudden pleasure and pain in the soul, these mixed feelings are due to
the malicious person’s pleasure at the misfortunes of his neighbor. The nature of the
laughable, according to Plato’s Socrates in the Philebus, then, is about laughing at the
misfortunes of others, rightly rejoicing about the evils that happen to the enemy and
unjustly laughing at the bad things that happen to our friends. Of course, one could very
well argue that not all laughter can be said to be caused by feelings of superiority. No
right-minded philosopher of humor would reduce all the various kinds of humor and
causes of laughing to a single mechanism, though I will make a feeble attempt at the end
of the chapter.
First, we’ll go through some examples for illustration and analysis of when we do
laugh out of feelings of superiority or sudden vainglory. Then we’ll address some current
objections to the theory and how these objections are misguided. Finally, we’ll end with
being totally convinced that the Superiority Theory of Humor is the superior theory and
why it is the favorite whipping boy of all other theories.
Let’s begin with our examples. Think about when Sacha Baron Cohen, disguised
as a bluegrass artist, performed a racist singalong at a right-wing militia rally, the
“March of our rights 3” in Olympia, Washington in the summer of 2020. According to
Rolling Stone Magazine, an analysis of one of the videos from the rally shows Baron
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Cohen singing the offensive racist lyrics, apparently having the audience gleefully
joining in:
Obama, what we gonna do? Inject him with the Wuhan flu. Hillary Clinton, what
we gonna do? Lock her up like we used to do. Fauci don’t know his head from his
ass. He must be smoking grass. I ain’t lying, it ain’t no jokes. Corona is a liberal
hoax. Dr. Fauci, what we gonna do? Inject him with the Wuhan flu. WHO, what
we gonna do? Chop’em up like the Saudis do. (Rolling Stone Magazine Online,
June 28, 2020)
You can choose any theory you want to analyze the humor in the prank but it is only the
superiority theory of humor that could adequately and sufficiently explain why the
Three Percenters laughingly, gleefully sang along and why, in turn, those of us who are
not of the militia ilk, also laughed. While we are laughing because of different targets we
are nonetheless laughing for the same reason: that feeling of superiority we have over a
target whose views we oppose. Baron Cohen’s song is rather simple yet brilliant. His
choice of ill-formed grammar “gonna do”, “ain’t no jokes”, “chop’em up” speaks to the
anti-intellectualist, anti-expert stance that seems to compliment the anti-government
and Second Amendment gun loving worshippers. A clear disregard for grammatical
rules signposts to the audience a clear disregard and a (perceived) disregard for political
correctness and cosmopolitanism. The participants gleefully sang along because Obama
is the first black president because they agree that Hillary Clinton should be locked up,
because they disagree with Dr. Fauci’s mask-wearing and social distancing, because they
do think that the numbers reporting illness and death in America is a liberal hoax to
discredit President Trump so that the Democrats can replace him in the next election.
All of these targets deserve to be laughed at because the Three Percenters believe they
are politically and morally superior to these targets. And these white participants
clinging to their values and perceived moral and political superiority as they laugh and
sing to these lyrics that Baron Cohen has masterfully constructed to play both sides, is
also very funny to liberals. The cosmopolitan liberals who tend to be over educated and
over read, the deniers of liberal-bias in academia, laugh at the laughers and those that
joined in the singalong. They laugh because the singalong confirms the belief that the
racist, pro-white, pro-America, anti-expert, anti-intellectualist ideologies infecting
America is precisely what is wrong with America, further degrading democracy and
contributing to the social and racial inequalities that are entrenched in every aspect of
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society. This white ideology necessarily is inferior to an all-inclusive ideology and it is
the feeling of superiority to this white ideology, the feeling of superiority to the Three
Percenters participating in the singalong, that cause the liberal to laugh. As you can see,
laughter is aggression in the theory of superiority of humor. There is no room for
harmless entertainment.
Even in cases where one might find apolitical, entertainment for entertainment’s
sake, there will still be laughter caused out of feelings of superiority. Jerry Seinfeld is a
comedian who is known for clean, apolitical and non-racist humor, but if we examine
his targets, which are mostly stupidity and ignorance, (stupidity distinguished from
ignorance in that stupidity is a qualitative state of the mind and ignorance is the lack of
knowing in the mind), we’ll see that it is mostly educated audiences who find him funny
and they laugh because of their intellectually superior position to the target of Seinfeld’s
jokes.
I got married late in life, I was forty-five. I had some issues. Was enjoying those
issues quite a bit as I recall. When I was single, I had married friends and I would
not visit their homes. I found their lives to be pathetic and depressing. Now that I
am married, I have no single friends. I find their lives to be meaningless and
trivial experiences. In both cases I believe I was correct. Whichever side of
marriage you are on you don’t get what the other people are doing. I can’t hang
out with single guys. You don’t have a wife; we have nothing to talk about. You
have a girlfriend? That’s whiffle ball, my friend. You’re playing paintball war
while I’m in Afghanistan with real loaded weapons. Married guys play with full
clips and live rounds. This is not a drill. Single guy is riding on a merry go round
blowing on a pinwheel. I’m driving a truck full of nitro driving down a dirt road.
(Netflix is a Joke, published May 5, 2020)
It is important to note here that not everyone will find Jerry Seinfeld’s bit funny because
they in fact, feel inferior. Undoubtedly there will be single men in the audience who are
not single by choice but single by happenstance. Perhaps a man is single because he is
down on his luck, unable to find a job or is working at a low wage and can barely afford
rent. He may be unattractive or without style or under or over weight, and because of
these temporary conditions, he may find that his life is filled with trivial and
meaningless experiences. Here is a case where it is not funny because it is true. Another
way to put it, is that the single man may identify with the target of the humor and
cannot laugh, and therefore would not find the difference that Jerry Seinfeld is making
between single and married men, funny. Seinfeld admits that he is correct in both ways,
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the first he was correct when he was single thinking that being married was pathetic and
depressing and he was correct when he was married thinking that being single was a life
filled with meaningless and trivial experiences. In both cases, he admits, in a way, to
being superior to the other side. The audience laughs at their feelings of superiority to
Seinfeld’s disclosure of contradiction, showing his ignorance of being a hypocrite.
In their book Inside Jokes, Hurley, Dennett and Adams suggest that the
Superiority Theory is perhaps the second most popular, the second most used theory of
humor because much humor is about debasing one’s opponent. They are right that there
are instances of humor, such as those enjoyed by infants and toddlers that do not fit
within a superiority theory of humor. But this is not a reason to throw the bath water out
with the baby. Let’s keep the bath water. Their critique is that the Superiority Theory
lacks a mechanism that explains why we laugh and they give four criteria that a
Superiority Theory of Humor would need to meet in order to be a viable, legitimate and
convincing theory. But the mechanism is quite simple for why we laugh, it is that
momentary elevation in ourselves at the target of our laughter. But to Hurley, Dennett
and Adams, this is not enough. They argue that there are still four points of explanation
needed for why we laugh:
How we come to the realization that someone or something is lesser in some way.
How we distinguish the humorous instances of these value comparisons from the
others.
What purpose is served by our normal enjoyment of such discriminations.
What purpose is served by communicating this through laughter. (p.58)
This is a common method of criticism new theorists of humor employ to serve their own
theory. Old theory x does not explain y, therefore, x is invalid. New theory explains y
and therefore is better than x. Adopt new theory. The first two of these explanations we
don’t need for the Superiority Theory of Humor. The second two can easily be explained
by the theory. However, while it is true that the Superiority Theory doesn’t explain how
we know our biases and it doesn’t explain how we distinguish the value comparisons
from other non-humorous instances. We don’t actually need these for the Superiority
Theory of humor to be convincing. I’ll argue why this is so.
The first criterion requires that the person laughing can explain why they feel
superior or why they think that the target of laughter is inferior. But humor is
instantaneous, there is not a single reflective moment, a supervening meta-awareness
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on why something is funny, when we laugh because something is funny. Can you even
imagine what that would even look like? You must say why you are laughing and
report all of your social and political and moral biases in order to legitimize your
laughter, before you laugh. No. That’s silly. The realization that we have a bias or that
we are superior, comes *after* we laugh, if ever at all, when we reflect about why we
laughed. And likely we are wrong or mistaken. Many people would deny that they are
racist or sexist or hold some other unpalatable view while all the while holding those
views. Let’s take the following joke for example:
How do you get Martha Stewart to cry? You masturbate in front of her and
then you wipe your dick on her curtains.
If the superiority theory is true, then men and women will laugh for different reasons,
different targets of inferiority. The men may laugh at the inferiority of the man who
masturbates publicly and not privately. The women may laugh at the proper decorum
Martha Stewart displays with meticulous attention to home improvement, and the
working woman who is an academic who has no time to emboss her own curtains (nor
has any interest in doing so) may laugh disproportionately to the stay at home woman
who enjoys curtain work. There are some who won’t even think that the joke is funny,
offended by the raunchiness of the joke, and some will laugh at those prudish folks, too.
Joiners of the singalong at the Three Percenters rally weren’t thinking or reflecting at all
as they were laughing and singing, because if they had, they would have discovered that
they, in fact, were the joke. The sentence, “It ain’t no jokes, Corona is a liberal hoax” is
so outrageous that anyone stating it, especially singing it on stage, couldn’t be serious:
it’s funny because it’s true that it is not true. The failure to realize that the Three
Percenters themselves were part of the joke, evidenced by their joining in the singalong,
reveals ignorance and perhaps stupidity on their part, which of course, elevates feelings
of superiority in everyone else watching the event. In fact, one need not have a liberal
bias to find Sacha Baron Cohen’s prank funny, one just needs to tap into one’s own
intellectual superiority to laugh.
The second criterion is also bogus and related to the reason why we rejected the
first criterion, because not everyone laughs at the same thing for the same reason as not
everyone shares the same targets of inferiority. There are just as many reasons for why
35

we laugh as why we don’t laugh, that ‘many’ being uncountable. If superiority theory
were true, then according to Hurley, Dennett and Adam’s second criterion, whenever we
felt superior to a target, we’d laugh, but because our experience shows that we don’t
always laugh when feeling superior, the theory needs to explain the difference for when
we do laugh and when we don’t laugh. But we could not laugh out of dissidence, or that
we are too tired or annoyed or that it just wasn’t funny, such as a poorly formed joke. If
we go back to Plato’s description of the ridiculous, mere feelings of intellectual or moral
superiority are not enough, our target needs to do something stupid, something contrary
to his own good, for us to laugh. And it is only those who are weaker than us that we
should laugh at. If our enemy is strong and holds power over us and does something
stupid, Socrates says we should fear for our lives.
The last two criteria, that the theory doesn’t articulate the purpose of enjoyment
in such discriminations, nor the purpose of communicating this pleasure to others, were
actually answered by Aristotle in his Poetics. Keep in mind that the name humor didn’t
arise in our understanding as it related to the comic until after the Enlightenment, and
so whenever Aristotle is discussing comedy, we need to interpret the comic as part of
humor, recognizing that today we treat them separately. Both purposes lie in the art or
technē, of humor, that comedy is an art of imitation, where art imitates life. Because
imitation is one of two causes that lie deep within our nature to create, and we first learn
by imitation, the purpose of our enjoyment and the purpose of communicating this
pleasure to others for humor are one and the same: a social corrective. While tragedy
imitates men better than we are, comedy imitates men lesser than we are.
One of the reasons why the Superiority Theory is often mentioned in tomes about
humor is because it happens to be the oldest articulated theory explaining why we laugh
in western thought. Any theorist writing about humor must include a discussion of the
Superiority Theory, hence the reason it is the most favored whipping boy of all other
theorists of humor. We could argue that Plato was not articulating a theory of humor but
simply the nature for why we laugh in the Philebus. We could argue that Aristotle was
articulating a theory of art, for which comedy is a species, and what he says about
comedy we cannot apply to humor. Nonetheless, even if we agreed that the first
articulation of the Superiority Theory is to be found in Hobbes, it is still the first theory
of humor in western thought. That sudden feeling of vainglory arising in us and causes
36

us to laugh may simply be indicative of an intellectual superiority to the target and
which may or may not come with additional feelings of moral, political or social
superiority. If we agree that all humor requires some cognitive recognition, then it is
easy to say that all humor includes some kind of identification with intellectual
superiority to find the humor funny.
The Superiority Theory has one thing going for it that the other theories don’t.
Not only can it explain why people can laugh at the same event but for different reasons
(i.e., they are laughing at different targets they feel superior to) it can also explain why
some people laugh and some people don’t at the same event. If the person identifies
with the target and feels lowly in response to the ridicule, they may cognitively
understand why others find the humor funny but nonetheless they will not, taking
offense at the joke or the humorous situation: “you shouldn’t laugh at that.” “Yes, but
you saying that is pretty funny.” “F@%# off.”
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A Spoonful of Sugar Makes the Misery Go Down: The Relief Theory of
Humor
Vanessa Voss

Who loves the game Cards Against Humanity? I think I’m going to play a few
rounds right now. I will be playing alone since Covid-19 is currently destroying my city.1
I draw a black card and a white card from the box. Black set-up card: “What brought the
orgy to a grinding halt?” I draw a few white cards from the deck and decide on this
answer: “Intimacy problems.” I draw another set of cards and do the same. “What left
this stain on my couch?” Answer? “A low standard of living.”
I laugh with delight. I then look at my old couch: it is broken, stained, old, and
worn. I’d like to buy a new couch, but I don’t have the kind of income that allows a
person to buy a new couch every 20 years. I also reflect on the fact that I live alone due
to my severe problems with intimacy. Normally, my empty bank account and my fear of
Match.com brings tears of sadness, not tears from laughter. What could possibly be
going on here?
In this chapter, we will explore just what could be going on here by taking a tour
through the Relief Theory of Humor. First, I will present and explain the Relief Theory
of Humor. Then, the main criticisms of the theory will be examined.
The Relief Theory Explained
The first thorough formulation of the Relief Theory of Humor was put forth by
the philosopher and sociologist, Herbert Spencer, in his essay “The Physiology of
Humor.” Spencer was inspired to create a better explanation of humor after reading
Alexander Bain’s criticism of the Incongruity Theory of Humor in Emotions and the
Will. For Spencer, though, his interests landed predominately on the physical act of
laughing itself; he desired a more physiological explanation of laughter. While he did
not leave out the content-based aspects of humor, his main focus was on the bodily
aspects of it.2 Spencer’s idea, which he called the Relief Theory, held that laughter, when

1
2

No, I haven’t started playing the game yet; my city is actually falling apart as I write.
Freud would later expand in more depth on the mental machinations of humor
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occurring in a humorous setting, was a release of the tension of emotion, or the release
of energy created by that tension. Spencer linked the action of laughing and the
behaviors accompanying laughter (for example, the contortion of the face, the
movement of the body) with his “hydraulic” theory of nervous energy. The “hydraulic”
theory is a physiological model that describes the human body like a system under
pressure, using the analogy of fluid, in which the fluid builds up pressure in the body.
The “fluid”, in the case of laughter, is the built-up nervous energy releasing. Like water
behind a dam, some of it needs to be released in order to save ourselves (or the dam).
This is what the act of laughing can do; it can release a healthy amount of nervous
energy to avoid disaster. This is also why The Relief Theory of Humor is also sometimes
called the Release Theory. Spencer says that when some mental disturbance or agitation
occurs, that energy “must discharge itself” in some way or another to bring your
physiological system to harmonize once more (Spencer, 461).
What could be the cause of this agitation or disturbance? To illustrate what he
means, Spencer gives the (humorous) example of a goat walking onto a theater stage
during a love scene. Picture it: you are watching a play about a pair of tragic lovers, say,
Heloise and Abelard. In this scene, the lovers, who have not seen each other for many
years, have a chance meeting in Paris. We, the audience, have such strong feelings at the
sight of their reunion.3 Perhaps we already know that this chance meeting will be their
last meeting, so we feel sorrow for them, but joy for them since they have this one
moment together. As these emotions overwhelm us, Spencer encourages us to imagine
that at this same time of great passion on the stage, a young goat struts out
unexpectedly. While on the stage, the goat trots up to Abelard and sniffs him, perhaps in
the crotch or on his behind. Spencer points out that a large “mass of emotions” has been
created in us, the audience, during this play, and that our “nervous system was in a state
of tension” while we anticipated the fate of the poor lovers. But now, through this little
butt-sniffing goat, a new “channel” of expression is open where the other is closed (the
channel of crying, wailing, lamenting). This new channel must expel the nervous energy,
but in this particular way: “half-convulsive actions we term laughter (Spencer, 461).”

3

Unless you are a sociopath.
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The father of modern psychology, Sigmund Freud, went on to more fully develop
the Relief Theory of humor. The starting point for any theory involving a Freudian
explanation of a phenomenon must start with a discussion of his theory of the
unconscious.4 First, we must familiarize ourselves with what the unconscious mind is.
Freud defines the unconscious in his work, New Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis, as “any mental process the existence of which we are obliged to
assume- because, for instance, we infer it in some way from its effects- but of which we
are not directly aware (194).” There are many things that bombard our daily lives: too
much information, fears, sex, insecurities, death: all the basic building blocks of modern
society. The conscious mind either cannot hold or cannot bear all the information and
stress, so through the act of repression, drains itself of the traumatic and difficult
materials. Freud defines “the essence of repression” as “the function of rejecting and
keeping something out of consciousness,” as it is too much for the conscious mind to
attend to and contend with (Freud, 158). This is a process that is happening behind the
scenes; the conscious mind is not aware when repression is taking place.5 Much like
Spencer thought the body could fill with “nervous energy” and need to be drained, Freud
argued that the content of everyday life filled up our mind with too much material and
needed a dumping ground. Repression is the garbage truck and the unconscious mind is
the landfill. Beep beep.
Why does this process need to occur? This links to Freud’s notion of the Pleasure
Principle. The Pleasure Principle is not as sexy as it sounds. It can be thought of as the
motivation for avoidance of pain or for the purposes of pain reduction. Freud writes,
“[t]he Pleasure-Pain Principle is brought into action in response to the danger signal
and plays a part in repression (Freud, 144).” Many jokes, being of a hostile, sexual, or
related to highly-emotionally charged issues, act as a way to find pleasure in things we
are not supposed to find joyful, such as a broken heart, death, sexual deviance, or
violence. Freud gives examples of this in his writing, but in this chapter, I will provide
my own example drawn from the Hollywood comedy canon. Here is an example of a
moment that should lead to heart-break (and thus, our empathy) for the character Lloyd
4

For brevity’s sake, I will only be expanding on ideas in Freud that a relevant to his theory of jokes.
Suppression, though, is when the conscious mind actively and knowingly seeks to hide unwanted materials, such
as Homer Simpson when he tries to “think unsexy thoughts” to deal with his attraction to a new co-worker, Mindy.
5
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Christmas in the film Dumb and Dumber. Lloyd has driven across the country to win
over the love of his life, Mary Swanson. When he finally has the opportunity near the
end of the film to express his love to her, this exchange occurs:
Lloyd: I want to ask you a question, straight out, flat out, and I want you to give
me the honest answer. What do you think the chances are of a guy like you and a
girl like me ending up together?
Mary: Well Lloyd, that's difficult to say. We really don't...
Lloyd: Hit me with it! Just give it to me straight! I came a long way just to see you
Mary, just... The least you can do is level with me. What are my chances?
Mary: Not good.
Lloyd: [he gulps, his mouth twitching] You mean, not good like one out of a
hundred?
Mary: I'd say more like one out of a million.
Lloyd: [long pause while he processes what he's heard] So you're telling me
there's a chance. YEAH!
The whole film has been leading up to this grand romantic moment. Sure, the character
of Lloyd (and his equally thick-headed friend, Harry) has shown us he lacks any
common sense or wisdom, and the film gives no indication that Lloyd might win Mary
over, but when Lloyd starts to profess his love, we go along with his hope for
reciprocation and feel the suspense of her possibly saying yes to him.6 When Mary says
there is basically no chance of her and Lloyd being together, the audience should expect
the feeling of disappointment and pity for Lloyd. For all his faults, he has tried his best
to win her over, and this is disheartening: when love is not reciprocated, we feel sadness.
But the tragedy will be turned into comedy, since Freud reasoned that we have a
motivation to avoid pain, one way can avoid it is through discharging the negative pain
through humor. When Lloyd’s response to Mary is one of hope and optimism (and
riddled with a complete misunderstanding of basic probability), we are given a chance to

6

The fact that the writers gave the female love interest the first name of Mary and the comic protagonist the last
name Christmas really makes the audience wonder if she will become Mary Christmas. Very clever (or hostile), you
creative-types!
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release the painful feelings through laughter. We don’t have to pity Lloyd: instead we
can laugh at his stupidity7 and, perhaps, be elated that he is still happy regardless of the
bad news. While the Pleasure-Principle at once can repress painful materials that the
conscious mind can’t handle, it can also play a part in creating laughter in the face of
pain. Consider, also, how many times we have laughed when injuring ourselves.8
Popular Criticisms of the Relief Theory
The Relief Theory has many faults. In this section I will be focusing on three of
the major ones: its failure to account for differences in tensions and releases, its seeming
to fall back into the incongruity theory, and our updated science of psychology.
The Relief Theory does not give an adequate distinction between the comic
release and other releases of built up tension. One might build up physiological tension
during an intense, close-scoring Indiana vs Kentucky basketball game.9 When the
buzzer sounds, the tension will be released via tears and screaming of pain or tears and
screaming of joy. The score, much like the punchline, was uncertain and could be an
unexpected twist, such as when a 3-pointer is made at the end of the game. But the
response is not laughter. One might watch (with high emotion) a couple taking their
wedding vows. We expect to hear both say, “I do.” But our hopes might suddenly be
dashed when the groom says, “I’m sorry, I can’t,” and leaves the chapel. We gasp, and
perhaps, we cry.
In both instances, the release of certain tension happens, and it is from some
unexpected occurrence or event, much like a punchline. But we do not respond with
laughter. The Relief Theory has a difficult time clearly demarcating what causes laughter
and what causes something else, such as shock, sadness, cheer, etc. And when the Relief
Theory explains what that demarcation is, it tends to sound as if it is in support of the
Incongruity Theory of Humor. Freud does try to categorize comic and humorous
phenomena and distinguish various responses to events, but in the end, Freud either
does not make a case for all comedic materials being releases of repressed nervous

7

There’s that hostility again.
There are reasons for us wanting to feel the pleasure of tragic drama as well which Freud discusses. See Heinz
Politzer’s book, Freud and Tragedy.
9 GO HOOSIERS!!
8
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energy or falls back on some sort of explanation via incongruity. Now isn’t that
unexpected?
The Relief Theory of Humor falls back on the very theory it was attempting to
over-throw when it tries to show the difference in unexpected events and our responses
to them, from demarcating the comic from the tragic (and others). Spencer spoke of
laughter arising from “descending incongruity” in which something elevated is replaced
by something trivial (such as a sincere romance replaced by a stray goat). This is the
difference in a tragedy and a comedy, for a tragedy could be said to be an “ascending
incongruity,” much in line with Aristotle’s idea of a noble person falling from their
elevated rank. But the fact that the Relief Theory relies on this incongruity to distinguish
the comic from other responses is a flaw in the theory itself. Though one might defend
the theory by saying that this theory only shows how laughter comes forth and why it
needs to be produced, but the theory does not intend to show how it is summoned from
the content of the world. At best, it is an incomplete theory at this point.
This leads us into the final criticism we will cover in this chapter, as the final
criticism has to do with the concern about how and why the laughter is produced: the
hydraulic model and ultimately Freud’s theory of the unconscious itself. There is no
model of emotions and the body that is seriously used in the medical and psychological
fields today that are in line with the hydraulic model. It has been replaced by updated
and scientifically validated systems. Spencer and Freud’s models of physiology and
psychology have been replaced with medical explanations that are backed with empirical
evidence. In writing on the Relief Theory of Humor, John Morell writes,
…we can note that today almost no scholar in philosophy or psychology explains
laughter or humor as a process of releasing pent-up nervous energy. There is, of
course, a connection between laughter and the expenditure of energy. Hearty
laughter involves many muscle groups and several areas of the nervous system.
Laughing hard gives our lungs a workout, too, as we take in far more oxygen than
usual. But few contemporary scholars defend the claims of Spencer and Freud
that the energy expended in laughter is the energy of feeling emotions, the energy
of repressing emotions, or the energy of thinking, which have built up and require
venting.
Freud’s theory of the functions of the conscious and unconscious mind is now famously
unscientific and lacking in credible evidence. In the same way that today we do not read
Marxism as a scientific theory, psychoanalysis as Freud saw it is no longer considered to
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be backed by truly testable and, therefore, falsifiable evidence. 10 The Relief Theory fails
because it’s foundation on the hydraulic model has failed.
Conclusion
The Relief Theory of Humor has appeal in a theory that can address why taboo subjects
tend to make the best subjects for humor and why we laugh sometimes when we are
nervous or feel pain: there is energy to discharge. But the flaws in the theory are serious
and hard to overcome due to the poor models it is based on.
Perhaps the Relief Theory of Humor can re-invent itself as a theory by attaching
itself to an evolutionary explanation of humor.11 For the Relief Theory to be a viable
model of humor, it must first update the base of its claims with one based by modern
day scientific research, and this is something evolutionary explanations of humor may
be able to offer. But, if it continues to cling to the hydraulic model of the body or Freud’s
theory of the unconscious, it is doomed to failure. Much like my finances and love life.
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Got IT?: Introducing Incongruity Theory
Michael K. Cundall, Jr.

So far, you’ve read about some other attempts to explain the cognitive/mental
processes behind the phenomenon of humor. Most texts will package the three main
theories of humor comprehension in a sort of triumvirate that includes the superiority,
release, and incongruity theories as the main contenders. These three theories have
been, in modern research and historically, the main candidates attempting to explain
what is necessary for us to find something funny. In this chapter we’ll cover the
incongruity theory.
Incongruity Theory Explained
In the most general sense, the Incongruity Theory states that in order for
something to be found funny or humorous, one needs to perceive a sort of incongruity.
What’s an incongruity? Well that’s the big question and one that occupies and vexes
many researchers (this author included). In the simplest and most general way of
stating the idea, an incongruity is something that is unexpected, absurd, out of the
ordinary, strange, or bizarre. Ok, that wasn’t simple. I would have gone on, but you can
check out www.thesaurus.com if you want to find other synonyms for incongruity.
The Incongruity Theory (IT, hereafter) is the dominant theory used in modern
research to explain humorous things. It’s not without its issues or critics. However, it is
safe to say that IT is accepted by most researchers as the most accurate and likely true
approach to explaining humor. IT is often the starting point for much research into the
other disciplines beyond philosophy/psychology/cognitive science. For example, current
neuroscience indicates that the areas that support higher-level conceptual thought, are
involved in humor processing. That we see areas of the brain involved in higher level
cognition and conceptual thought involved in humor behavior supports IT’s claim that
humor is a conceptually based activity that involve incongruity processing.
Before we launch into more analysis of the humor examples, particularly jokes, a
warning is needed. Analysis of any joke or bit of humor generally, if not nearly always,
makes the jokes not funny. A quote from E.B. White is clear on this, in a humorous, IT
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supporting way. “Explaining a joke is like dissecting a frog. You understand it better but
the frog dies in the process.” The incongruity is to be found in comparing the feeling one
has at the end of the joke analysis to death. I hope that’s not the case below, but you’ll
likely find the jokes less funny for the analysis.
It would do well to do a little more unpacking of terms like incongruity,
absurdity, unexpected, and bizarre. But basically, the kernel of the idea is that you
experience something that does not fit easily within the particular context. To use an
example from the movie Friday, there’s a scene where we enter into a local bodega (a
corner store) in a largely African American community and we are met with a sign that
proudly proclaims that the store is “Black Owned.” As the camera pans down, an Asian
man rises from below the counter. This juxtaposition of the Asian man coming from
under the counter, which supports the idea that he’s the owner, with the sign that
proclaims the establishment is black owned is perfect example of ideas or objects that
are incongruous with one another. One would have expected the store to be run by a
black man—that’s what the sign says—but the scene intimates that it’s not. This example
also helps us to see the “unexpected” nature of the incongruous. The presentation of the
sign primes us to think the store is owned, not by an Asian man, but a black person of
color. Good comedy works to create expectations and them frustrate or play with them
in such ways as to get the audience to find something funny or humorous. If you want to
find humor, look for ways that things don’t seem to fit together. Perhaps you fancy some
jumbo shrimp?
Bizarre or absurd as types of incongruity are a bit more difficult to describe as
they are, well, bizarre, but they are definitely further refinements, or subsets of the
incongruous. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the bizarre or absurd is with the
following joke.
How many surrealists does it take to change a lightbulb?
Purple fish!
This little joke is pretty good at being absurd. Who besides someone in a Monty Python
sketch would use a fish to change a lightbulb?! The joke uses the idea of a surrealist
(artists who tried to pair together ideas that were often extremely different) in order to
get the listener to be prepared for absurdities. A good example of surrealist absurdity
can be found in Salvador Dali’s painting, “The Persistence of Memory” in which we see
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clock faces melting like a rubber pancake. Clocks don’t melt like that. At least not the
clocks I know. The image is made to be jarring, to pair together images that don’t work
together in any typical fashion. Returning to the above joke, the answer of purple fish is
not relevant at all to the question. Did the punchline fail to add in the number of purple
fish needed? Even if one is familiar with the “lightbulb” form of joke, this particular one
works because the answer supplied is a non-answer. Just as the surrealists might have
liked. Hopefully you followed that. Explaining the absurd is a bit…absurd. It’s difficult to
try to make sense of nonsense.
Let’s continue using this approach of relying on jokes to clarify the IT; it’s a timehonored tradition in humor research. A fair warning is needed, as jokes are but a small
slice of the humor pie. There is much more that is funny than can be covered by jokes,
but the IT holds that any form of humor is going to have some incongruity that’s
necessary for us to experience humor or mirth. But as a tool for explicating humor
theories, jokes are compact, easily digestible, and thus make for useful examples.
One of simplest forms of humor in young children can be found when they
actively do something contrary to expectation or norm. For instance, my children loved
to take nursery rhymes that they knew well and then not say the expected words at some
point. My son used to change the last word of the first line of the famous “Twinkle,
Twinkle, Little Star” rhyme. “Twinkle, twinkle little star how I wonder what you…
rooster!” The substituted word would always change, but it was typically a noun of some
sort and often an animal. He would giggle with sheer delight. For some, this sort of play
with language shows that real incongruity-based humor has taken root.
Certainly children had laughed and giggled prior to language (laughter is
evidenced before language after all and is thus a deeper part of our evolutionary
history), but this active playing with language and expectations is a mature form of
humor, even if it’s seen as immature to the more advanced humor connoisseurs we all
find ourselves to be. There are a number of elements here that speak in support of IT.
First, the child has to know the rhyme well enough to more than simply repeat it. They
have to understand what the rhyme overall means. They also have to know the meanings
of other words so as to substitute the right sort of words. If my son had substituted an
adjective or conjunction it would have been odd. The noun work in a way other wordtypes likely wouldn’t. Children also have to realize that they are substituting and are
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essentially playing around with the structure of the rhyme. This play then leads to a
feeling of delight in the form of humor or mirth. The child will continue playing with
that rhyme substituting words here and there both with others and by themselves. They
never seem to tire of it. Even though the audience grows tired easily. If you’ve spent any
time around children when they find something funny, they will quickly wear it out. But
not for them.
How is this word play an incongruity? As I noted above, the child is playing
around with the expectation of the well-known lyric and substituting their own words.
Clearly, they understand about expectation and then are using the unexpected presence
of the new word to create humor. This is textbook IT. But this also shows how deeply
cognitive the act is. So far so good for IT.
Let’s look at a couple of jokes with varying levels of complexity.
Moving up the ladder of humorous complexity, let’s take a look at a couple of
knock-knock jokes.
Knock-knock?
Who’s there?
Hoo.
Hoo who (hoo)?
What are you, an owl?
Perhaps this isn’t a great joke, but it is a sort typically seen in children. Where’s the
incongruity? If you can figure it out, please skip the rest of this paragraph, but there may
be more incongruities than you initially think. The incongruity, the playing with
expectations as such, is that the second line of the joke is the listener and this query
made assumes the next answer will be a name not a sound. The joke teller does not do as
expected and supplies a clever homonym to ‘who’ in the sound hoo. The listener, in line
four, not really knowing if the term spoken earlier is ‘who’ or ‘hoo’, but likely assumes
the former, then follows along with the standard knock-knock joke format. The joke
teller then delightfully admonishes the implied silliness of the listener to have been
making owl noises rather than responding appropriately to the joke form. (I know, the
White’s frog has now totally expired) If you count them up, there are a number of
incongruities in play here. But whatever incongruity you focus on, the joke works on
48

frustrating or playing around with expectations. Whether you find the sly response of
the joker in setting up the listener to make a silly owl noise, or the taking advantage of
the form of the knock-knock joke to force the listener into the silliness, incongruity is at
work here through and through.
I would like to end with one of my favorite jokes from esteemed humor
researcher Victor Raskin.
What is the difference between a parrot?
None.
The right side is exactly the same as the left, especially the left.
If you can make sense of this joke, you’re way better than I clever reader. The whole joke
is layered with absurdities. It’s more a Zen koan or riddle than a joke. The initial
question is nonsensical. You don’t ask about the difference between a single thing;
comparison require two things. The question alone is utterly nonsensical. The response
of “none” both increases and diminishes your perplexity. The answer is in a real sense
spot on. It recognizes that you can’t find a difference between a thing and itself.
Comparison, as noted, requires two things. But then the coda of the joke, in attempting
to explain the answer muddies the conceptual space. The listener has to figure out how
one side can be “exactly” like the other, and “especially” so at that. This joke would have
found itself quite at home in some of Lewis Carroll’s works. The whole joke is just a
chain absurdities, one seemingly more absurd than the next. There’s nothing more to
get than the fact that it’s absurd. Personally, I find it delightful and love the example and
find it more and more humorous each time I experience it. But within me finding it
funnier with each exposure, opens an avenue of critique for IT. But before we move on
to critiques, let’s explore some other facts about humor that support the notion that
humor is a cognitive act that requires some form of perceived incongruity.
Think about what’s required for you to “get” a joke. You need to know something
about it. If I told you a joke where Etruscans were the main actors, you might not find it
funny.
How many Etruscans does it take to change a lightbulb?
None, they were dead before electricity was invented.
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High comedy this isn’t; it’s barely qualifies as a joke. But if you know nothing of the
Etruscans you couldn’t possibly make sense of it. In order to get whatever may be going
on in this poorly formed joke, you need to know that Etruscans were an ancient
civilization in Italy that was conquered by the Romans early on in the Roman Empire’s
history. Hence they were an ancient group and had never experienced a lightbulb.
More on Incongruity
In order for any two people to share a joke, it’s important that they share a
certain conceptual or knowledge base. If you’re not an English speaker knock-knock
jokes will go over your head. You need to know English to get the jokes. The lightbulb
joke about the surrealists works because the audience knows a little something about
what a surrealist is and then uses that knowledge to make sense of the absurd response.
You can perform this sort of analysis on most any of the jokes or humor you’ve
experienced. It’s also one of the reasons that humor doesn’t usually cross cultures. The
Friday bit about black owned-might not work as effectively in say mainland China, or
Tasmania. Humor typically requires more of a shared cultural and cognitive background
than other forms of entertainment.
Why does this support the IT? Because this obvious fact about humor shows how
much, cognitively speaking, is required of us when we experience and enjoy humor. It’s
not like a piece of music. Bach can please someone with no knowledge of classical music
or instruments. A beautiful piece of sculpture or statuary can do the same. This isn’t to
say that those forms of art are not complex, it’s just to highlight that humor is of a
different sort of experience; one that requires knowledge, expectation, and belief to
typically be experienced as such. IT needs cognition, belief, and expectation to work.
Without it, IT isn’t much. Even our vernacular “Get it?” question, indicates that one has
to understand the ideas involved to find humor.
Hopefully this tour has shown how and why IT is the leading candidate for
explaining humor perception. It fits with current scientific approaches, it conforms and
relates to our everyday experience of humor, and it’s also explanatory. This does not
mean that IT is not without its problems. It surely has some and we will briefly cover
those next.
What’s Ailing Incongruity?
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“It’s philosophy Mike, everybody’s wrong.” Those words came to me from one of
my dissertation advisors. Philosophers are a notoriously surly bunch—heck, even our
patron saint, Socrates, did his best to show everyone was wrong—and that landed him a
heaping glassful of hemlock juice, which isn’t too helpful if living is your goal. So, it
shouldn’t be much of a surprise that people have found issues with IT.
The main issue with IT is that not all incongruities we experience lead to humor.
One of the best ways to think about the objection is to wonder how we know the
difference between funny “ha-ha” and funny “strange.” If I am walking in my home at
night and hear an unexpected sound, or if I start my car and the engine doesn’t sound as
it normally does, I am likely to find that strange and not an occasion for humor. But if
you recall the definition of IT, it simply states that incongruities will be found funny.
Hence, one would predict that any experienced incongruity would produce humor. My
off-sounding engine does not produce a laugh. Hence we’ve found a counter-example to
the theory.
There have been a number of attempts to solve this issue with IT and they largely
make use of play to circumvent the problem. Roughly the general idea is this. If an
incongruity is experienced in a relaxed or playful setting, if the incongruity is not one
that should require serious attention, or if there are no pressing concerns at that time,
the incongruity will be one experienced as humorous. In general, all other things being
equal, if there’s no reason to worry about the incongruity, then laugh. This explains why
humor is found more in times of leisure and play than anywhere else. Another way to
think about this playful or non-serious approach to incongruity is to think about the
difference in a dead-pan performance versus a clown. Comedians who adopt a more
dead-pan style of presentation can leave their audiences confused. Audiences aren’t sure
if they’re supposed to laugh (here an indicator of humor) or not. The comedian isn’t
giving enough clues to indicate that this is supposed to be funny. More traditional
comedians with their exaggerated gesticulations or bombastic/exaggerated vocal
inflections help the audience understand that what is going on is supposed to be funny
and then allows us to experience the incongruity as funny. Here the audience is told that
the incongruities on offer are objects of humor, not concern. IT is refined by adding the
“play” qualification so as to help us know which incongruities are funny “ha-ha” rather
than funny “strange.”
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Another issue with IT comes from my continued delight at the parrot joke. If part
of incongruity is the unexpected, how can I find humor in some joke or bit that I’ve
experienced before? If you laugh at the same parts of movies that you’ve seen before,
then that incongruity can’t be unexpected. You know it’s coming. At first the incongruity
was unexpected, but now it can’t be. How do we explain the continued humor? Have a
shot at working that one out.
One of the more serious objections is that incongruity has nothing to do with
anything in humor. In fact, when you get a joke, so the objection goes, there is no
incongruity at all. The joke makes sense, if in a different or atypical way. In order to get
the joke you resolve the incongruity – it’s perfectly sensible. If the joke were truly
nonsensical, the response wouldn’t be humor, it would be confusion. When people write
jokes, or develop humor, they find ways to play with the concepts, but not so much as
make the incongruities completely nonsensical. If there was no way to link the
“incongruity” back to the set-up of the joke/humor, there would be no way to get it.
There would be nothing to get: just an absurd idea hanging out. The concepts involved
must be related in some way or else the audience will be confused. Confusion rarely
leads to humor. This objection, if true, radically undermines IT.
The IT is still the best working theory out there that has general acceptance.
There are problems with it, as there are with all theories. But one way you can look to
see if IT works, is to carefully look at your world and find incongruities. Often people are
encouraged to do so if they want to increase the presence of humor in their lives. This is
a practical application of the theory. I encourage you to try it, if only to raise the amount
of humor in your life.
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My, How Clever: Cleverness Theory
Steven Gimbel

Phlebitis. Not the word you expected this essay to begin with, is it? What is
phlebitis? It’s a medical condition in which a vein, usually in the leg, becomes inflamed.
It is very painful and what I am suffering from right now. Bet you are glad you’re not
me. Nah, I’m just playing. I don’t have phlebitis, but you probably do. It affects about
90% of students because of the hard-surfaced school chairs you are forced to sit in for
hours at a time, but you won’t feel the pain until later in life. Just kidding. You won’t get
phlebitis.
What a weird paragraph, huh? Was it funny? Funny-strange maybe, but not
funny-ha-ha. And that is exactly what is so philosophically interesting about it. You did
not expect to find a paragraph about phlebitis in a philosophy book – that’s counter to
all your expectations. It’s incongruous. At one point you thought I had a painfully
debilitating condition that you did not have. That made you sudden realize you were
superior to me. But then I told you I was just playing, only to then lie and tell you that
you would get it. But then I let you off the hook. What a relief. The weird, but not funny
first paragraph of this essay contains every single mechanism that the other humor
theories claim is the active ingredient in humor. Every single one. Yet, it was not funny.
My claim is not that there are not incongruity-based jokes – there are LOTS of
them. My claim is not that there are not humorous put-downs and insults that make you
feel superior to the person getting picked on. Some comedians made careers on such
jokes. My claim is not that humor never involves play. Of course, it does. My claim is not
that there is no build up and release in well-constructed jokes. Lots of them work in
exactly that way. But not all of them. There are plenty of examples of all of the cited
mechanisms that do generate humor, but also lots more that don’t. But if not every
incongruity, not every instance of superiority, not every bit of playfulness, not every
instance of relief causes humor, which ones do?
THAT is what I contend I have the answer to. It is the ones that are clever. My
humor theory is called the cleverness account and it contends that humor is any and all
intentional, conspicuous acts of playful cleverness. There are four components that,
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when you put them together, give you acts of humor. Let’s work through them one-byone.
To understand the importance of the intentional requirement, we need to begin
by distinguishing humorousness from funniness. These seem like synonyms, but they
aren’t. Something is funny if it gets a certain comically amused reaction from someone.
Good humor is usually funny, but not all funny things are humorous. The Russian leader
Mikhail Gorbachev had a discolored patch on his bald head. Suppose the patch had been
accidentally, but exactly in the shape of a human hand with an extended middle finger.
That would have been epically funny. But it would not have been humor because it just
happened. If it had been a tattoo – that would be humor. We may find a sunset over a
lake to be beautiful, but it is not a work of art. Art requires intentional creation and
humor is a form of art. Hence, it is not sufficient that something is found funny, it needs
to be intentionally constructed to be funny to be humor.
The second condition is conspicuousness. Conspicuous means obvious. By this, I
don’t mean that jokes don’t have an element of surprise or tension. Telegraphing a
punch line (having your audience see the funny part of where you are going before you
get there) can destroy a joke. The sense of conspicuous used here is that it is an act that
is seen or heard – or, in the case of some disgusting jokes, smelled. Jokes are artistic
acts and art requires an artist and an audience. A joke that is not recognized as a joke is
said not to “land,” that is, it goes over the audience’s head. The point of a joke or any
other humorous act is to land, is to be recognized as the humor act it is. Jokes are told to
be gotten.
The third element is that the act of humor is playful. By this, I mean something
different from the play theorists. I don’t mean jolly or lighthearted. I am using the term
“play” in the same sense that we do when we tell a child not to play with her food. To
play with your food is to use something for a purpose other than its intended purpose.
Eating a banana is not playing with it, but holding it up to your ear and pretending it is a
telephone is. (I guess for kids these days, you need to use a pop tart and not a banana for
that gag.) Humor requires manipulating something – an object, words, a situation – in a
way that makes them do something they don’t usually.
The final element is the most important. Humor is a display of cleverness. No
cleverness, no humor. What do we mean by the word “clever”? Clearly, it has something
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to do with thinking well or being smart or coming up with something new or seeing
things a different way or solving a problem. Being clever is a positive attribute that has
to do with using your brain. But there are lots of different ways to do that, so we need
our account of cleverness to be broad enough to contain them all. If you limit what it is
to be clever, then a clever person will show you how clever they are by being clever in a
way not accounted for by your account of “clever,” no matter how clever the limitation
is.
The inclusive notion we will use to account for our notion of cleverness rigorously
is that it demonstrates a cognitive virtue, in other words, it takes a way of thinking that
is helpful and desirable in real world situations – being well-read, being able to see
things from multiple perspectives, being a good problem-solver – and creates an artistic
context where it is not used for some helpful goal, but simply to be put on display in the
work of art that is the joke.
Put all four of those together and you get humor. Humor is an art form, meaning
that it is intentionally created and meant to be seen. But it is the art form where we take
something and playfully manipulate it in a fashion that displays cleverness, some
cognitive virtue that would be useful in real life, but just for laughs in the work of art
that is the joke, the pun, the visual gag, or whatever other humorous medium employed.
Does it work? Better than the others ones, I claim. Consider two examples, two
jokes.
Two old men are sitting on a park bench feeding the birds when one turns
to the other and says, “I know the name of every bird in this area.” The
other one says, “You know all of them?” “Yup,” the first guy says, “all of
them.” “How about that one?” the second man says pointing to a bird in a
tree. “The black one with red and yellow on the wing?” “That’s the one.
What is it called?” With great confidence, the first man replied, “Ralph.”
This is a joke that is based on an incongruity. When the first man says he knows the
name of every bird, we naturally think he means the scientific name of the species. What
he really means is the name which he uses to refer to them individually.
Let’s change the joke a bit.

55

Two old men are sitting on a park bench feeding the birds when one turns
to the other and says, “I know the name of every bird in this area.” The
other one says, “You know all of them?” “Yup,” the first guy says, “all of
them.” “How about that one?” the second man says pointing to a bird in a
tree. “The black one with red and yellow on the wing?” “That’s the one.
What is it called?” With great confidence, the first man replied, “That’s a
washing machine.”
Notice what happened in the change. We took out the name Ralph and
substituted a noun phrase that is not a name. This makes the first guy’s response even
more incongruous, even more unexpected, even more contrary to what we think is
coming. We increased the incongruity, but we didn’t increase the funniness. In fact, you
are probably thinking, “that’s not even a joke anymore.” Right. We removed the clever
part for something more incongruous. We increased what they say is the basis for jokes
and removed what I say is the basis for jokes. Look what happened. It stopped being a
joke. That seems to indicate that it is the cleverness and not the incongruity that is
responsible for the humor even in a joke where the cleverness turns on an incongruity.
Let’s do it again with a different mechanism.
My friend’s cooking is so bad, the flies pitched in to have the screen on the
kitchen window fixed.
That is a joke that is based on superiority. It is an insult joke based on a clever put down.
Now, let’s take out the cleverness, but ramp up the superiority.
My friend’s cooking is so bad that no one in the house will eat it, especially
after three people got food poisoning from it, vomited all night, and one of
them even had to go to the hospital to have his stomach pumped.
The second version clearly explains how bad the friend’s cooking is in a way that is
worse than the first. That means that he is even more inferior and thus you are even
more superior. But, again, more superiority does not translate into more humor. Quite
the opposite. Take out the cleverness and increase the superiority and what you are left
with isn’t even a joke.
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So, what does that tell us? It is certainly true that superiority, relief, and
incongruity are mechanisms on which jokes are constructed, but it is the clever use of
superiority, relief, and incongruity that make them acts of humor, not the superiority,
relief, and incongruity in themselves. Hence, when we are looking for the essential
property that makes an act into an act of humor, look for the cleverness. That is where it
resides.
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Epistemology
One of the early great names in philosophy was Socrates. He would spend his
days walking through classical Athens, especially the marketplace, the agora, asking
anyone who would engage with him one simple question, “Do you know anything?” If
someone asked you, what would you answer? Remember this is in the marketplace,
crowded with people who know you. The obvious thing to say is “Yes, of course Socrates,
I know something.” Socrates would then ask you what you knew and start asking
seemingly simple questions. The ultimate end (and this is what makes reading Plato’s
dialogues that chronicle these conversations fun) is that the person would always end up
contradicting themselves and making seem as if they didn’t know anything. Watching
people expose themselves as morons in front of everyone was the ancient Greek
equivalent of reality television.
So, do you know anything? How do you know you know it? What does it mean to
know something? If we don’t know anything, how would it be possible to know this?
These are what we in philosophy call epistemological questions. Epistemology is the
study of knowledge.
If you have learned anything about philosophy so far, you have anticipated the
obvious question. “So, what do you mean by knowledge?” For this, we standardly use
the definition given by Plato. Knowledge is true, justified belief. Knowledge therefore
has three parts.
First of all, to know something, you have to believe it. If you don’t believe that
cows can swim better than wildebeests, then you surely cannot be said to know it. To
believe a proposition is to assert its truth. If you don’t think something is true, then
there is no way you can be held to know it.
But knowledge is surely more than belief. We can believe false things. You may
have once believed that Santa Claus exists. You were wrong. You believed Santa was
real, but you did not know it because it is false. It can’t be known. So, we have a second
element necessary for knowledge – truth. To know something, you have to believe it and
it has to be true.
But that is not enough. You could believe it for the wrong reason and it might
accidentally be true. You might ask your friend where his car is. He says honestly, “It is
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in the parking lot right off campus.” You ask him why he believes this. He tells you
honestly that he had parked in the lot on campus, but during his class they came…aliens
from another galaxy. The mothership hovered over his car and they used their tractor
beam to pull it up and reverse engineer it. When they were done, they reassembled it –
didn’t fix the dent in the bumper – and went to put it back, but the lot had filled up. So,
they put it down in the lot right off campus.”
You look and it turns out that his car is in the other lot right off campus. But, it
wasn’t the aliens. It was his roommate who needed to run an errand and knew where he
left his keys. The roommate is lazy and the lot off campus is closer to their room, so
that’s why he parked it there.
So, your friend believed his car was in a different lot than the one he had parked
it in. And he was right. His belief was true. But did he know where his car was? No. He
didn’t have knowledge even though he had a true belief because it was accidentally true,
not true for the right reason. We need a third thing to have knowledge – belief, truth,
and justification. You have believe the true thing for the right kind of reason.
The obvious question is “what is the right kind of reason?” This is fundamental
question of epistemology. Traditionally, the answer was given in terms of reducibility to
undeniable first beliefs. We call this position foundationalism. The different kinds of
foundationalist views ascribe different sorts of basic, atomic truths.
Rationalism is the view that the starting place for all justified true belief is the
human mind itself. Reason justifies the fundamental truths. There are some beliefs that
are innate, inborn to the human mind. Just like when you buy a computer and the
operating system and certain programs are already loaded on it, it is the same with the
human mind. It comes with certain pre-existing beliefs.
Rationalists will often point to mathematical propositions. Consider one of
Euclid’s axioms, any two points can be connected with a line. Is this true? Of course.
Have you tried this with all possible points? No, of course not. Then how do you know
it? It’s self-evident. You can just see that it’s true. Anyone who denies it is lying or just
trying to be obnoxious. It is obvious to the human mind. It is one of the undeniably true
starting points from which all of plane geometry is built.
In this way, rationalists need to say that our fundamental beliefs are innate. If
you have a human mind, it comes with certain beliefs contained in it that we just believe.
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From those, using logic, we can derive all other truths. All other beliefs, rationalists
hold, should flow like geometry.
Other philosophers have held that mathematical-type truths are the exception.
There are some necessary truths like those of logic or mathematics, but most truths are
of a different sort. They are contingencies. They might be true. They might be false.
There is only one way to know which it is. You check. Look and see. Empiricism is the
epistemological view that the foundational truths from which we build up all knowledge
are sense perceptions. Seeing is believing.
This is a very scientific approach to knowledge. We build up all our justified true
beliefs from what we can observe. Observations can be verified by others, so we can trust
them. Them we have the building blocks to construct our world by combining them in
new and interesting ways.
Of course, it runs into some complications. Do you believe that there are atoms?
Ever seen one? Well, no. But they are part of a theory that explains a whole lot of things
that we do see. And I’ve seen a picture of one in a textbook. Actually, you’ve seen the
output of electron microscopes that have been graphically represented, printed and
interpreted and told that is what you were looking at.
Have you ever seen Santa Claus? No. Santa doesn’t exist. But you thought he did
and you had evidence. You saw someone fitting his description at the mall. Presents
appeared where they hadn’t been the night before. You left milk and cookies for him and
they were gone when the presents appeared. If you think about it, the evidence for Santa
is pretty close to the same as the evidence for atoms and yet you believe in one and not
the other. Surely, there is good reason to believe that our knowledge of atoms is superior
to our knowledge of Santa Claus. This is where philosophy of science emerges from
epistemology.
But a third strain of foundationalist epistemological thought moves in a
completely different direction. It seeks the basic foundational truths in deeper human
experiences. Where empiricism takes all human observations to give us the building
blocks, transcendentalism takes certain experiences to be special in doing so. For
religious thinkers it would be revelations, that is, direct experience with the Divine. For
American transcendentalists it would be the sense of awe and connectedness to the
world one gets from confronting nature. Unlike the universalism of empiricism where
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everyone should be able to observe the same thing if looking at the same thing at the
same time, these transcendental truths are particular to the experience of the observer.
Such particularity may make us doubt the truth of the report. How do we know
the person isn’t just making it up or misremembering? Such doubt is the hallmark of
one of the most powerful objections to the entire foundationalist approach to
knowledge. Skepticism is the view that none of these foundationalist approaches are
sufficient to give us knowledge. The skeptic argues that we can know nothing, that
knowledge is impossible. We want knowledge. We fool ourselves into believing we have
knowledge, but this is all a big lie. We don’t know anything.
Is it possible that you are not the person you think you are, living the life you
think you are living. Is it possible that you are just a brain, floating in a vat of medium,
connected by wires to a supercomputer programmed by an evil genius to feed into the
brain electrical signals that it wrongly interprets as observations, as emotions, as the life
you think you have. It is possible. Not likely, perhaps, but at least possible. (Yes, this
philosophical question is where the premise for the movie The Matrix originated.) If it is
possible, could we know which is actually true? If not, can we know whether anything
that would serve as a foundational basic building block of our beliefs was true? Skeptics
say no.
Then why do we think we have knowledge? Some skeptics say that it is because of
human power structures. You believe what you are told…or else. As a child, if you don’t
believe what your parents tell you, you get punished. If you do, you get rewarded. You go
to school. Believe what your teachers tell you and report it back well on tests, you get
good grades. Don’t and you fail. In society, believe what the authorities tell you and you
are allowed to live well. Don’t and you will be the target of social alienation and arrest.
Social constructivism is the view that believe what we believe, not because there is
real knowledge in the world, but because there is political power that determines what
we have to think and has the power to enforce these beliefs which are confused with
knowledge.
A final approach sees both foundationalism and skepticism as too radical. The
fact is that we have beliefs about the world and some of them are reinforced by the world
in allowing us to do the things we want to do and some of them are destroyed by the
world when the world does not allow us to do what we want to do. As humans, we have
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goals. We try to reach those goals employing our beliefs. If a belief is helpful, keep it. If
not, throw it away. Pragmatism is the view that knowledge reduces to the usefulness
of a belief. We should not speak of true and false, but rather what William James called
a proposition’s “cash value.” What is the belief worth? Is it helpful? Sentences are not
magical connections to an underlying world, they are just tools in the human toolbox.
Keep the tools you need, the tools that work. If your screwdriver breaks its handle, you
throw it away and get a new one. Same with your intellectual tools. When they break, get
rid of them and get a new one. Believe them when they work, but know that they are just
tools.
So, epistemology leads us to ask all sorts of questions about the nature of
knowledge. What do we know? Can we know anything? By what means do we come to
know what we know? Let’s look at a question in epistemology raised by jokes. Jokes are
sets of sentences. Jokes make sense. You get jokes. You also get math problems. In both
cases, there is confusion followed by an “aha” moment. The “aha” moment in the case of
the difficult math problem occurs when you realize the answer or the path to the answer.
It is the gateway to mathematical knowledge. Does this mean that jokes give us
knowledge? You have to know things to get the joke, but does getting the joke give us
knowledge?
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Joking as Truth-Telling
Thomas Wilk
They say there’s a grain of truth in every joke. Presumably, then, jokes are used to
communicate that truth in some way, and we can come to know something when we get
the joke. The “aha!” moment when the punchline lands reveals some truth to us. In this
essay, I’ll argue that joking often functions as a kind of truth telling, but not the kind of
truth telling that I’m doing in this sentence or when I swear to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. It’s a subtler kind of truth-telling that can sometimes
serve to reinforce beliefs that a community holds in common and sometimes be used to
bring them out into the open to be challenged.
Think about the last time you told someone the truth. It’s such an everyday
occurrence that it almost seems strange to reflect on it. Your mom asks what you had for
breakfast, and you tell her you ate a bagel. Your friend asks if you’re feeling alright, and
you say your allergies are acting up. Someone asks for directions to the library, and you
point them in the right direction and tell them to look for the building with all the books.
When we speak in a way that aims to inform others, we generally say what we take to be
the truth, or, as I’ll put it, we generally only make claims that we endorse. We give them
our stamp of approval and stand behind them. We do a lot of truth-telling, even if we
also lie, mislead, and conceal from time to time. In fact, we couldn’t pull off those
deceits if people didn’t trust one another to tell something close to the truth most of
time.
Most of our truth telling comes in the form of assertions. We use declarative
sentences – “The cat is on the mat,” “The dog is out of food,” “The hungry dog is going to
eat the cat on the mat” – to convey something that we believe to be true in a way that
will, if everything goes right, lead to the hearer believing it to be true. Assertions have a
deep connection to truth. The philosopher Paul Grice has argued that we intuitively
follow a rule of truthfulness in our conversations. We should only say things we believe
to be true and for which we have some evidence, and others expect that of us.
I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an
ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt;
if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber (Grice, 47).
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Others have argued for the even stronger Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA).
According to KNA, assertions play the role that they do in our language—they are what
they are—in part because they follow a rule that says you should only assert that p if and
only if you know that p, and, of course, you can only take yourself to know p if you take
p to be true. Asserting something is the most common and straightforward way to tell a
truth, i.e., to convey to someone something that you think you know.
Jokes are not assertions. There are often assertions used in the telling of a joke.
“Three fonts walk into a bar…” but the joking frame, the context of the telling, usually
indicates that this assertion is not to be taken at face value. KNA is relaxed; we no longer
expect what you say in the form of an assertion to necessarily be something you take to
be true. Instead, we’re engaged in a kind of playful exchange in which we’ll entertain
clear falsehoods as if they’re true in order to engage with the cleverness of the
punchline: The bartender says, “We don’t serve your type in here.”
There’s clearly no Knowledge Norm of Joking. KNJ would require that you tell a
joke if and only if the premise is true, but a lot of jokes have false premises, and we’re
just fine with that. Some jokes, of course, do rely on a true premise, and they’re funny
precisely because they’re true. Take this classic from Jerry Seinfeld:
According to most studies, people's number one fear is public speaking.
Number two is death. Death is number two. Does that sound right? This
means to the average person, if you go to a funeral, you're better off in the
casket than doing the eulogy.
The contradiction between what most studies reveal and what we really feel about
the funeral is where the humor lies. If we don’t accept the premise, if it doesn’t have the
ring of truth, the joke isn’t very funny. But there are many jokes that don’t require the
truth of the premise. Seinfeld’s schtick works for him, but not all jokers play the same
game. Santa, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy walk into a bar. The bartender looks
up and says, “What is this, some kind of joke?” Unless you believe that these figments of
our cultural imagination really exist, this joke’s premise is clearly false.
Though it is not as straightforward a form of truth-telling as your average
assertion, it would be too quick to conclude that joking is not a form of truth-telling at
all. There’s nothing improper or incorrect about telling a joke that’s patently false. A
patently false joke, though, need not fail to tell a truth or to convey some knowledge, for
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often-times we use literal falsehoods to speak truths. The last time you told someone
they looked like a million bucks, odds are even that you meant they looked great or like
they’d been run over by a semi, and, of course, we’ve all faced the moment of truth in
which we had to tell someone we cared about that their wardrobe, accessory, or hair
choices are stuck in the last decade. When we do, we usually don’t tell it to them
straight. Instead, we reach for a bit of sarcasm to soften the blow. Yet our intent is
clearly to convey the truth to them in the hopes they’ll run upstairs and change before
we have to be seen with them in public. You can convey something true by saying
something that is literally false.
Even false jokes, then, might convey some grain of truth. Let’s think about how
that might work first in the case of a false assertion and then in the case of a false joke.
When your friend tells you, “Whoa, you look like a million bucks,” how do you know
whether they’re saying something that’s literally true to convey that truth to you or
saying something that’s literally false to soften the blow of telling you that you look like
something the cat dragged in? Their tone and the shock on their face may be a hint, but
the inference you make from the words you hear to the truth they convey turns on a
presupposition that you both share. A friend only says this to you when they know that
you know already that you don’t look so hot. Whether it’s because you’re lying in a
hospital bed or because you had too good a time last night, you and your friend both
know and both know that the other knows that you look awful. Your friends’ quip that
you look like a million bucks is just another way of endorsing that presupposition, i.e.,
of committing themselves to its truth.
Now suppose you did have a bit too much fun last night, but you think you’ve
pulled yourself together pretty respectably. When your friend makes the quip, you’re
unsure how to take it. You think you look alright; not great, but not terrible. You surmise
that your friend must think that you know you don’t look so hot, even if you think you’re
pulling it off. Your friend endorses what they take to be a shared presupposition, but it is
in fact one that you don’t accept. Now you face a choice. Do you trust your friend’s
judgment and accept, on the basis of their testimony, that you don’t look as good as you
thought or do you push back? We’ve arrived here at an important point in our
investigation. That you face this choice reveals that your friend’s quip has conveyed to
you their endorsement of this presupposition. You know what they meant even if it
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wasn’t what they said and even if you don’t endorse the presupposition yourself. Their
endorsement now gives you some evidence for its truth, and you must weigh that
evidence with all the other evidence you have and decide whether to endorse it or not.
But your friend has hedged their bet. They didn’t just come out and tell you how awful
you look. As such, they’ve left themselves room to withdraw their endorsement of the
presupposition. If you say, “Rough night, but I think I did alright pulling myself
together. You don’t think I look good?” they’ve left themselves room to say, “No, no! I
really meant it; you look great!”
Let’s call your friend’s endorsement of the presupposition in this scenario a
kinda-sorta endorsement (that’s the technical philosophical term). It’s a hedge; it leaves
conversational wiggle room for withdrawal or softening of the endorsement. Jokes, I will
argue, engage in just the same kinda-sorta endorsement. When you tell a joke, you
kinda-sorta endorse the presupposition(s) one needs to accept in order to get the joke,
and you do this with the expectation that the presupposition(s) on which the joke turns
is one that your audience also kinda-sorta endorses. If they do, then they’re in on the
joke.
Within the frame of a joke, the endorsement of the presupposition is flexible in a
way that a speaker’s endorsement of an assertion is not. This flexibility manifests as ease
of withdrawal. When you make a claim in the form of an assertion, you’ve given others
license to hold you to account for that claim. They can challenge you to give reasons for
it. If they trust you, they can repeat it and send others who challenge it your way. And,
importantly, if what you’ve said is dangerous, harmful, insulting, or troubling in some
other respect, you’re on the hook for it. You’ve given it your endorsement it, after all.
You’re committed to it and ought to be held to account for it. But the kinda-sorta
endorsement of a sarcastic remark or a joke leaves you an out. Its flexibility is so
pronounced that, in some cases, it’s withdrawn as soon as it’s made. We simply act as if
we are endorsing the presupposition for the fun of the joke, but everyone involved
knows that the endorsement is dropped as soon as the joke has been told. The joker and
the audience endorsed the presupposition that Santa could walk into a bar for the sake
of the joke, but neither believes this could really happen outside of joking frame. We all
know that Santa’s more likely to be found in a bakery than a bar.
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Kinda-sorta endorsement of the presupposition of a joke, however, doesn’t
always disintegrate once the telling is done. It can linger, leaving the audience
wondering whether the teller meant to endorse the presupposition beyond the context of
the joke. The intrigue, power, and frustration of jokes is found in this ambiguity. The
telling of a joke that plays on racial, ethnic, or gender stereotypes, for example, kindasorta endorses those stereotypes. In some contexts, when it is clear that the kinda-sorta
endorsement is withdrawn as soon as the telling is complete, these jokes are relatively
harmless. The trouble arises from the fact that the joke teller is rarely in full control of
the context. Jokes, like all speech acts, are public and open to interpretation and
appraisal by anyone who hears them. If the context of the telling is not one in which the
endorsement of the presupposition is clearly cancelled for all hearers, even if the joke
teller intends to cancel it, hearers may take offense. They understand, perhaps
rightfully, that the endorsement of the problematic presupposition could be understood
by others as an endorsement of its literal truth beyond the joking context.
In some contexts, the endorsed presupposition is (intentionally or not) reinforced
by the telling of the joke. Those who are in on the joke see that others also accept the
presupposition. They may take that as evidence in its favor, or, more likely, they may be
influenced to implicitly accept the presupposition as a result of its repetition. Even if
they know it’s something that shouldn’t be said openly, the joke communicates to them
that others accept the stereotype on which it turns and licenses their acceptance of it in
turn. The hearers who are in on the joke, the cultural in-group, feel vindicated in
holding the stereotype because they know that others hold it, too. The repetition of this
process is one mechanism by which stereotypes are held in place within a social group.
Sometimes, however, when told in a skillful way and in just the right context,
jokes that play on stereotypes can also serve as a challenge to those very stereotypes.
The kinda-sorta endorsement of the presupposition serves to remind the audience that
these stereotypes are deeply engrained by our culture. They get the joke precisely
because they grasp these stereotypes and easily call them to mind. The context of the
telling—who’s telling the joke, who’s in the audience, what else has been said, and even
the broader social context—makes it clear that the joker takes the stereotype to be false.
They endorse it only within the joking frame with the broader aim of taking us to task
for tacitly accepting it. Jokes told in this setting are a powerful way to coax people in
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positions of privilege to examine and, perhaps, reject problematic stereotypes that they
hold. In the hands of a skillful comedian, these jokes can prompt critical reflection on
the drive home from the club or as one lies awake in bed remembering the show.
So, do jokes tell truths? Do we gain some knowledge when we get the joke? I
answer that, in an important if non-literal way, they do and we do. Jokes requires us to
entertain the presupposition as if it were true, to kinda-sorta endorse it. Unless the
context is one that explicitly cancels that endorsement for both the joke teller and the
audience, the endorsement extends beyond the joking frame. The joke serves, in some
contexts, to reinforce the communally held beliefs it presupposes and, in others, to
challenge those very beliefs. Jokes can build community around common knowledge of
shared beliefs, and they can also force us to reckon with the shared beliefs around which
we’ve built our communities. The truths they tell, then, are second-order. The joker
doesn’t literally tell us the presupposition of the joke, she reveals it to us and makes us
communally aware that we share it. Unlike the mathematical knowledge we gain when
we reach the “aha!” moment of a mathematical puzzle, the “aha!” moment of the joke
gives us knowledge about ourselves, our communities, and our shared beliefs.
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I Laugh Because It’s Absurd: Humor as Error-Detection
Chris Kramer
“A man orders a whole pizza pie for himself and is asked whether he would like
it cut into eight or four slices. He responds, ‘Four, I’m on a diet”.’1
While not hilarious – so funny that it induces chortling punctuated with outrageous
vomiting – this little gem is amusing. We recognize that something has gone wrong. On
a first reading it might not compute, something doesn’t quite make sense. Then, aha!,
we understand the hapless dieter has misapplied general rules of thumb, mental shortcuts, or heuristics, that we were also initially committed to and that would usually be
good enough to rely upon – fewer slices equals fewer calories; diets require fewer
calories, etc. – but in this particular case they fail, and the feeling of mirth is our reward
for making this discovery. We don’t say all of that after a punchline, of course, but that’s
what is happening according to the Humor as Error-Detection Theory: our sense of
humor can sense our errors.
This chapter will focus on the overlap and benefits of a humorous and
philosophical attitude toward the world and our place in it. The historian of philosophy
Will Durant tells us that genuine philosophy begins when one learns to doubt; we can
say something similar with humor--trust me.
If philosophy (or humor) is to serve a positive purpose it is to dissipate certainty
The paraphrase above (with my parenthetical addition) is from Bertrand Russell’s
Philosophy for Laymen. This is his central point: “[Philosophy] must not teach mere
skepticism, for, while the dogmatist is harmful, the skeptic is useless. Dogmatism and
skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the
other of not knowing” (Russell, 45). It is interesting that both philosophy and humor
confront a similar target: absolutism. To clarify, Russell is worried about an extreme
form of skepticism that presumes knowledge is impossible. Socrates, I think, dealt with
1

From Philosophy Bites Podcast with David Edmunds and Nigel Warburton, ep. 151, 4/9/11.
https://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/4/4/0/440ba45df61652ba/Noel_Carroll_on_Humour.mp3?c_id=3170938&cs_id=31709
38&expiration=1593445900&hwt=96d8eb7bc5bf362449d62701916c818e. Carroll believes that “Humor is about
humility, realizing what cognitively frail beings we are.” He’s probably right.
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that brand of unmitigated ignorance some time ago: are you certain you know nothing?
The extreme skeptical claim is self-refuting, paradoxical, and at least a little bit droll.2
This is different from what we might call “rational skepticism” which is the sort of
epistemic caution extolled in philosophy, but also in humor as we can see from
humorists like Mark Twain, “What gets us into trouble is not what we don’t know; it’s
what we know for sure that just ain’t so” (quoted in Hurley 109), and comedians like
Chris Rock, “to make people laugh about things that weren’t so funny [or obvious] to
begin with. That’s why I’m here” (Oprah Interview 2002), Hannah Gadsby, “My goal is
to shake your confidence” (Douglas 2020), and Louis CK,3 “I believe in taking people to
upsetting territory, and making them glad they went there” (Sundance 2010), and we
like it. So, we benefit from a humorous attitude in a similar way that we can benefit from
a philosophical attitude: we are open to doubt, confusion, ambiguity, vagueness,
complexity. That is, we are open to reality as it is, not just as we might wish it were.
The moment you sense that feeling of unshakable confidence in your beliefs, you
should be worried, because, as Russell and Twain aver, that is where danger lurks. I give
little to no thought to the truth of the equation 1+1=2.4 In fact my certainty in that
precludes me from even considering alternative answers. That is fine. But if that same
feeling of certainty infects other areas of epistemic concern, like religion, politics, ethics,
or baseball statistics, then I have a problem. I will be disinclined to even listen to
differing perspectives. This way leads to dogmatism, and that quickly manifests in
burning witches, or insisting that COVID-19 will go away if only we would just stop
testing for it so much.5

2

If I know I know nothing, then there is something I know; that I know nothing. But that is not knowing nothing,
it’s knowing something--that I know nothing. Therefore, it’s false that I know nothing. And I know it’s false. So, I
know something. Something doesn’t smell right--but nothing smells worse.
3

Yes, morally troubled waters here. I will only say this: Louis CK is like Immanuel Kant, if only in this respect:
both displayed egregiously sexist ideology and/or behavior, and both are difficult to completely remove from the
canons of their respective fields. For more on this, see Becca Rothfeld’s “Can Sexual Predators Be Good Scholars?”
The Chronicle of Higher Education 2017). Kant probably also masturbated into plants in front of people.
4

Russell did though. For a fun time, find his logical grounding for that equation halfway through volume 2 of the
massive tome Principia Mathematica. Now that text is hilarious. You will vomit.
Our President: “When you do testing to that extent, you’re going to find more people, you’re going to find more
cases, so I said to my people, ‘Slow the testing down, please.’” Jane C. Timm, “Fact check: Trump blames testing
5
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Happily, a humorous attitude toward the world helps facilitate a philosophical
attitude, and vice-versa. Consider any number of seminal6 thought experiments
involving evil demons, brains in vats, what it would be like to be bats, teletransporters,
and famous violinists surreptitiously attached to our backs. These mental exercises
cultivate unconventional ways of thinking about issues we might otherwise
complacently ignore. They are also kind of funny; at least, if we are open-minded, they
elicit a “hey, that’s funny”, as in “strange”, “unexpected”, “novel”, or an enlightening
variant of “WTF!”, but about matters we thought we already knew quite well. Humor,
like philosophy, takes nothing for granted; this is good, because I’m pretty confident
that we’re wrong a lot more than we’re right.

Fallacies are funny
Very often when we discover a mistake in reasoning, a fallacy, we laugh.7 This is
interesting. Contradiction, inconsistency, irrationality, absurdity, nonsense,
ridiculousness, repugnance, fallacy, etc., are some terms philosophers have used to refer
to instances of poor reasoning. They are also concepts useful in analyzing why laughter
often accompanies fault-finding endeavors. For instance, I was recently in a politicaleconomic discussion, and my interlocutor responded to my point with something like
“you don’t benefit poor people by raising the minimum wage. That’s just Econ 101.” My
witty repartee: “And that is a proof surrogate!” Puzzled, he asked what the hell that was.
My even wittier riposte: “Don’t you know? That’s Logic...101.”8 A surrogate mother is
not the actual mother, she is standing in for her. Likewise, a surrogate proof is not an
actual proof, it is something else that is easy (castigating someone for not taking the

for spike in COVID-19 cases. Experts fault reopening of states.” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donaldtrump/fact-check-trump-blames-testing-spike-covid-19-cases-experts-n1228671. June 10, 2020, accessed 6/29/20.
6

You thought there’d be a joke here, didn’t you?

7

Special thanks to Brian Wagner and Michelle Rotert for all our conversations on this topic. For a look at funny
fallacies in Sesame Street, see (Ross 2015).
That’s not exactly how it went down. Instead I actually made some esoteric case against propagandistic language
that indoctrinates us into thinking we help the poor by helping the rich; and we hurt the poor by trying to help the
poor. Not as funny or clever. But the witty reply only really occurred to me just now. If brevity is the soul of wit,
immediacy-of-rebuttal is its body.
8

71

proper college course), taking the place of the burden of thinking logically. Of course,
part of my wittiness was itself a proof surrogate. We laughed.
Returning to our President’s peculiar view on the causal connections between
testing and the spread of a disease, Trump and his spokespeople have claimed he was
being sarcastic with those comments, presumably each time he made them. But if you
watch the videos of each of those statements, and you know the meaning of “sarcasm”,
you might come to a different conclusion--indeed, you might laugh at their risible
rationalizations. If he was being serious, which he has, inexplicably, also said, well,
there’s not much hope. To expound by way of analogy, here are some other areas where
we could “improve” through willful, aggressive ignorance: if we desire fewer babies, get
rid of pregnancy tests; if we don’t want mercury in our waters, stop looking for it
there; want to lose weight? throw away all your scales, and don’t go to the doctor-ever. That last one should markedly improve your overall health. Notice these absurd
analogies reveal the silliness (I was going to use “stupendous stupidity” but that would
be uncouth, and if I am anything, it’s couth)9 of the primary analogue.
It is not coincidental that in logic we have an argument form called reductio ad
absurdum, or for the initiated, and snobby, just reductio. It is, as you might guess, to
reduce another’s argument or claim to absurdity, which in logic implies revealing
contradictions or at least significant inferential errors in their argument. Daniel Dennett
refers to it as “the crowbar of rational inquiry,” and, in reference to the common
employment of analogies found with similar logical thrusts and parries, he tells us it
works “by parody of reasoning” (Dennett 29). This is clever; “parity” of reasoning
amounts to the legal heuristic, similar cases ought to be decided similarly. But you see,
“parody” of reasoning connotes satirical imitation or lampooning. It’s quite good, really.
The reductio offers a handy rejoinder to rampant conspiracy theories, e.g., where
you might ask an Alex Jones-type, what would have to also be the case if what you’re
saying about the Sandy Hook mass shooting conspiracy were true? An answer: Oh, the

9

This is an example of paralipsis, more of a rhetorical device of manipulation than a fallacy, but usually resorted to
when one is bereft of logical argument; and it can also be quite funny. It is purposely calling attention to something
in the very act of asserting that you are not going to talk about it. It could be classed as a variant of performative
contradiction, like that found in Augustine and later more formally in Descartes: if I can doubt my own existence,
that entails I must exist. Put in terms relevant here, “I don’t exist!”, once uttered, annihilates itself--“Who said that?”
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gun-control folks wanted to gin up anger at NRA folks, so they went the route of masschild-murder to manipulate our pathos to spark an attack against the Second
Amendment. This seems implausible.10 If contradictions, absurdities, question-begging
nonsense, etc., were to follow, that should show that the initial conspiratorial claims are
dubious, if not outright laughable.11
Recognizing absurdity can be funny. Søren Kierkegaard goes so far as to claim
that all humor is a species of contradiction. Literally “to speak against” oneself,
contradictions do seem ripe for humor: “Errors are comical, and are all to be explained
by the contradiction involved, however complicated the combinations” (Kierkegaard
1986, 86). He probably meant something like “incongruity”, or unexpected dissonance,
rather than the strict logical sense of “contradiction”, but there are many examples of
funny formal contradictions.12 Here’s one from quantum physics: Schrödinger’s cat
walks into a bar and doesn’t. It would be irrational, in terms of classical logic13 to assent
to both of those claims at once. But, lots of people a lot of the time, fall into the abyss of
absurdity. It might even be an inescapable aspect of being human, to paraphrase Walt
Whitman, so what if we contradict ourselves, “we are large, we contain multitudes,” and
this might mean that humor is in fact inevitable.
The first part of this chapter’s title borrows from Kierkegaard (1989, 446), and
before him the Christian apologist Turtullian, who once quipped about the central
contradictory tenets of Christianity, in putatively ironic fashion, “I believe because it is
absurd.” The idea that we laugh at absurdity, contradictions, or an incongruity between
That is called understatement--exaggeration going the other direction. See Timothy Johnson’s “Here is exactly
what Alex Jones has said about the Sandy Hook massacre” https://www.mediamatters.org/alex-jones/here-exactlywhat-alex-jones-has-said-about-sandy-hook-massacre (2017) for Jones’ long-standing perspectives on Sandy Hook.
Accessed 7/1/2020.
10

There are plenty more supremely stupid claims that would have to be true if the “Sandy Hook Conspiracies”
(there is more than 1) were true. Why this will not always convince a conspiracy theorist that they have made an
error is curious, but would require a separate chapter to properly address. Suffice it to say here, their perseverance in
maintaining a self-sealing web of beliefs is extraordinary, against which even laughter might prove ineffective.
11
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Our meme-obsessed culture sometimes can provide decent educational examples:
https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=funny+images+of+contradictions&qpvt=funny+images+of+contradicitons
&form=IGRE&first=1&scenario=ImageBasicHover. Accessed 6/10/20. Kierkegaard would love the internet!
(Sarcasm, not paralipsis).
13

There might be exceptions to this according to non-classical logics, in which some contradictions can be true. This
view can be found in paraconsistent logic--which is itself a joke. And also, it isn’t.
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the way we thought the world was and how we now recognize it actually is, goes back at
least to Arthur Schopenhauer (an odd source for humor analysis. Seriously, go find an
image of him right now--that face and humor are extremely incongruous).
For Schopenhauer, humorous laughter results from the “victory of knowledge of
perception over thought [which] affords us pleasure…It must therefore be diverting to
us to see this strict, untiring, troublesome governess, the reason, for once convicted of
insufficiency” (Schopenhauer, 279-80). This seems correct, but needs the following:
being amused can be a diversion, but not necessarily, or not only that, and “for once”
seems too weak – mistakes are everywhere, and with the properly cultivated attitude,
not only can we be primed to find them, we can actually enjoy the discoveries enough to
want to repeat the experience of error-detection, so that we are open14 to the possibility
of errors and become better equipped to recognize them in the future. Thus, humor can
be intrinsically valuable and diverting, like sex, which is pleasurable in and of itself, but
also instrumentally valuable as a fecund form of playful intellectual training, a means to
give birth to a sound web of beliefs – like sex, with an intellectual.
Schopenhauer even provides an example of our joyful experience of detecting an
error in a joke: “The soldiers in the guard-room who allowed a prisoner who was
brought in to join their game of cards, then quarreled with him for cheating, and turned
him out … [he then dissects the joke for us] They let themselves be led by the general
conception, ‘Bad companions are turned out,’ and forget that he is also a prisoner, i.e.,
one who they ought to hold fast” (Schopenhauer, 277-8). Once again, no projectilepuking here, but notice it can be interpreted as a fallacy of Accident in which a general
rule is followed and accidental features in this specific case are ignored, as the rule of
thumb, heuristic, or “general conception” is strictly adhered to even in the face of
mitigating factors that should have been seen as exceptions the rule. That sought-out
feeling of mirth is so rewarding that we enjoy finding mistakes, even in our own
14

Being open to error is essential, and we can see in at least one way how a humorous attitude differs from an overly
serious one: “The opposite of laughing and joking is seriousness. Accordingly, it consists in the consciousness of the
perfect agreement and congruity of the conception, or thought, with what is perceived, or the reality. The serious
man is convinced that he thinks the things as they are, and that they are as he thinks them” (Schopenhauer 280, my
italics). Such a dogmatic lens is highly susceptible to ignoring errors, not just committing them. For more on the
ambiguities of “seriousness” and “playfulness”, see (Kramer 2015b).
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cognitive house, as we will soon see. So, on the Error-Detection model, mirth provides
“the motivation for a mind to search out subtle oversights made in reasoning that could
infect the integrity of our knowledge” (Hurley, 67), making humor an excellent and
enjoyable mistake-minding tool.

Why is error-detection so enjoyable?
I mentioned sex, a couple of times. That is with good reason – we need it, desperately.
For whatever (comically strange) reason, that is just how our species propagates. It is
nearly impossible to explain this procedure to your children without eliciting an
uncomfortable smile or a guffaw of outrage tinged with befuddlement – “No way! That
can-not be how it’s done!” The child’s mixed-emotional exclamation is not misplaced; it
really does seem like they have unearthed a colossal blunder in the design of the world,
and their laughter in part expresses this.
The world is complex, and is exponentially more so when we add human beings
interacting with one another in situations that require immediate action with little
information. We need something that can do the dirty work of “debugging for the
underlying mechanisms of control within an environment” (Hurley, xi) to catch the
flawed rules of thumb that would otherwise direct our behavior and belief. One of the
clearest presentations of this view is from Hurley:
Our brains are engaged full time in real-time (risky) heuristic search, generating
presumptions about what will be experienced next in every domain. This timepressured, unsupervised generation process has necessarily lenient standards and
introduces content—not all of which can be properly checked for truth—into our
mental spaces. If left unexamined, the inevitable errors in these vestibules of
consciousness would ultimately continue on to contaminate our world knowledge
store. So there has to be a policy of double-checking these candidate beliefs and
surmisings, and the discovery and resolution of these at breakneck speed is
maintained by a powerful reward system—the feeling of humor; mirth—that must
support this activity in competition with all the other things you could be thinking
about (Hurley, 12-13).
The hard-won reward for sex is orgasm, as the easy-won reward for error-detection is
mirth, and we are addicted to both – hopefully not at the same time. The feelings of
mirth arise as payoff for the mental energy required to juxtapose potentially conflicting
ideas in our minds, allowing for us to discover an error in our committed beliefs:
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“Humor happens when an assumption is epistemically committed to in a mental space
and then discovered to have been a mistake” (Hurley, 121). Most of the examples used
by Hurley regarding committed erroneous beliefs are rather innocuous. However, the
cognitive groundwork they provide allows us to extend their notion of error detection to
humor as a mechanism capable of revealing pernicious stereotypical beliefs, e.g., to
which one is committed. The feelings of mirth arise as a reward for finding an error in
heuristic thinking that if left unchecked, would lead to the sort of negative stereotyping
and oppression. That is some of the serious work that humor can do.15
Heuristics are fast, frugal, and rarely conscious, so, in order for an error to be
exposed, the humor must bring to consciousness the relevant frames or schemas in our
mental spaces, and in a way that is pleasant enough to desire repeating it, again, and
again. Not only are the heuristics that so often regulate our lives below the level of
consciousness, most of our beliefs are not consciously engaged at any given moment,
even when they might be causally efficacious with respect to our action. This is a
problem if those underlying causal beliefs are flawed and might lead to unethical acts
against others. This is one reason why philosophical thought experiments can be so
effective, for example, as they are designed to tweak our intuitions in the “laboratories of
our minds”, our mental spaces, as opposed to empirical testing in physical labs which is
not always possible.
It is a useful exercise to consider how many beliefs you might actually have, and
then, ask how many of them are likely true? Where did they come from, when did you
acquire them and why? Listening to some comedians, it seems this Cartesian method is
central to their performance: you think you know all your beliefs are true? Well, what’s
the deal with death and public speaking? “According to most studies, people’s number
one fear is public speaking. Number two is death. Death is number two. Does that sound
right? This means to the average person, if you go to a funeral, you’re better off in the
casket than doing the eulogy” (Seinfeld, 2014).16 Well obviously, that is false, even
absurd. But then why do we keep claiming we fear public speaking so damn much? In
other words, we are wrong about what we think our own fears are! How stupid can we
15

For more on this see (Kramer 2013; 2015ab).

16

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ6giVKp9ec. Accessed 7/3/2020.
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be? A better question: can we ameliorate our ignorance through recognizing an error
within our own belief system? If we cannot, then perhaps “stupid” is apt. If we can, and
even enjoy the process, well then, we might just be brilliant!
What’s so funny about me being so wrong?
It is true, our gleeful error-detection in other people’s words and deeds is more
common because it is much easier than realizing I have reasoned repugnantly. But
sometimes we can laugh at our own ludicrous behavior and thought, and be better for it.
After all, a philosophical attitude critical only of others comes perilously close to
dogmatism, so we should be able to direct our humor-analyzing mechanism to our own
web of beliefs as well. I will close with an anecdote to make this pedagogical point, even
though it will be at my own expense--such is the sacrifice heroic educators must
sometimes make.
There was a time when I suffered from “road rage” and I would often yell and
pound my fist in the air at my freeway opponents. Once I was cut off by a pickup truck
and immediately flew into rage-mode, screaming and punching the ceiling of my own
car--I acquired the stereotype “all pickup drivers are jackasses” from my father; striking
my own car is my embellishment. I briefly caught sight of myself in the rear-view
mirror, and in that second I burst out in uncontrollable laughter, at myself. This
happened so quickly that the laughter began before the ceiling-pounding had ended,
making for a borderline psychotic, clearly ridiculous scene.
This was not a typical eureka moment that happened in a flash; I had built up to
it through months, if not years, of my wife’s gentle, and at times more aggressive,
humorous mocking of my deep character flaw. My self-directed laughter was not
ridiculing or a superiority-type of mockery espoused by Hobbes (see Sophia Stone’s
chapter on superiority theory in section 1), as I would then have had to be feeling
superior to myself in that very moment--this would be incoherent. The sense of humor
in that instance put me in the right distance metaphorically from the source of the
humor (myself, perceived in an unappealing light), and enabled me to understand, and
perhaps feel what I must have looked like from someone else’s perspective, and that
something had gone horribly wrong with me. It worked! This, finally, made me
conscious of the stereotype-driven character flaw, and changed my behavior; the
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laughter at myself drove me to ride a bicycle to work. I am happy to report, I no longer
feel any rage at those pickup truck driving jackasses.
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Stop Saying that Things are Funny Because They’re True
Liz Sills
Time travel with me, for a moment, back to the year 2018. It was a year marked
by political factionalism and Keto dieting, among other cultural pillars, but according to
a Vox article from January 2018 one trend outshone them all: “there is perhaps no
single item that has moved the dangerous desires of the human spirit as much as the
brightly hued laundry detergent capsules known as Tide Pods” (Abed-Santos, 2018, 1).
These colorful blobs of cleanliness owed their prominence at the time to the viral Tide
Pod Challenge, which involved people filming themselves putting liquid laundry
detergent pods in their mouths (sometimes chewing them or even cooking them first) in
defiance of warnings on the products’ packaging. At around the time the Vox article was
published there had been thirty-seven cases of Tide Pod ingestion during the first month
of 2018 in the US, half of which were intentional (Bever, 2018). Remarkably, what far
outpaced the actual consumption of Tide Pods was the massive number of funny memes
that popped up to lampoon the challenge, like this one:

Abed-Santos observed that these memes mocked the silliness of the trend and the
strange reality that a few people were actually participating in it. That is, they were
based in real-world events, but they made that reality seem ridiculous and, hopefully,
undesirable. Since the frequency of meme-ing the Tide Pod Challenge far outpaced the
frequency of actually participating in it, we can assume that people found the spoofs far
preferable to the trend on which they were based.
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Tide Pod memes tell us a lot about society and the ways it reflects on itself
through funniness. And in doing so they are especially illuminating in one respect:
Funniness does not deal in hard, fast, capital-T Truth. It takes our perceptions of reality,
scrambles them around in our heads, and leaves them even more open to interpretation
than they already were. The cliché that a joke is “funny because it’s true” needs some
revising: it would be more accurate to say that things are funny because they make us
question truth. They drag us into a fictional realm where our assumptions about reality
might not be so reliable. And we, addicted to the happy hormones that come with mirth,
open ourselves cheerfully to that truth-bending questioning.
Pack Your Bags for a Truth-Vacation
Philosopher Henri Bergson tells us that experiencing comedy, humor, and other
attempts at provoking laughter leaves people in a state of unreasoning
“absentmindedness” as they passively process “facts and fancies” (14). Abandoning
rational thought like this allows the (non-) thinker to change perspective during a brief
sensation of utter chaos. A thinking person, for example, knows that the sky is blue, and
does not find that fact in any way amusing. But tweaking deadpan knowledge in a funny
way asks us to take a quick vacation from the world of fact and do some (thoughtless) reevaluating. The next time a small child asks you why the chicken crossed the road, for
example, they are counting on you to come at the joke from the realm of reason
(chickens exist, crossing the road is generally a goal-oriented activity with an obvious
objective, reality is mundane). But you will only be able to join the child in their
absentminded glee at a form of explosive anti-humor if you’re willing imagine ridiculous
alternatives, then return to the banality of the real world and laugh at it.
Funny things are, of course, grounded in things we would consider really, truly
true: Chickens, Tide Pods, etc. If they weren’t, they wouldn’t contain enough common
ground for multiple people to understand a joke. But the act of finding something funny
takes us away from epistemological certainty. In fact, things wouldn’t be funny unless
they took us (at least temporarily) into the realm of fiction.
Funniness dances a complicated tango with knowledge. It is, of course, possible
to learn things from funniness – but the things we learn often change our conception of
what’s true rather than reaffirming it. It’s a form of inquiry that way. In fact, funniness
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leaves us more in the real of the ideal than that of the real. It blends experience and
reason in a weird cognitive zigzag that leaves us understanding the world differently
after the punchline than we did after the setup. And whatever species of knowledge we
embrace after we’ve laughed is certainly not a priori or unitary. It differs from person to
person, varying widely based on whatever cognitive junk we have stored away in our
spacious mental closets. Now let’s spend some time making sense (but not Truth!) out of
all that.17
If Your Professor Remembers the Year 2005 Ask Them What “Truthiness” Is
Kenneth Burke, a philosopher of rhetoric famous for both his studies of the
proclivities of human nature and his explorations of it in his personal life, says that the
comic frame of understanding the world is useful for “making a man the student of
himself” (171). We do indeed learn through funniness – in fact, Burke says we use
funniness to interpret knowledge. That knowledge is of a particular kind, though:
knowledge of human relations with emphasis on human power and decision-making. He
does not think that the comic helps us piece apart great Platonic, super-human truths
about the universe. Rather we laugh at things because of their humanity, and that
amusement helps us understand each other and ourselves and culpable, fallible agents
of our own destiny.
Laughing at ourselves and others can have a variety of rhetorical functions. It can
unify people when we all laugh at our common weirdness. It can also divide people
when we laugh at others and act like they’re the only weird people in the entire world.
Either way we’re learning – we learn understanding or we learn judgment. It’s
important to remember, though, that the study of humans is a subjective field and is at
the mercy of our own subjective human perception, particularly because of that power of
individual decision-making that the comic frame brings to our attention. We’re not
learning any a priori truths as we laugh. In fact, I challenge you as a reader to come up
with a juicy joke about an ontological proof that doesn’t involve any kind of human
snafu. Go on. I’ll wait.
17

For a more complicated explanation of all of these ideas than the one you’re about to read, please see my
longer, more academic version of this train of thought entitled “The Epistemology of the Funny,” which was
published in 2016 in Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication, 7:3.
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Want to Change the World? There’s Nothing to It
Not only does funniness make us contemplate humanity, it does so in new ways
that make us question the rightful order of the world. When we experience mirth we are
snatched from our everyday lives and deposited, at least briefly, into an ideal world. (By
the way, when I say “ideal” I don’t necessarily mean “good” – not a world of perfect
justice, courage, and armpits that smell like a spring day in rural Ireland. “Ideal” here
means “existing in the realm of ideas.”) Let me explain what I mean.
Consider parody. It’s a form of funniness where you mimic something,
sometimes something more powerful than you, in order to make it seem silly. If you
were to stand in front of the room and hilariously imitate your professor before they
arrive to teach, that would be parody. If you were to rewrite the course syllabus in order
to make fun of the class, that would be parody. (Feel free to do so and show your
professor – odds are they’ll just be very happy you’re paying such close attention to the
document.) Even the Tide Pod Hot Pockets box at the beginning of this chapter is an
example of parody. Think about this, though: When you’re mimicking something, you’re
thinking about it and re-imagining it in a way that it doesn’t exist. Your new conception
of it might even disrupt the way it originally worked – like parody that’s designed to take
down power structures (also known as satire).
This process happens with funniness of all kinds. Even if you’re laughing because
your best friend fell down some stairs, or because a toddler made an awkward pun,
you’re still reimaging how things work. No! you’re thinking, stairs are for walking down,
not for sliding down! Or no! you’re thinking, that’s not what words are supposed to do!
Thus, you have arrived in the realm of pure ideas, of pure imagination, because you’re
questioning your reality. That questioning process means that finding something funny
doubles as a form of inquiry: Rather than seeing the thing as part of a hard and fixed
reality, you’re seeing it as something moveable, malleable, and worth asking questions
about. Of course, the original reality stays in your mind: You will still eventually have a
crisis of conscience and stifle your laughter enough to ask your friend at the bottom of
the stairs if they’re ok. But your return to reality is preceded by a trip into a realm of
thought that will, perhaps, defy real-world explanation. More importantly, when you
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return from your mental adventure you will probably be somewhat changed for the
experience.
Ziggedy-Zag
Funny things blend experience with reason. Isn’t that provocative? We often
think of those two constructs as separate things. There’s the realm of experience in
which I am taking a bite of ice cream and adoring the flavor, and there’s the realm of
reason in which I am (maybe too late) thinking about the pros and cons of eating ice
cream and deciding whether I should do it or not. Experience and reason can even
disagree with each other. I might, for example, know from experience that my Aunt
Karen hates ice cream, but I also might keep fantasizing that if only I could discover the
perfect flavor I could change her mind. But the neat thing about funniness is that even
when experience and reason seem to be at odds with each other, laughing can swirl
them around together in our heads and leave each kind of understanding a little bit
changed for the experience.
Discourse that makes us laugh is often based on the Aristotelian notion of an
enthymeme. An enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism that has, as its major premises,
facts that are so commonly understood by the audience that they don’t need to be said.
When stand-up comedian Mae Martin quips “My stomach just fell out through my
vagina” after a surprising interaction with an audience member (Just for Laughs, 2018),
she is counting on her audience to understand 1) figurative language, and 2) the basic
physical sensation of surprise, both without her having to explain them. Otherwise she
wouldn’t be able to make jokes like that without worrying about audiences rushing her
to the nearest emergency room, in which case she certainly wouldn’t have time to stop
and enumerate her major premises and their connection to her conclusion.
Enthymemes give audiences a collective starting point. We all understand “gutwrenching shock,” for example, thanks to our own experiences with it, and without
having it explained to us we can move on into more interesting parts of the joke. But
funniness works by taking that common starting point and twisting it, tearing it away
from our common lived experiences by juxtaposing it with absurd things that make us
think about it in a different way, thanks to our ability to reason. Laughing thus involves
a cognitive zigzag where the audience starts thinking about the unstated premises of a
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particular joke, shatters that usual conception, and then lands a little far afield from
where it started that thought process. Importantly, the audience is still thinking about
the same enthymemes. They’re just doing it in a different way. After the Mae Martin
quip, for example, people are still thinking that she’s surprised (zig), but now they’re
considering surprise as a function of the human vagina (zag) – probably a new way of
viewing the subject for many people in the crowd. In short, if you want to make someone
look at a familiar object in an unfamiliar way, make a joke about it. If the joke is good
enough, they’ll apply reason to experience in a way that might not otherwise have
occurred to them. Funniness creates novelty that makes us abandon previously
understood knowledge.
The Junk in Your Cognitive Trunk
Inasmuch as we assume we’re all beautiful and unique individuals, we each
follow our own beautiful and unique zigzags when we hear something funny. We all
arrive at our own new ideas by fluctuating between experience and reason. Does that
make funniness a form of inquiry? Sure. And doesn’t inquiry get us all closer to the
truth? Absolutely not. Thanks to a wonderful and maddening concept called polysemy,
each person who hears the same joke – even if they all are somehow understanding it
through the exact same enthymeme – will get something slightly different out of it
because we all have different brains with different things stored in them. The knowledge
we gain through laughing therefore cannot be unitary, and therefore-therefore cannot
be considered absolute Truth.
Imagine your brain as a basement filled with storage bins. Psychologists Robert
S. Wyer and James E. Collins argue that when you’re trying to make sense of something
(something like an enthymeme that’s been twisted in an unfamiliar way by a joke), you
start unconsciously rummaging through those bins looking for relevant stored material.
Of course, when you’re processing a joke you don’t have time for a thorough search –
your brain just opens the nearest likely-looking bin and finds the most relevant thing it
can. In Wyer and Collins’s theory of humor elicitation, you would hear “restaurant” in
the setup for a joke, wrench open the bin in your head-basement labeled “restaurant,”
and hope that something in there meshes with the joke you’re about to hear. (This
process is the reason that jokes about outdated material don’t work well. Material about
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frosted lip gloss and bedazzling is going to make people dig deeper into their cognitive
storage bins than they’re willing to go on short notice, even if they really bought into
those fashion trends in the early 2000s.)
The thing about those bins, though, is that each of us has different things stored
in our bins, even if the labels on them are the same. Try this experiment with your
friends: Say the word “dog,” and then have everyone describe the image that popped
into their head when you said it. Some people might visualize their own pet. Others
might be fans of Paw Patrol and get a more cartoonish image. One person might be
remembering that they meant to fill out an application to volunteer at the Humane
Society. Everyone has a storage bin labeled “dog,” but the contents are all different.
That variation is the root of polysemy, the idea that any cognitive prompt has
“determinate but non-singular” (Ceccarelli, 399) meanings. That is, every person who
hears something will process it in a slightly different way and end up at a slightly
different final destination, even if everyone started out in relatively the same place with
the same enthymeme. If I tell a joke designed to shatter common conceptions of
penguins, each person who hears it might be duly shattered but might also walk away
from their zigzag process with an entirely different new conception. There’s no telling
the directions people will go when you untether them from the concrete realm of
experience.
If our cognitive storage bins are all so different, and if our funny zigzag journeys
are all so different as a result, funniness cannot result in epistemic certainty. We cannot
leave a joke with the confidence that we have learned The Truth and Nothing But the
Truth. Our reasoning processes are too individualized. We land in similarity at best –
but not in absolutes.
Funny Hot Pockets are Neither True Nor False
Scroll back up to the beginning of this essay and give that Tide Pod Challenge
meme another gander. Consider this: We learn things from it, but we’re not learning
about Tide Pods or even about Hot Pockets. We’re learning things about the curious and
unpredictable people who confuse the two, and about the population of individuals who
find that ludicrous enough to lampoon. It’s a parody of a common product image,
meaning that it invites us to think about that product in a new way rather than just
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solidifying its current perceived reality. We each appreciate that parody by starting with
our lived realities of Tide Pods and of Hot Pockets and putting them together in a new,
weird way that we find happily nonthreatening but that also makes us reimagine how
the world works – or at least how people eating food works. But each of our reimaginings is slightly different. Some people might see this image and actually decide to
try putting laundry detergent into food. (Please don’t. That’s too much of a TruthVacation.) Some people might condemn participants in the Challenge. Still others might
want to experiment with food dye and see if they can make their own colorful Hot
Pockets. Whatever your reaction, though, and however differently you’re looking at the
world because of that meme, you have not landed on Absolute-Knowledge that can be
proven true or false. Your results are epistemically agnostic.
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Ethics
The next two chapters will look at the part of philosophy we call axiology.
Axiology is the study of value judgements. We say things are good or bad, right or
wrong, beautiful or ugly, sublime or mundane. The central question of axiology is “on
what basis can we justify such claims?” There are two branches of axiology
corresponding to two different sorts of judgements we make. Judgements about the
moral rightness or wrongness of a freely chosen human action is ethics and that will be
the topic of this chapter. The study of the basis for judgements concerning beauty and
the quality of art is what we call aesthetics and will be the topic of the next chapter.
Before we launch into in depth discussions of the rational grounds upon which to
make ethical judgments, we first need to answer two objections: (1) there can be no
rational grounds for judgments in ethics because it is just whatever a person/society
thinks, and (2) there are grounds for making ethical judgments, context-dependent and
subjective to each person’s experience, but they are not rational, human reason is not
enough to justify them. How we respond to these questions depends on our ethical
system.
An ethical system is a working definition of the concepts of morally right and
morally wrong. We all have vague ethical intuitions that suffice for most day-to-day
situations. We just know that it is good to help the needy and bad to torture newborn
infants with a fork just for the fun of it. But if we want to be able to approach the sticky,
hard to answer issues, then we need explicit definitions for our basic moral concepts.
When we say that an act is morally wrong, we need to be able to clearly and
unambiguously explain why. In other words, we need to articulate reasons to defend
these intuitions.
That is why we need an ethical system. Think of an ethical system as a box with a
slot on one side, a button on the top, and three lights on the front. The top light is green
and has the word “MUST” written in large bold letters. The middle light is yellow and
has “ok” etched into it. The bottom light is red and imprinted with the words “Stop! No!
Verboten! Cut it out, you degenerate! What kind of sicko are you, anyway?” You stick the
description of an action into the slot, push the button, and one of the lights comes on. If
green lights up, the action is ethically necessary; you are morally obliged to do it. If the
yellow light comes on, then the action is morally permissible, that is, you don’t have to
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do it, but there’s no problem if you do. If the red light comes on, then the action is
morally impermissible, it is an ethically wrong behavior.
The two central claims that we need to establish are – playing along with the
metaphor – 1) that such a box exists and 2) that we can pop the hood and see how the
gears are put together, that is, that we can understand exactly why an action is
determined by the machine to categorize why the morally necessary, permissible, or
wrong buttons light up. The idea that we can and should understand the intellectual
mechanism behind moral judgments is called ethical rationalism. It contends that
“ethically right” and “ethically wrong” are meaningful notions and that people with
minds like ours can fully understand them; in other words, that there is a box, and we
can understand its programming.
In the next section, we will examine several ethical systems that have been
proposed by important, and for the most part dead, philosophers through the last
twenty-four centuries. We will be quality control, testing the calibration of each
proposed box by sticking in uncontroversial actions that we can all agree are right or
wrong and making sure that we get the desired output. If you put into the box the action
“Rescue drowning child at the edge of the pool right in front of me” and the green light
doesn’t come on, we know that the box is faulty. If you stick in “Enslave the next-door
neighbors so I never again have to mow the lawn” and the red, morally impermissible
light doesn’t come on, again, we know the internal workings of the box are to be rejected
as a way of determining moral rightness and wrongness.
The goal of determining how a box works is equivalent to being able to fill in the
blank in the sentence, “Act x is morally right if and only if _________.” We want to be
able to explain clearly and completely what makes an action morally right or morally
wrong because if we can’t explain our judgments, we can’t defend them. And then moral
discourse completely collapses into the sort of closed-minded shouting matches that
plague us now. To make progress on the hard issues before us, we need to clear up a few
questions at the foundational, theoretical level before we try to apply them to the world
around us.
Before we can do that, however, we need to answer the two challenges to ethical
rationalism that have emerged from contemporary, politically infected, pseudo-ethicsspeak. On the one hand we have what’s called moral relativism and comes in two
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flavors. The first, ethical subjectivism, contends that moral rightness is just whatever
any given person thinks it is. There’s my morality, your morality, Soupy Sales’ morality,
but no objective, universal morality apart from what any given person holds. Moral
rightness and wrongness only have meaning relative to some person or other. In other
words, what makes an action moral is whether or not I feel that it is moral. The second
flavor of this view is cultural relativism, the position that moral right and wrong are a
function of the social acceptability of an act. There is no real sense of right and wrong,
according to this view, only how a given culture defines it. “Because I was brought up
that way,” simply ends the discussion. In other words, what makes an action moral is
whether or not a society has decided that it is moral.
Neither of these are unusual views today, and if you listen carefully you can
frequently find people sliding back and forth between subjectivism and cultural
relativism as if they were the same thing. The similarity that interests us is that either
view, if true, would eliminate the possibility of there being a box of the sort we are
seeking. No one could possibly be wrong about any ethical statement they make, and
thus, moral judgment is trivial to the point of disappearing. Everyone has his or her own
box and no box is any better than any other. Because morality would just be a matter of
how you feel or what society thinks, there would be no such thing as an objective moral
truth – in other words, there would be no “right answer” to any moral question. Say that
I feel that killing kittens is wrong, and my society agrees with me. But you feel that it’s
right, and your society agrees with you. Without some sort of objective moral standard,
or truth, to determine which of us is right, we have no way of determining who is right.
Morality becomes meaningless if we have no way to determine whose moral feeling or
moral society is right.
On the other hand, there are those who do not deny the existence of a box
whatsoever. Indeed, quite to the contrary, people who argue for a brand of moral
imperialism assert that a box must exist, that there are absolute answers to every
moral question. Some even claim to have in their very possession The One and Only
True Box and are willing to do very nasty things to the bodies and relatives of others
who have what they deem to be fake versions of The One and Only True Box. The
problem is, while they contend that a box exists, they hold that it is impossible to see
how the box works and why exactly it works that way. They claim that there is absolute
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right and absolute wrong, but, in their view, there is no rational reason that human
beings could understand as to why any given act is morally right or morally wrong. It is
a matter of faith and not reason. Ethics ceases to be a matter open to rational
consideration.
The first view undermines ethical rationalism because they claim that a box does
not exist, and the second view undermines ethics because they say it exists, but you can’t
know how it works. So, before we can start comparison-shopping for ethical systems, it
is imperative that we first understand the flaws in these positions. The fact that they are
unworkable does not mean that there is not something in both sides that is attractive on
some level. There is, and will always be, an aspect from each that needs to be
incorporated into a successful, complete ethical system. What we want to do in the next
section is figure out what is wrong with each of these views, what is right about each of
these views, and what can be saved.
Ethical Subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism is the view that moral judgments are purely a matter of personal
decision. Everyone has his or her own ethical system, and the fact that you consider an
act morally right for whatever reason (or, indeed, for no reason at all) means that, for
you, the act is morally right. We can set it out like this:
Ethical subjectivism – An act x is morally right for me if and only if I think it is.
There are two things we need to focus upon in this definition. First, it is a
relativistic definition; that is to say, the truth of any moral claim is relative to the person
judging it. It is not universalized to all people. The second aspect is the infallibility of
moral judgments. According to this view, it is impossible for anyone to be wrong when
they make a moral claim. If I say so, then I must be right simply because I said so. It is
logically impossible for me to be wrong about any moral claim.
Reasoning about ethics now becomes akin to reasoning about your favorite flavor
of Ben and Jerry’s ice cream. If your favorite flavor is Cherry Garcia, then no matter how
good of an orator I am, no matter how strong of a rational argument I formulate, I could
never get you to change your mind and assert that, “While I thought that Cherry Garcia
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tasted better than New York Superfudge Chunk, I have now come to understand that I
was wrong and, in spite of what I tasted, I now assert for rational reasons that New York
Superfudge Chunk actually tastes better than Cherry Garcia.” The simple fact is there is
no accounting for taste. If Cherry Garcia tastes better to you, then it tastes better to you.
The matter is not open to rational conversation. If you came across two people in a
screaming match, one yelling passionately, “I prefer Cherry Garcia,” and the other
responding with equal volume and zeal, “I prefer New York Superfudge Chunk,” you’d
do well to think that these two will never convince the other they are right.
He screams, she screams, but we need not all scream for ice cream. The real
problem is not that one’s favorite ice cream flavor seems insufficiently important to
warrant fisticuffs (although, yes, some anger management therapy might not be the
worst of things in this case). No, the real problem is that the two people have nothing
that they disagree about. They are both simultaneously correct. There is no point of
contention; his favorite flavor is Cherry Garcia and her favorite flavor is New York
Superfudge Chunk. So long as they are truthfully reporting their preferences, they are
both right.
The ethical subjectivist reduces morality to this same level. From time to time,
you will even find a sense of taste explicitly substituted for moral reasoning. The usual
form is “Act x is morally wrong for me because I think it is yucky.” For example, “Eating
meat is wrong, I can’t imagine killing a little pig, it’s gross.” It may be, but that does not
necessarily make it morally problematic.
The real crime of ethical subjectivism is that it makes moral disagreement
impossible. If ethical subjectivism were true, then if Hitler really thought exterminating
Jews, homosexuals, and political opponents were morally acceptable actions, then for
him it was. And we can’t really object to this anymore than we can object to his favorite
flavor of ice cream. When a radical pro-lifer and a radical pro-choicer sit down at a table,
they have nothing to discuss; they don’t really disagree because there is no debatable,
underlying principle to disagree about – it’s simply a matter of subjective taste. It may
be that I can’t understand why you don’t find certain things to be yucky like I do, but,
hey, some people are turned on by grown people dressed in diapers, some people like
Brussels sprouts, and somebody really bought all those Nickelback albums. Again, there
is no accounting for taste.
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But ethics is cannot be merely a matter of taste. When we disagree about the
moral acceptability of an action, we are disagreeing about something. When the radical
pro-lifer and the radical pro-choicer are arguing, they do have something to argue about.
Neither may explicitly state what it is, but there really is some implied or explicit
principle underpinning the disagreement. Unlike the ice cream argument, they cannot
both simultaneously be right – though they can both be wrong. They do disagree.
Something more than taste is at issue.
How do we know this? After all, who’s to say? Consider moments of moral doubt.
From time to time, we all find ourselves at points where we are not sure about what the
right thing to do would be. We need to make a choice, but it is not at all clear to us what
the right choice should be. We feel torn. We feel anxious. We know that there really is
something at issue. We feel guilty if later on we feel like we made the wrong choice.
If ethical subjectivism were correct and moral rightness was therefore merely a
matter of taste, then such reactions could not exist. No matter what you decided, it
would instantly become right because you decided it. There’s never any reason to fret
over any moral issue, and certainly no reason to feel guilty. Guilt just doesn’t make sense
on a subjectivist model of morality. Just making it up as we go along is fine – and if we
discover later that our preferences have changed, that’s also fine. But this simply
doesn’t make sense given what we actually experience. We do feel tortured by hard
moral decisions. That horrible knot in the pit of your stomach wouldn’t be there if the
choice of action was just another version of Coke or Pepsi, paper or plastic, medium rare
or well-done. And we certainly wouldn’t feel gnawing guilt or shame about telling that
guy at the ticket counter to also have a good flight when we know damn well he’s not
going anywhere. Where does this sensation come from? Where does regret,
embarrassment, shame, or sadness come from if everything we do truly is just “what was
best for us at the time”, or what we considered a moral preference?
In cases of deep moral doubt, we don’t just feel, we think. We deliberate. We
weigh both sides. Maybe in the end we throw up our hands and do what is most
expedient, maybe we play “eeny, meeny, miney, moe,” maybe we let someone else make
the decision for us, but sometimes we make our choice based upon a rational argument.
Sometimes – sure, not all the time – but sometimes (and that is all we need to see the
problem with ethical subjectivism), sometimes, we find an ethical argument convincing,
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and we then have a good, rational reason for choosing how to act in that situation. In
fact, we do this most of the time, even if we don’t realize it. But if anyone asked you why
you did anything – why you made any decision, from why you took this class to why you
wore that shirt to why you ran that red light – you can give them a list of reasons, even if
you weren’t aware of those reasons at the time. Because of the infallibility of moral
judgment that comes with it, such moral doubt and such good reasons could not
possibly exist. If ethical subjectivism were true, then whichever way you decided would
instantly become morally right because an act is morally right, in this view, just because
you think it is. It would never matter what actions you choose, you wouldn’t feel
anything but contentment with those actions in retrospect, and you wouldn’t justify
those actions with reasons if asked.
Furthermore, subjective understandings of morality seems to be something that
develops over time. Have you ever changed your mind about the moral rightness of an
action? Think of the way we refer to our previous view: “I used to think that putting beef
bouillon cubes in the showerheads of my dorm was funny, but I was wrong.” If morality
is purely subjective, then such a statement would be nonsensical – you couldn’t have
been wrong if you really thought you were right at the time. But the action was immoral,
regardless of the fact that your thinking was skewed when you were younger.
If you’ve ever tried to convince someone that an act was morally right or wrong, if
you’ve ever changed your mind about the moral acceptability of an act, or if you’ve ever
been convinced by an argument from someone else, then you must allow that moral
right and wrong is more than mere personal taste. Ethical subjectivism is false.
But there is a good reason why ethical subjectivism is so attractive to so many
people. It is a reaction (an overreaction, but a reaction nonetheless) to something that
many intuitively and correctly sense is wrong in some contemporary moral discourse.
We want to avoid being moral imperialists – the sort of people who assert that there is
only one right thing and only one way to do that right thing. According to these folks,
there is never any reason for moral doubt. There is no moral ambiguity. Everything is
absolute and clear-cut. Not only that, but they have all of the right answers, and if you
disagree with them it is a clear demonstration of a serious flaw in your character. The
technical philosophical term for such people is “self-righteous blowhard,” (although we
often use other terms that we will refrain from printing here) and ethical subjectivism is
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often an attempt by good, caring, rational, open-mined people not to be self-righteous
blowhards. In the face of widespread intolerance towards people who hold disagreeing
moral views, many who embrace ethical subjectivism do so because they wrongly think
that it is the only way to make room for legitimate moral disagreement.
The move to subjectivism is based upon a crucial and mature insight into ethics:
“I may be rational, and I might have what seems to be a really strong argument for my
position, but, you know what, I might be wrong.” It seems to be a critical property of
robust, authentic, adult deliberation that room exists for moral doubt and disagreement
between smart, thoughtful, good people. There are real moral conundrums – situations
in which the decision seems hard because it is hard – and sometimes we do have to
agree to disagree. Life doesn’t always work in black and white – it’s wildly complicated
and nuanced. Any ethical system that we come up with needs to reflect this reality. If an
ethical system makes difficult questions seem too neat and easy, then it is trivializing
ethics. A successful ethical system needs to show us why the tricky questions are, in fact,
tricky.
But while the move to ethical subjectivism is motivated by good intentions, it
actually fails in those intentions. Not only is the view problematic, as we have just seen,
but it does not accomplish our other social goal of supporting good faith, open-minded
ethical discussion.
As we have seen, ethical subjectivism fails in the attempt to make room for
competing views about ethical issues because under ethical subjectivism there are no
competing views! Everyone is right. It finds itself on the exact opposite side of the
spectrum from moral imperialism; just as extreme, but in a completely different way.
Ethical subjectivism most often derives from the attempt to be tolerant, but in the end it
ends up entirely intolerant. If we were all ethical subjectivists, we would not be living in
harmony with people who disagree with us, rather we would each be sequestered in our
own little ethical bubble where it doesn’t matter how reasonable or wacko the folks in
the surrounding bubbles are. We would not be safeguarding open-minded moral
conversation, we would be making it impossible. It would be as if we all have our fingers
in our ears screaming, “I can’t hear you! LALALALALA! Talk to the ethical hand.” If the
idea was to create thoughtful ethical discourse, this ain’t it.
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Further, this view does not disarm the self-righteous blowhards. They’ve figured
out that beating ethical subjectivists in moral debate is easier than finding an out of date
magazine in a dentist’s waiting room. In reaction to the self-righteous blowhards’ lack of
tolerance, the ethical subjectivist has elevated tolerance from its rightful place as a
virtue and set it upon a pedestal as the one and only morally relevant virtue. There is no
doubt that, all other things being equal, we ought to be tolerant, but there are plenty of
things we should absolutely not tolerate, morally, socially, or politically. If tolerance
above all if the only moral value, then not only do we have no right to say that Hitler was
wrong, but we also have no moral grounds to claim that the views or actions of others
are unjust. If it’s all subjective, I can’t really complain if someone wants to kill my kitten,
it’s their preference. I don’t want my kitten to be killed, but I can’t claim that it is unjust
and should be punished or prevented, because that would require some sort of
agreement on what constitutes a thing being punishable or prevented. Subjectivism does
not allow for that possibility. So not only do we lose the possibility of disagreement in
dialogue, we also lose any foundation for justice itself. All anyone would have to say is
that by considering their horrendously morally objectionable views to be horrendously
morally objectionable you are being intolerant, and, since you say that we always have to
be tolerant, you must therefore tolerate the intolerance and injustice that they are
advocating. The goodhearted folks who make the move to ethical subjectivism get their
backsides kicked every single time because the rules of the game can be used against
them. Yes, it is good to be tolerant, but in some particular cases other virtues have to
come first. Sometimes justice, sometimes fairness, and sometimes even the promotion
of tolerance itself require taking actions that do not place tolerance at the forefront.
Tolerance is an important thing, but not the only important thing.
Real tolerance does not mean everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion.
Some opinions are poorly thought out, unsupported, detestable affronts to morality.
Such opinions ought to be opposed, and the flaws demonstrated for all to see. Tolerance
means giving people with differing opinions a genuine opportunity to thoroughly
explain their position before making a determination about that position. It is
approaching others with an open-minded hearing and listening in good faith, such that
if they demonstrate a flaw in your position you would consider that flaw in a genuine
sense, perhaps even giving up your position and changing it to theirs. It means playing
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the moral deliberation game fairly. We want to find the right answer, not just win the
argument. If the other person turns out to be right, we need to be open to changing our
minds. But we can’t find out if the other is right if we don’t give them the space to speak,
and if we don’t listen with a genuine willingness to understand them. In Plato’s words,
we need to make sure that we “nobly submit to the argument.” The self-righteous
blowhard is one who puts the conclusion first and then tries to backfill a moral
justification. If they are not playing fairly, they do not deserve the same moral status.
Tolerance may mean live and let live, but it does not mean think and let not think.
Open-mindedness and the space for legitimate moral disagreement needs to be
preserved in our eventual ethical system but worked into the system in such a way as to
avoid these problems.
Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism is the more filled-out big brother of ethical subjectivism. Both offer
relativistic definitions of our basic moral vocabulary; in both cases it is claimed that
there is no objective sense of an act being morally right or wrong, only right or wrong
relative to something. In ethical subjectivism, that something is each individual;
cultural relativism, on the other hand, that something is a group, a culture, a society.
The definition could be set out this way:
Cultural Relativism – An act x is morally right for culture S if and only if x is
approved of in S.
Moral rightness, in this view, is completely determined for a society by the practices and
norms of that society, and the ability to judge anyone’s behavior by those criteria is
strictly limited to that society.
Versions of the problems we saw with ethical subjectivism will pop up for this
view, but a new problem arises for the cultural relativist that wasn’t an issue for the
subjectivist – What counts as a culture? With subjectivism, at least we could identify the
individuals – except, of course, when it came to moral disagreement between conjoined
twins. But what about cultures? Is it the national borders of countries that decide it? Is
there one morality for the whole United States or are there different definitions of right
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and wrong in New England and in the South? Is it heritage? Are there distinct
Caucasian, African-American, Asian-American, and Latinx ethics in Los Angeles? How
big does a group have to be to count as a culture? Do Lithuanians in Chicago get to
decide what’s moral and immoral for Chicago Lithuanians, but Lithuanians in
Albuquerque don’t – unless they manage to relocate enough retirees from Chicago to
have a “Little Vilnius”? The social relativist needs to be able to unambiguously define
what a culture is to answer all of these questions. It is a tall order, but not their only
problem.
There is no doubt that groups of all sorts have norms for behavior, that what is
acceptable conduct in one group may or may not be acceptable in another, and that they
enforce these expectations through social mechanisms ranging from Amish shunning to
Jewish guilt to a good old Bronx dope smack on the back of your head, “What’s the
matter with you?” But this enforcement of social norms is unfortunately all too easy to
mistake for morality. Just because each society has its own rules for acceptable and
desirable behavior, and reward and punishment procedures that keep people
accountable for that behavior, does not mean that these socially enforced values are
moral values. Even though many morally wrong behaviors are also socially
unacceptable, the social and the moral are different, distinct notions. It might be
morally neutral to wear a color other than pink on Fridays, but it would merely be a
social slight against a group of “mean girls”.
The problem is that the words “right” and “wrong” have several distinct meanings
and that it is far too common for people to shift between these different meanings
unknowingly. The two easiest senses to distinguish between are “morally right” and
“factually right.” A sentence is factually right if what it says about reality is true and
factually wrong if what it says about reality is not true. The sentence, “Bill Barr wears
women’s clothes,” is true just in case Bill Barr frequently adorns himself in women’s
attire and false if he doesn’t. But moral statements are not factual statements. They do
not describe how people do act, they describe how people ought to act, and very often
people don’t act the way they ought to. Ethics does not describe, it prescribes. “Bill Barr
should not shoplift panties from the women’s section of Macy’s”. Thus, morally right
and factually right are completely different animals.
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But there are other distinct notions of “right” besides morally right which are also
prescriptive, which tell people how to behave and how not to behave. One can be “legally
right” but morally wrong. Take drug laws, for example. In some states, marijuana is
legal, and therefore legal right, or at least not legally wrong, to use. Other states, though,
marijuana is not legal, and it is legally wrong to use. Morality doesn’t work that way. If
something is morally wrong in Wisconsin, then it is morally wrong in Illinois, and
morally wrong in Colorado, and Washington, and everywhere else. Laws don’t work that
way – something is legally right or wrong depending on the borders that law governs.
Laws are made by legislatures. Legislative powers in some cases are given to
representatively elected bodies; sometimes this power resides with the population itself,
sometimes with dictators or small groups in star chambers. But whatever the
mechanism, legal right and wrong are determined by the whims of those legislators.
Laws may require citizens to do things which are morally necessary (don’t
murder random people on the street) or they may require people to do things which are
morally problematic (return humans who have escaped their masters back to those who
own them). Most of the time, however, what the law tells you to do is morally irrelevant.
Our laws demand that we drive on the right side of the road, British laws demand that
they drive on the left. Which one is immoral? Laws structure society, sometimes in
accord with morality and sometimes in violation of morality, but most often laws are
merely conventional decisions made to keep some sort of order that have nothing to do
with morality.
Now, we hope that laws do not require you to act immorally or make morally
required actions illegal. But this may or may not be the case. “Legally right” is the result
of a legislative process that may be bought and paid for by moneyed interests, or it may
be controlled by people who are acting to benefit only themselves, or it may be the
outcome of a compromise that pleases nobody. But the notion of “legal” is the accidental
result of a legislative process, which is not the same as moral deliberation. There may
even be a moral obligation to oppose immoral laws, but that in no way means that the
legal and the moral are the same.
Similarly, groups have their own social mores. You may ask, “What are mores?”
When the moon hits your eye like a big pizza pie, that’s a more. But, there can be no
doubt that etiquette is a strongly socially enforced system. When you’ve committed a
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faux pas, a social/cultural oopsie, it is made clear to you, and you know not to do it
again. But simply because society demands that certain kinds of behaviors be curtailed
does not mean that such behaviors are immoral. Picking one’s nose in public is rude and
disgusting. It is a behavior that will generate unfavorable comments, lead to
disapproving looks, and keep you from receiving further invitations to dinner parties.
But as long as you wash your hands immediately afterwards, so as not to communicate
any germs beyond your own body, mere rudeness – gross as it may be – does not
constitute unethical behavior. Socially wrong and morally wrong are not the same thing.
To see this clearly, consider the case of someone disapproving of a socially
acceptable act on moral grounds. Suppose we discover the writings of an antebellum
Southern abolitionist, someone who opposed slavery in the South before the Civil War
because, she contended, the social institutions that allow someone to own another
human being are immoral. This person would be seen as ethically admirable today, but
the cultural relativist would have to see this person as morally wrong and irrational in
relation to her cultural context.
The reason is that for the cultural relativist, it makes no sense to talk about moral
rightness and wrongness outside of social acceptance. Consider the person who says, “It
is raining outside, but I don’t believe it is.” This person is an idiot or a liar. He has
asserted the truth of a statement and then asserted that he will not accept the truth he
has already asserted. Only an idiot refuses to believe what he knows to be true. But if we
accept the cultural relativists’ definition of moral rightness, then our abolitionist is in
the same position. Because slavery was socially acceptable at the time, according to the
cultural relativist, it would be morally right in the society to which she belonged when
she condemned it morally. Thus, the statement “Slavery is socially acceptable, but I
think it is immoral” would be the same as “Slavery is moral, but I think it is immoral.”
The abolitionist becomes an idiot. People who object to common practices on moral
grounds might be right or wrong about their claims, but they are not irrational for
questioning the morality of everyday social practices, and the only way we can save their
rationality is by denying cultural relativism.
While the view is irreparably defective, like ethical subjectivism it comes from a
good place: the desire to be tolerant. We want to understand that there are other
morally acceptable ways to live life and structure society than what we are accustomed
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to, and grant that we have something to learn from other cultures. It also stands as a
reaction (albeit again an overreaction) to cultural imperialism. Like moral imperialism,
this view claims that my culture has it right and every other culture damn well better live
like us or they are immoral human beings and ought to be thankful for the
waterboarding. There is a long history in humanity generally to subject members of
other cultures to horrendous, egregious, despicable treatment simply for being different.
Longstanding customs that are well-adapted to the environment in which people live
have been forcibly changed, even if the fashions of Western Europe and the United
States make no sense in the contexts of the lives of these people. This sort of tampering
in other cultures is often morally unacceptable.
But there are two problems. First, cultural relativism undermines its own ends
because the cultural relativist cannot morally condemn the cultural imperialism he
opposes. The cultural relativist wants to say (1) that it is immoral for one culture to force
its ways on another culture, and (2) that there is no sense of morality outside of what
any given culture says it is. Notice that the claim in (1) is exactly the sort of universal
moral declaration that (2) does not allow. (1) and (2) contradict each other. They can’t
both be true at the same time. To end cultural imperialism, there must be a universal,
objective moral truth about the wrongness of interfering in the ways of another culture.
But the notion of “morally wrong” by the cultural relativist’s own definition is culturally
relative. It is impossible to have a universal, objective moral truth about anything!
The second problem is that sometimes cultural practices are so horrible, so evil,
such an affront to morality itself, that stepping in to stop them is morally necessary.
“Never again” is the slogan that arose from the horrors of the death camps in Europe
after the Second World War. This proclamation is ethical, it demands that all people be
seen as people, and if that means stepping in to stop the slaughter of innocent lives, so
be it. Of course, exactly what justifies intervention, especially military intervention
which is sometimes the only way to protect the innocent, is a tricky business. When do
we cross the line? Yeah, it’s a hard question, but it’s a real question. Welcome to ethics –
it ain’t always easy.
So what we want to keep from cultural relativism is similar to what we found
desirable at the heart of the ethical subjectivist’s motivation: the notion that there may
be more than one way that is allowable even if we are forced to pick only one. In these
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cases, tradition or sentiment may be the deciding factors, and we must accept that we
will not be able to criticize the character of someone who chooses differently.
Contrary to the relativized definitions of ethically right and wrong, this doesn’t
necessarily mean that there are no universal, objective moral notions, it just means that
they do not always neatly and completely decide every hard choice for us. There is a
difference between every choice being morally acceptable and there being a range of
mutually exclusive, morally acceptable options. Sometimes, moral theory can narrow
down the field, but not pick a winner. Sometimes there is a moral tie.
The French existentialist, Jean Paul Sartre, gave a moving example of this in his
work “Existentialism is a Humanism.” He describes a student who came to him during
the Second World War when the Nazis occupied France. His father had become a Nazi
collaborator and was thrown out of the family. His only sibling, his older brother, joined
the resistance and was killed. He is the only person his aging and beloved mother has
left. If he were to go off to fight the Nazis, his mother would not only be broken-hearted,
but would likely die. At the same time, if he stayed with his mother, he would not be
doing what he saw as his moral duty to try to free his homeland from the evil occupiers.
If he joined the underground, he might or might not make any real difference. If he
stayed with his mother, he knows he would make a real difference. What should he do?
Which comes first: the duty to your country or the duty to your mother? There may not
be a single right choice here, but that does not mean that all morality is relative. While
either option might be the right one, and we it may not be able to condemn one choice
over another, we can still say with certainty that taking an axe and hacking his mother to
pieces while swearing allegiance to Adolf Hitler would clearly be a morally blameworthy
decision.
So there seems to be an irremovable place for personal decision making, and for
sentiment and emotion in moral deliberation, even if we are able to build the sort of box
we want. A successful ethical system will show us why the hard cases are hard and why
the competing rational choices both seem rational, even if we must ultimately choose
one over the other. The resolution of these questions will often require human
consideration, not mere calculation.
Sentiment will also be part of the process when we move from deliberation to
action, in moving from knowing what you should be doing to actually doing it.
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Remember that acting in a morally good fashion requires not only figuring out what is
right, but having the strength of character to do it. It is often emotion that forces us into
action. When we heap blame upon someone who has done something wrong, we often
appeal to their emotional failures, not their intellectual ones. Sarah McLachlan is going
to keep showing us those pictures of abused animals until we are guilty enough to pick
up the darned phone because we all know we can afford to help and therefore we should.
When we complete our picture of honest, vigorous, real life moral deliberation, we need
to make room for personal choice, sentiment, and emotion in these places.
Divine command theory
A frequent claim that you will hear if you speak about ethics with people is, “My
morals come from my religion.” Many people draw tremendous strength from their
spiritual faith. Beside empathy, religious conviction surely stands as the other
preeminent source of moral courage, the ability to actually go through with what one
knows one must do. In the aftermath of the South Asian Tsunami, hurricane Katrina,
and any number of other disasters, not to mention feeding the hungry and housing the
homeless on any given day, religious organizations are often the ones doing the morally
admirable work for the neediest among us. Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi,
Mother Teresa, the Dalai Lama, Dorothy Day, and countless other champions of moral
justice and in-the-trenches good works explicitly place their spiritual views atop the
reasons they did what they did. Religion can be a tremendous power for good and right.
Of course, every now and then you get a Reverend Fred Phelps, who pickets the
funerals of soldiers saying God killed them because the US allowed gay marriage.
Torquemada burned and tortured countless people to death for being insufficiently
Christian. Yigal Amir, an orthodox Jew, murdered the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak
Rabin in cold blood for negotiating with the Palestinians. Who could question the
religious fervor of the Hindus who murdered of innocent Muslims in Gujarat or the 9/11
hijackers? How do we understand religious moral conviction when, in these cases, the
practice of it can be so wildly immoral?
There is no doubt that when beginning to deliberate upon a daunting moral
question that requires action, it is a fine starting point for your thinking to ask “what
would Jesus do”? Or the Buddha? Or Shiva? Or the Great Spirit. Or… But the point of
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this section is to demonstrate that while religious conviction can be a fine starting point
to this discussion, it cannot be the entire discussion. The key difference between a
religious belief and a philosophical one is what counts as prove for the truth of the
claim. Religion and philosophy have different criteria for what counts as good evidence
– and this criterion rarely overlaps. Subjective emotional evidence is powerful religious
evidence, but it’s not going to convince a logician. In fact, some religious arguments
begin with the logically sound premise that God’s knowledge is inaccessible to human
beings and therefore must be taken solely on faith. For our purposes as philosophers,
religious criteria alone isn’t sufficient – we need logical argumentation to support
claims, even those that have theological origins. Plenty of philosophers throughout time
have shown us how to have both religious conviction and philosophical rigor, from St.
Thomas Aquinas to Alasdair MacIntyre.
Even though religion and philosophy have different criteria, their subject matters
are often overlapping. Religious organizations are social institutions and, as we saw with
cultural relativism, there is no doubt that most religions have behavioral codes, usually
in the form of rules or commandments. Further, organized religions have reward and
punishment mechanisms to make sure that those in the structure obey the rules –
indeed with the threat of fire and brimstone, eternal damnation, sitting at the right hand
of God, and the promise of 70 adoring virgins, religions take reward and punishment
enforcement mechanisms to an entirely new level. Like social etiquette, some of these
theological rules overlap explicitly with moral concerns and are perfectly in line with the
demands of morality. This is often the point of religious stories and allegories that have
unambiguous moral overtones. “Thou shalt not murder” and “thou shalt not steal” are
both theologically and morally good rules of thumb.
But just as the ethical is different from the social and the legal, so the moral and
the theological are also different. If someone enjoys a hamburger, he may be a bad
Hindu; if on Good Friday, a bad Catholic; if during the day during Ramadan, a bad
Muslim; if with cheese and/or bacon, a bad Jew; but violating any of these theological
rules does not by itself entail that his action is unethical. Just like which side of the road
to drive on, some theological rules are moral in nature and some are just part of how you
must act to be a part of that religious organization. Some theological rules are moral
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rules, but just because it is a theological rule does not automatically by itself transform it
into a moral one.
This is not to say that the moral teachings of any given religion are not morally
good teachings, rather it is to say that subscribing to any given faith does not get you off
the hook for thinking hard and deeply about the difficult ethical issues one comes across
in real life. To fall back on religion to justify blind allegiance and not consider competing
arguments when faced with a real ethical quandary is simply a cop out. Many of the
lessons taught by the world’s religions are good ones, and the world would be a better
place if people actually behaved according to them instead of merely affixing fish to their
car bumpers, but belonging to a religious organization does not allow one to avoid moral
deliberation.
The claim that morality is the result of God’s will with respect to how we behave
is called Divine command theory, and the notion of moral rightness may be set out in
this way:
Divine command theory – An act x is morally right if and only if God prefers that
you do x.
While some religions have philosophical reasons for why God prefers x, and there
exist moral theories that explore these (such as the Natural Law Theory) Divine
Command Theorists are not concerned with discovering or speculating on those
reasons. Moral judgments in this view are determined by how well one’s conduct
conforms to the desires of the Almighty. The only thing consulted in determining
whether an act is right or wrong is what God wanted that person to do in that situation.
A couple of the worries with this position should be obvious. Putting aside all of
the metaphysical issues about the existence of God, the problem of evil and the suffering
of innocent children, and the ability of God to create a rock so big that even God can’t lift
it, there are specifically ethical concerns. The first problem is that defining moral
rightness solely in terms of the Divine Will means that making any moral judgment at
all requires the ability to know the mind of God.
The historical claim for the Divine Command Theorist is that this Divine will is
exposed to people not through reason, but through revelation. Certain people at certain
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times have had God appear to them in one of a variety of forms, and He has revealed His
desires to them. Some of these experiences have been recorded as Scripture. Moral
rightness therefore requires strict adherence to rules written in ancient languages and
translated into modern language. Holy books, aside from their other functions, are
moral codebooks in this view.
There are three main problems here: 1) the problem of interpretation, 2) the
problem of completeness, and 3) the problem of soundness. We’ll look at these in order.
The Scriptures are written words, and written words may be understood in many
different ways. This is especially true with the Bible and its many allegories. There are
not easy, straightforward, unambiguous meanings to many passages. The question,
then, is that if moral rightness derives from the Word, but we only have access to it
through a human understanding of the words – and there are several possible coherent
understandings – how could we ever know which one interpretation is the right one?
This becomes even more complicated when we consider that what we read in our native
tongue is a translation from the original written language – there are some words that
exist in Latin, Hebrew, and Greek that do not exist at all in English. So who translates
the Word, and what words they use to bring out what meanings, can further effect the
final product. How could we ever actually make objective moral judgments if the
subjective opinion of the translator is present in the very translation of the texts? On
every side of every moral issue, you will find authentically religious people who derive
the strength of their convictions from their faith. Just as one should worry about anyone
who claims to have God’s cellphone number, anyone who claims to have the one true
interpretation of all of Scripture ought to be viewed with great suspicion.
But even if we did somehow have uninterpreted access to some underlying Divine
sense, there are still two other problems. One is the problem of completeness. If your
only source of moral guidance is a book written by prophets millennia ago, what could
one do when faced with dilemmas that involve issues not seen in that time? The word
“internet” does not appear anywhere in the King James version of the Bible. In vitro
fertilization, cloning, surrogate mothers, spousal abuse, “aggressive accounting” and
repackaged mortgage-backed derivatives, feeding tubes and life support,…the list of new
moral questions that result from technological and social progress goes on and on.
Reality is a complex and constantly changing place. Any finite set of rules, no matter
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how large, general, and insightful, will ultimately be insufficient to handle new cases.
We would have to focus on general principles and apply them to specific new cases –
which creates another opportunity for us to get our interpretations and applications
wrong.
One way to deal with this is to take the Amish route and simply eschew new
technologies. That certainly avoids some problems; but it doesn’t answer the question, it
merely sidesteps it. There are novel, complex moral issues that must be sorted out, and
Scripture, while perhaps helpful as a starting point for discussion, is simply not
sufficient to end the discussion for every case.
But apart from the new problems and whether the old commandments are
sufficient to handle any moral conundrum that comes down the pike, there are passages
that tend to be overlooked in modern times because there are practices that are
allowable according to Scripture, but which are nonetheless immoral.
Warning: uncontroversial claim ahead. Slavery is immoral.
Yet, if you go back and look at the debate over slavery in the United States, those
who were arguing for keeping the institution legal did so primarily by drawing support
for it from Scripture. Nowhere in the standard canon do you find an unambiguous
statement that it is wrong to buy and sell human beings and use them as inhuman tools.
Indeed, one can point to passages that assert just the opposite, which set out the rules
under which slavery is permitted (for example, see Exodus 21: 7-11, Exodus 22:1-3,
Deuteronomy 15:12-15, Leviticus 25: 44-46, Ephesians 6:9, and Colossians 4:1). Again,
uncontroversial claim, slavery is wrong. But to accept this requires moral reasoning
beyond religious belief. It requires moral reasons.
Beyond these deep problems associated with Divine Command Theory, there
remains one last significant worry when we take moral rightness completely away from
human reason and place it in the realm of faith. By making faith rather than reason the
central condition, a problem pointed out by Plato emerges. In one of Plato’s dialogues,
Socrates comes across a young man named Euthyphro and discusses the nature of
morality. When Euthyphro defends the Divine Command Theory, Socrates asks, “Is an
act morally right because God prefers it or does God prefer it because it is morally
right?” It’s the moral equivalent of the chicken and the egg, but it has some very serious
ramifications for Divine Command Theory no matter which side of the bet you take.
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If one says that God prefers acts because they are morally right, then you must
accept that the act was morally right before God took a look at it. This requires that
moral rightness exists independently of God’s desires and that God then only prefers it
because it was already morally right. This takes God out of the moral picture. We need
only understand the nature of moral rightness, and do not need any understanding of
God at all. He’s just standing there on the side giving a wink and a big thumbs up, but
the thumb is not the reason for the goodness. In other words, all God is doing is pointing
to the good thing, and the thing that would be good whether God pointed to it or not.
That leaves the other horn of the dilemma, that the reason an act is good is
simply that God prefers it. What is good is whatever God decides is good – and that has
nothing to do with the goodness of the act itself. That means that if God enjoyed seeing
people set infants on fire and roasting marshmallows over them, such horrendous acts
would be morally good. The immediate impulse is to say, “But God would never prefer
such a thing.” “Well why not?” we ask. “Because it is morally wrong to set an infant on
fire in order to make s’mores.”
D’oh, look what just happened. That move takes us back to the first horn of the
dilemma, where acts are morally good independent of God. You can’t refer to the
morality of an act when that morality is – as you, yourself just claimed – completely
determined by what God likes and doesn’t like. You can’t say that God wouldn’t like it
because it is immoral, because to be moral just means that God likes it. If there is a
reason why God would or wouldn’t like it, then it is the reason that is important, not
God’s preferences.
By taking this second option God is kept in the picture, but it would mean that
moral rightness and wrongness would just amount to a particular individual’s
preference. There could be no good reason why an act would be right or wrong any more
than there would be a good reason why God prefers chocolate ice cream to vanilla.
Therefore, there would never be any reason to think about or discuss moral problems –
you buy the chocolate because it’s what God wants, and that’s that. There would never
be good reason to think hard about or change our minds about moral issues. We are
back to irrationalism.
The other remaining problem about this – especially for the biblical literalists – is
that one of the early stories in Genesis is about Abraham willingly bringing the knife
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down on his son Isaac because God told him to kill the boy. God tested the patriarch by
seeing not only if he was willing to commit murder for Him, but if he was willing to
murder someone with whom Abraham had a special moral relationship, his own child.
We see versions of that sort of behavior today. Consider cults like the Branch Davidians
following David Koresh or Jim Jones and the people who were willing to give what they
thought was poisoned Kool-aid to their families. We look at these people as crazy, sick,
or brainwashed, but certainly not morally exemplary, especially the cult leaders, who,
we say, are acting like they think they are God. Demanding or following through on
these requests may be a clear showing of religious fervor or commitment, but that
commitment is not morality.
The 19th century philosopher of religion Søren Kierkegaard pointed this out when
he discussed the story of Abraham and Isaac. What Kierkegaard concludes is that ethical
and religious duties are different: ethics comes from reason and religious duties come
from faith. Ultimately, he thinks we need to make a leap of faith to overcome ethics and
become truly devout. This is what Abraham did when he willingly attempted to murder
his innocent and beloved only son; Abraham chose faith over morality. Personally, while
there are many people who are both extremely pious and very moral, if someone who
put theology before morality were to baby-sit my kids, I would make sure to hide the
knives and show them clearly where we keep the sacrificial rams out back next to the
altar, just in case the voices show up while we are out at dinner.
So divine command theory is up to its commandments in problems, just like the
relativistic views. But there are some aspects to divine command theory that are crucial
for our complete ethical system and need to be kept. What motivates divine command
folks is the claim that ethical disputes are about something real and that the solutions
should not be relative, but universal. Morality is more than just a matter of personal
taste. The idea of moral universality, that there is one box for all of us, is a good one that
we want to keep.
Further, the idea that there is some aspect of morality that has the form of
commandments, what we call imperatives, is absolutely correct. In some cases, we
absolutely can look at an action and declare it immoral because it violated a rule that
starts “Thou shalt not…” Some actions are, in and of themselves, wrong.
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But then the nagging question, “What makes them wrong?” pops up. Being able to
simply fall back on “because God said so” would be easy, but it doesn’t work. There is a
difference between theologically right and wrong and morally right and wrong. We can
– and sometimes do – have ecumenical discussions about morality and these can be
enriching and enlightening. But these discussions may be just as enlightening if they
include atheists.
We are looking for an ethical system, a box that will tell us when an action is
morally necessary, morally permissible, or morally impermissible. We want to be able to
use this box and to examine it. We need to know what it is that makes ethical actions
ethical and what makes unethical actions unethical. To do this, philosophers since the
times of ancient Greece have proposed different systems. Each of these systems focuses
on one of five different aspects of the moral situation and tries to elevate that aspect so
that it alone becomes the defining characteristic of moral rightness and wrongness.
These aspects are:
•

the way the behavior affects the character of the person acting;

•

whether the action itself is intrinsically good or bad;

•

the consequences of the behavior for everyone involved;

•

whether it violated the rights of the person to whom the act was done; and

•

personal commitments that the person acting has to people he or she cares about.

Consider again Sartre’s student. How would we judge his choice? We would ask a
number of very different questions, all of which seem relevant to judging his eventual
action. We would ask questions like: Are you really the kind of person who would leave
his mother when she really needs you? But doesn’t he have a duty to defend his country
when it has been invaded? And what would the results be if he did go? What real
difference can one person make in a war effort? Isn’t the choice between making a real
difference to somebody or possibly no real impact in something larger? But does he have
the right to ignore the needs of his countrymen? On the other hand, isn’t there a special
responsibility that someone has to one’s mother? She gave life to you, raised you, took
care of you when you were sick, doesn’t that mean something morally?
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Each of these is a question that is relevant to determining how one ought to act in
this unfortunate situation. Each is based upon a different aspect of the moral situation
and each is representative of a different ethical system. What we need to do, then, is test
drive each of these boxes and see if any of them are the right answer.
Virtue Ethics
In virtue ethics, the rightness or wrongness of an action results from the effect on
the character of the person who did it. The consequences that we consider here are not
the material consequences in the world, for example whether the person made a lot of
money for doing it, received a medal, or has nasty memes made about them. Rather, we
look at what kind of person the person who acted has become as a result of the action.
We are what we do. We are only honorable if we do something honorable. We are only
brave if we don’t wet our pants at the sight of danger. We are only generous if we give
money to good causes, or at least pick up a check every now and then. It is what we do
that makes us who we are, not what we feel about it. I don’t care that you really are very,
very sorry for what you did with that cigar. Sorry don’t mean nothing. You are a louse if
you act like a louse. You are a cad if you act like a cad.
The insight beneath virtue ethics is that human beings are creatures of habit. We
are much more likely to do something if it is something we have done before. If it is
something we have done many times before, we do it almost automatically, sometimes
cavalierly. This is the psychological reason behind marketing and brand loyalty. If they
can get you to try their product once, you are, in verifiable fact, significantly more likely
to pick it up again in the future. It is the reason that many criminals get caught. At first,
they are very careful to cover their tracks, knowing how bad their action is. You’d think
that the more they get away with it, the more skilled they would become at leaving no
trace of their identity behind. But what often happens is that they become sloppy
because the action no longer seems that far out of the usual course of things. There
seems to be less reason to be concerned with covering their tracks.
Whenever we act, we shape our underlying moral structure and make it more
likely that we will act in certain ways thereafter. This is not to say that we are
irreversibly programmed, but that we are certainly psychologically affected in such a
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way that it ultimately takes concentration and effort, sometimes great effort, to change
our ways once they are set.
What we now know from detailed sociological and psychological research was
pointed out in the 4th century B.C. by Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics. He held that
the human mind is shaped by human actions and this is what we call our character. We
are perfectly free to choose our character through our actions when we are naïve, young,
and stupid, but over time that character becomes more and more set until we are
crotchety, old, and stupid.
There are certain properties that ideal people have and less than ideal people
lack. Those properties are called virtues. The properties that less than ideal people
possess, but ideal people do not, are called vices. To behave in a fashion that is morally
correct is to act in such a way as to become virtuous. To act unethically is to act
viciously. Virtues are something that everyone has the potential to actualize through
actions, and so are vices, but no one is just born virtuous or vicious. That is a matter of
what you choose to do, and what you choose to do as a matter of habit.
The obvious related questions are, “Who is the ideal person?” and “How do we
determine what are the virtues and vice?” The answer to the first is either Mr. Rogers or
Mother Teresa, or maybe the love child of Mr. Rogers and Mother Teresa, who would
probably look a whole lot like a wrinkly Ron Howard.
Aristotle, however, addresses the second question concerning how we figure out
what are the virtues. He says that the key is to understand that each human, by being a
natural member of the human species, has an inborn goal. A taller, stronger oak is a
better oak, and all oaks come from acorns, so for each acorn there is a natural, innate
goal: to be a strong, tall oak. Those things that lead the acorn to actually become the oak
it potentially could be is good for the acorn. In the same way, there is embedded in
human nature potential that we may or may not actualize through our actions, and to
actualize that potential is what “good” is for humans.
The human mind or soul (they meant the same thing for Aristotle) has two parts
that are particular to humans. One part deals with knowledge of facts, logical reasoning,
and analytic problem solving; the other part deals with ethical matters. One part is for
intelligence, and the other is for wisdom. With respect to intelligence, more is always
better. No one ever said, “Oh, you won on Jeopardy. I’m sorry. Maybe next time you’ll be
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a little more of an idiot, or at least, for your sake, we can hope so.” Knowing something
is better than not knowing it. Making fewer mistakes balancing your checkbook is
always better than making more.
With the moral part of the soul, however, things are different. Aristotle argues
that where intellectual virtues are found in the extreme, ethical virtues, by contrast, are
found in the mean, in the middle. The key is to find the happy medium. Too much is
bad, too little is bad, down the middle is just right. To be standoffish or over-effusive is
bad, to be even-tempered is virtuous. Cheap bastard or spend like Imelda Marcos in
Payless, both bad; generous is good. Wet blanket or buffoon, bad; witty, good. The
middle road is the path to virtue according to Aristotle. The virtuous action is the action
that will be the right thing, at the right time, to the right degree, for the right reason, and
for the right ends.
How in the world can you figure that out? You learn through practice, but
building up a good character, and then it becomes second nature. If every day I leave the
house and I don’t kill anyone, it won’t be hard for me not to kill someone today. But if
I’ve been killing people every day for a year, it might be just part of my normal routine.
I’ve gotten in the habit of killing people. The actions you do repeatedly build up habits
that become second nature, part of your character. The way muscle you want to exercise
to be able to determine the right thing to do (at the right time, to the right degree, etc.),
is your practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is like street smarts – it’s an intuition you
hone based on experience that helps you figure out how to read the situation and
determine the right action. You can’t be practically wise by reading about what other
people do, or by studying virtuous people; practical wisdom requires action. You can’t
learn how to play the guitar by reading about guitarists, or by watching YouTube
tutorials. The only way you’ll learn how to play the guitar is if you pick up a guitar and
start playing. The same is true of virtue – you have to use your practical wisdom and
practice, and the more your practice, the better you’ll get.
Some folks object to virtue ethics through what’s called the universalization
problem. Is the ideal person ideal for everyone? Isn’t it, in some sense, determined by
individual circumstances and each person’s own goals? That is the view of some
contemporary virtue ethicists, like Nel Noddings. Noddings argues that we each have an
ideal ethical self – a realistic picture of the person we really could be, living the life we
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really could lead. It is from this image and what we would need to do to live up to it that
we get our virtues. You may be the sort of person for whom a full life includes a
significant place for contributions to the arts or maybe it is a life dedicated to furthering
scientific knowledge. Creativity and freedom of mind would be important virtues for the
first person, while rigor of mind and patience may be more crucial for the latter. One’s
own projects will determine what qualities are to be preferred.
We can now set out the system explicitly:
Virtue Ethics: An act x is morally right if and only if doing x makes me more like the
ideal person I could be.
The sort of person you should be may be universal if you follow Aristotle or a
matter of personal circumstance if you follow Noddings, but either way, it gives us
grounds for moral judgment. “Can you believe what that lying sack of fertilizer just
said?” now has moral teeth because no matter who that person is, his or her ideal moral
self would most likely rise above the level of “lying sack of fertilizer.”
But there are problems. If we just focus on the person acting and whether the
actions are virtuous, sometimes we get it wrong. Immanuel Kant points out that the last
thing you want is a virtuous criminal. If someone has bad intentions, the last thing you
would want is someone clever, brave, and temperate. The most evil villains in literature
and film are also the most virtuous. Think of Count Dracula or Hannibal Lector. They
are so much scarier because they don’t make the mistakes of someone who does not
display such virtue in being so vicious. This is why it’s so crucial to understanding virtue
ethics that we understand the theory as a character-based ethic rather than an actionbased one. Vicious people can do virtuous actions, a virtuous person can have bad days.
But a virtuous person will never be a serial killer, and a vicious person will never be a
saint.
Let’s now shift the focus off of who did it (character) and onto what they did
(action).
Deontology
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The ethical system that locates rightness or wrongness in the action itself is what
we call deontology or duty-based ethics. Unlike virtue ethics, this is an action-based
ethic, meaning that the goal is to focus solely on performing moral actions, and not
focused on developing a good moral character. Rightness, it holds, is intrinsic to the act
just as blueness is part of blue jeans. The duty-based theorist sees considering some
aspect of the situation other than the action itself – say, looking at the effects of the
action on the agent or anyone else – to be like looking at someone’s shirt to determine
what color his pants are. If you want to know what color his pants are, look at his pants.
You want to know if the act was ethical, look at the action.
People may be honorable or not, trustworthy or not, obnoxious drunks who tell
you how much they love you and then punch you in the mouth claiming you seduced
their girlfriend or not. But it is behaviors, not people, that are ethically necessary,
permissible, or impermissible, and to determine the moral status of an action the only
thing we need to consider is the action itself independent of any context.
Murder: bad. It doesn’t matter whether you are Professor Plum, Colonial
Mustard, or Charles Manson. It doesn’t matter if you used a candlestick, a revolver, or
several brainwashed, strung out followers. Murder is intrinsically wrong, and we have a
moral duty not to murder. Duty-based ethics are based on universal, absolute rules. To
act in an ethical fashion is to follow the rules. If you break a rule, you violate morality.
Codes of ethics that you see in various professional and social organizations have this
sort of system underlying them.
People who are comforted by Divine command theory intuitively hold a dutybased system to be the foundation of ethics, and the move to bring in God can be seen as
an attempt to deal with one of problems of a duty-based system. If moral rightness and
wrongness are intrinsic properties of actions, how do I tell which it is for some specified
action? With blue jeans, I just hold them up to a light or put them in a fancy
spectrometer. We can always determine with absolute certainty whether something is
blue or not. But there is no ethicometer. Ethical properties are not descriptive of the way
the world is – they tell us how it ought to be. So, who decides what the rules are? Who is
to say how the world ought to be? God is an easy answer to that question. Easy, that is,
until we really start thinking hard about it. But if not God, then who?
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But the problems get worse. If morality is determined by absolute, universal
rules, then those rules would have to cover a potentially infinite number of possible
actions. As such, we’d need a potentially infinite number of rules. But I can’t know an
infinite number of rules; hell, I can’t remember what I had for breakfast. That means
that morality is beyond my limited human intellectual capabilities, and so I, and every
other mere mortal, am off the moral hook. After all, no one can reasonably demand that
I do what I am incapable of doing, and I am incapable of knowing all the rules.
An answer to these problems came from Immanuel Kant, a man so rule-bound
that he died a virgin and would have his manservant wrap his hands before bed. Kant’s
extremely clever complete answer to this question includes lots of words like a priori,
prolegomena, and antinomy, and so was not understood for about half a century after
his death. But the basic idea is that if you pop open the rule-based box, inside is another
box that makes the rules. Whenever a situation is put into the duty-based box, the
second box looks at the paper, generates the proper rule, and if the action is in accord
with the rule, the green light goes on and if it violates the rule, the red light goes on.
So now all we have to do is open up that second box to see how it works. This second box
is what Kant called the “categorical imperative.” It works like this, take the action,
remove all context – who did it, to whom it was done, why it was done, when and where
it was done, what happened as a result of doing it,… – ignore it all. Get down to just the
bare action and ask, “Which ought to be the universal rule, always do it or never do it?”
or “What if everyone did it?” This will serve as your ethicometer and illuminate the
intrinsic ethical nature of the action for you. Think of “What if everyone did it?” it as the
rule that generates the rules.
The system can now be set out explicitly:
Deontology: An act x is morally right if and only if there is a universal moral rule
‘Always do x.’
When deciding whether it is ok to murder someone who delights in creating a public
nuisance,
forget about who it is, what the world would be like without him, what the punishment
would be for killing him,..none of that matters. Just ask whether “always murder” or
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“never murder” ought to be the universal ethical law. The fact that “never murder” is the
appropriate choice makes that and every other murder morally wrong – no matter what.
But while Kant seems to have answered our two concerns above, there is another
problem. By placing the ethical properties of an act solely within the nature of the act
itself, we lose the ability to deal with cases where the consequences of the act seem to
make a big difference.
Suppose you are asked by an angry person with a gun where his intended victim is
hiding. You know the intended victim is a good person, you know the murderer has a
mistaken belief about the person but won’t listen to you, and you know the hiding place.
Kant says that morally you need to tell the truth. Really? And get an innocent person
killed? Don’t listen to Kant. Don’t tell the murderer the truth. Consequences matter. An
unnecessarily dead good person is a bad thing. So, while there is definitely some sense
in which ethical rules are important to a complete ethical system, sometimes you have to
break the rules to act morally.
Utilitarianism
You are sitting in a park people watching. A stranger walks up to you and, for no
reason at all, hands you a freshly baked chocolate chip cookie. As you say, “Thank you,”
and take a bite, another stranger walks up and, for no good reason at all, punches you in
the nose. First act, good; second act, bad. Why? Simple. The first act generated
happiness and the second act generated pain. Our actions have ramifications in the
world around us – real life costs and benefits. We can choose to act in ways that either
make the world a better place for everyone in it or act in ways that don’t. Morality seems
to say that determining the rightness or wrongness of an act requires determining
whether the act will result in a better or worse world.
The system where the consequences of an action are the determining factor in the
rightness or wrongness of an action is called utilitarianism. The utility or usefulness
of an action is the reason an act is ethically necessary or not. To determine whether an
act is moral or not, perform a cost benefit analysis taking equally into account the pain
and pleasure of everyone affected.
Should I lie? The answer, according to the utilitarian, depends upon to whom and
about what? To some attractive woman in a bar about what kind of car I drive? No. This
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lie, while at best may produce passing pleasure, in the end will cause things to come out
badly for everyone involved. Should I lie to my best friend in order to get her to the
surprise party I know she’ll enjoy? Of course. How about to the angry person with the
blunt instrument in search of his victim you see hiding in the bushes? You lie. To the
three-year-old who asks you if Santa is real? Don’t be a jerk.
The utilitarian asserts that there is nothing intrinsically wrong about lying. In
fact, there is nothing intrinsically right or wrong about any action. It all depends upon
whether the lie will have better or worse consequences than not lying. But those
consequences need to include all the consequences, even the long term ones, not just the
“it makes life easier at this moment” ones. The seemingly convenient lie will often have
very bad unintended consequences. But that does not mean that one ought never lie.
Repeat after me, “No, I don’t think that makes your butt look big at all.”
The folks who advocated utilitarianism in the 19th century were also the people in
favor of political reforms that gave more people, including women, the right to vote. The
idea behind both of these systems is that everyone’s pain and pleasure is considered
equally – the moral equivalent of one person, one vote. Everyone’s potential pain and
pleasure are all thrown onto one big ethical tally sheet, and everyone is considered
equally in the calculation, no matter who it is. If someone experiences more pain or
pleasure, of course the amount is considered, but whether it is prince or pauper is
completely irrelevant. Utilitarianism is meant to be democratic ethics.
These are also the folks who championed free market economics. The idea that
the marketplace is rational and will stabilize prices in order to maximize overall benefit
for everyone is right in line with the idea that ethics ought to do the same in the same
way. It is fully intended to make moral deliberation into ethical accounting.
We can set out the system, then in this way:
Utilitarianism: An act x is morally right if and only if it is the action that brings about
the best overall consequences.
We are morally responsible for the state of the world around us, and to be moral is to act
in such a way that we leave the best possible world behind.
So, what could possibly be wrong with that?
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Imagine that one day you come home to find that you have been robbed. Your
computer, TV, ipad, speakers – gone. You go room to room noting that your most
expensive leisure-time and labor-saving devices have all been stolen. Shocked, you walk
into the kitchen and there, on the refrigerator, under a “Save the Children” magnet
you’ve never seen before, is a note: “Got tired of waiting for you to call, so I just took all
your stuff and hocked it. Using the money to feed and build schools for the children of
three villages in sub-Saharan Africa. Thanks for your ‘generosity.’ Sincerely, Bono.”
There is no doubt that the wealth tied up in your entertainment equipment is
generating more overall good in the world having been liberated from your sorry,
Dorito-eating, couch potato possession. Does that make it morally appropriate to send
in the Bono brigade to burgle your home? Maximizing utility in cases like this does not
lead to ethical action, quite the opposite. And if one were to confront Bono, and they
indignantly ask why shouldn’t they do what they can to help these people in need, your
response would most likely be, “You have no right to come into my home and take my
stuff.” While there is certainly an aspect to a complete ethical system that hinges on
leaving a better world than we found, ethical right and wrong here seems to hinge on
this idea of rights which – at least in this case – seems to trump utility.
Rights-based Ethics
In the 20th century the most influential moral notion was that of rights. Women’s
rights, civil rights, gay rights, human rights; all have been the rallying points from which
injustice was fought, and, in some cases, outright defeated. Exclusion from full
humanity and citizenship is the hallmark of an unjust social structure, and the most
powerful moral weapon in the dismantling of barriers put up by the haves to keep the
have-nots out has been the notion of rights.
One of the reasons this tool has been so effective is because the notion of rights is
also crucial to the haves. The place where the concept of rights begins is with property
rights, with the erection of social protection structures for the stuff of the wealthy and
the ability to enforce contracts so that they have a stable business environment in which
to seek further enrichment. What property rights do is guarantee that nobody can mess
with my stuff and that I’ll get paid if I sell it. The powerful are almost always also the
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rich, and in order to keep what they have in terms of both wealth and power, they rely
on the inviolability of a structure based on rights.
It was then a very small step to extend the notion of rights from keeping my things safe
to keeping my body safe, and then we were off and running, declaring moral rights to
protect our privacy, access to healthcare, and countless other needs. More and more got
packed in until we started seeing claims like “I have a right to drive a gas-guzzling,
fume-spewing SUV,” regardless of how it impacts the environment or other cars in
collisions.
We now throw around the term “rights” without having any real sense of what it
means. To fix this, we must first distinguish again between the notions of legal and
moral because we use rights-talk in both cases. If a buddy confided in me that he got
herpes from his roommate’s girlfriend and I promised to keep it secret, and then I
immediately text this fact to a mutual friend, I cannot cite the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States in my defense. Breaking confidence while gossiping is
not a federal crime, but it does make you a slime bag. Your legal right to free speech
means that you cannot be arrested for saying most things. It doesn’t mean that there are
no moral responsibilities to watch what you say. Just as in the case of cultural
relativism, where we had to be careful not to confuse legal with moral, here we need to
keep legal rights – which again are decided by the whims of a legislative body – distinct
in our minds from moral rights.
This difference is part of the reason why we see so much talk about human rights from
the United Nations, a body which sits outside of individual governments and the legal
rights they may or may not grant to their citizens. The UN advocates for measures that
bring the legal rights of each individual nation closer to the basic moral rights shared by
all people. The idea of universal human rights is a moral notion, and the hope is that by
having an extra-governmental organization concerned about moral rights, we may be
able to affect the granting of legal rights within individual countries in such a way that
legal and moral rights converge.
Where virtue looks at the actor, duty looks at the action, and utilitarianism looks
at everyone in the world, rights-based ethics focuses all attention on the person to whom
the act is being done. The central insight is that all human beings have the same basic
needs and the same basic conditions that will allow them space to develop freely and
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flourish. As such, since every human – and animal rights advocates argue, every
member of the animal kingdom – is an autonomous being who by his/her/its very
nature has a certain intrinsic value, the conditions of their thriving ought to be morally
protected from transgression.
But not all of the conditions for human or animal flourishing are the same
everywhere and at all times. Certainly, what is needed in some contexts is different from
others. This is where we bring in the concept of a social contract that both affirms
universal human rights and allows for local variation. Societies are set up differently,
and in each, rights are distributed differently. In some cases, the distribution is designed
to maximize individual freedom, in other cases to maximize social orderliness and
security, in others to maximize equality. There are competing moral goods, and different
groups in different contexts will choose to elevate different ones as primary. This can
even change in a single culture over time, so the social contract is dynamic, constantly
renegotiated in the face of a changing social context.
It is here that we see some of the cultural relativists’ insights beginning to appear in a
more sophisticated form. In normal times, markets may be allowed to set prices, say, for
plywood; but after a natural disaster, where scarcity may take the price of goods
necessary for the protection of life and property through what little is left of the roof,
price gauging makes you a scum bag. Rights are not entirely absolute and may vary with
the social context.
There are two reasons why this does not devolve into cultural relativism. First,
universal human rights are always present to serve as a lowest level of inalienable rights.
The social contract is constrained by the demands of basic human existence and
flourishing. Second, the contract is based on a moral good that the group has chosen to
elevate – equality, security, freedom – and there may be deep, intellectual discussion
about whether this good ought to occupy a privileged place. Rationality may still exist in
the negotiating of the social contract.
But regardless of the source of the right, universal or from a social contract, we
can now define our basic moral vocabulary.
Rights-based Ethics: An act x is morally permissible if and only if it does not violate
any person’s rights
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously said, “The right to swing my fist ends where the
other man’s nose begins.” As long as you are not violating the rights of anyone else, you
may do as you darn well please.
And that is the key to rights-based ethics; it entails purely negative duties. Rights
never tell me what I have to do for you, they only say what you can’t do to me. For all of
the historical heavy-lifting they have done over the last couple of centuries, the moral
concept of a right is an extremely weak notion. You can act in a way that doesn’t violate
anyone’s rights and still be a complete prick.
Suppose you are taking a walk down the street and you suddenly have what
seems at the time to be a great idea. You want to write it down so you don’t forget it, but
you don’t have a piece of paper. Suddenly, you realize that you are passing a yard sale,
and there on the table is an old notebook for a nickel. You buy it and write down your
idea. Later, when leafing back through the notebook, you come across some strange
symbols and a paragraph from the former owner as to their meaning. It turns out that it
is the chemical formula for a substance that would be the greatest wonder drug in
history. It can cure cancer, AIDS, malaria, sleeping sickness, male-pattern baldness,
menstrual cramping, and erectile dysfunction – every major threat to humanity. You
now own this piece of paper because you bought the notebook and have acquired the
right to use its contents as you see fit. You could turn this piece of paper over to medical
science and save the lives and end the suffering of many people.
But, if you follow a rights-based ethic, you wouldn’t have to. You can do whatever you
want. You could burn it. You could eat it. You could go to oncology wards and wave
around the page saying, “I bet you wish you had this,” while dancing the Can-Can. That
page is yours to do with as you please, and you don’t have to be a nice guy to still be
moral according to a rights-based system.
The folks who buy into rights-based ethics Locke, stock, and barrel are called
Libertarians. Just as ethical subjectivists elevate tolerance above all other virtues to the
status of the one and only virtue, so libertarians elevate individual freedom above all
other moral concerns. Rights are needed to guarantee individual freedom, all else be
damned. It is certainly true that, all other things being equal, liberty is an incredibly
precious thing that ought to be protected with one’s life if need be. One cannot say
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enough about how important and wonderful freedom is. But, as with tolerance, it is not
the only thing. Life is a complicated place, and while liberty is tremendously valuable, it
is not, as libertarians want to maintain, the only thing of moral value.
The notebook example above demonstrates the moral poverty of libertarianism. The
view is generally supported by well-off, well-educated, self-centered white guys who
above all else want to make sure that now that they have theirs, a) no one else will take
it, and b) they don’t have to feel guilty about not wanting to share it. By focusing
exclusively on rights and the resulting freedoms, libertarians free themselves from what
we usually think of when we think of morality, that is, being decent, caring, empathetic
human beings who actually give a darn about anyone other than themselves. This is not
to say that everyone who calls him or herself a libertarian is a selfish, uncaring clod.
Freedom is important and we need people dedicated to protecting it, but it is not the
only important thing and those who hold it to be can work against human flourishing.
When the notion of rights is allowed to seep its way into questions of morality around
personal relationships, we end up with really bad relationships. If your sweetie pie gives
you flowers or chocolates on Valentine’s Day because they see it as fulfilling a romantic
contract, your honey bunny probably does not really understand the meaning of the
word “romantic.” And if smoochums now expects that, having satisfied their end of the
romantic contract you are now required to satisfy your part, a visit to a couples’
counselor (or the acquisition of a dating site membership) might be prudent. Being a
good person requires more than just avoiding violating the rights of others. It involves
actually feeling the pleasure and pain of others, especially those close to you. While the
concept of rights needs to be kept in some capacity, morality seems to need to move
beyond mere rights to empathy, concern, and care.
Care-based Ethics
One thing that all of the above systems have in common is that they were all
developed by men. This is evident in the character of the systems. Notice how they bear
a striking resemblance to the way that traditional men’s occupations work: they are
legalistic approaches or economic-based approaches. When coming up with a system, it
is not strange that men would model that system on other systems of socially enforced
behavior. But that is not the only such model.
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Carol Gilligan was a research assistant in the laboratory of Harvard psychologist,
Lawrence Kohlberg, who was studying the development of moral reasoning. He followed
Jean Piaget in asserting that one could rank moral maturity with the lowest level being
obedience to authority for fear of punishment and the highest level being the use of
universal abstract moral concepts such as justice. He noted that boys would frequently
reach this most abstract level of moral sensibility, but that girls most often would not,
remaining instead in the concrete world of the situation around them. He concluded
that males are frequently more morally developed than females.
Gilligan thought that something was wrong, not necessarily in the observations,
but in Kohlberg’s analysis of them. Women, she argued, do, by in large, approach moral
situations differently. It is, indeed, less based upon strict adherence to cold, abstract
rules and more based upon relating to people as the people they are. But this does not
mean that girls are less morally developed. It means that women most likely are dealing
with a different sense of how one ought to relate morally to other people.
This sense is based not around the contractual model of tit for tat and abstract
principles, the sort of thing that boys would have to internalize if they were to be
successful in traditional male social roles. Rather, it is based around the sort of
relational skills that girls would have to master to be successful in the traditional roles
reserved for them: wife, mother, nurse, and teacher. In all of these roles, the core
principle of the relationship is care. To care about another is to take legitimate interest
and concern in their development and well-being.
Notice how different this is from the contractual-based relationships that are standard
parts of the work world. In the work world, the focus is not on the development of the
other person, but on your own self-interest. You enter into relations with others for the
sole purpose of advancing your own interests, and you remain in that relationship only
as long as you both believe it is mutually advantageous. If someone else gives you a
better price and you haven’t yet signed on the dotted line, see ya. Legal and business
relationships are built around the notion of contracts where it is clearly set out what
each must do for the other. Once both parties agree to the contract, you are tied in. You
now have an obligation under the contract. Once you fulfill your end of the bargain, you
are released from the relationship. You need not have anything more to do with the
party of the first part. You may choose to continue to do business with this person, but
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you are under no obligation to do so. In a contractual relationship you only do as much
as you have to, and you do it so that the other person will do for you what he agreed to.
You act in the interest of the other person only so that he will do what you need him to.
Once he’s done it, goodbye.
Care-based relationships are a completely different animal. Where acting releases you
from a contractual relationship, with a care-based relationship, acting in the interest of
the other person further embeds you in the relationship. You become someone the other
person knows she can count on when she needs you. Parents do not keep track of the
time and money they spend on their children expecting to be repaid. They act out of love
and care, out of a genuine sense of concern for the flourishing of their child. To be a
good parent is to willingly sacrifice, to put your child’s interests before your own. The
approach to morally good behavior that we see in the other systems fails in cases where
there is a special relationship.
Suppose you are late for an important meeting and you see someone broken down on
the side of the road. It is cold, raining, miserable. Your eyes meet his as you pass, and
you can tell that the person does not have a cell phone. The road is not a main
thoroughfare, so it might be quite a while until someone else happens by. If you drive
past the person thinking, “I wish I had time to stop for you, but I have a meeting I have
to get to,” the person most likely would watch your taillights and simply say, “%$&!.”
You’d probably feel a small pang of guilt, and rightly so. It wasn’t the nicest thing you
could have done.
But now suppose that it was your best friend whose car broke down, and when your eyes
meet, you know he recognized you. Now, when your best friend – the one who lifted the
toilet seat just before you revisited those tequila shots and burritos; the one who would
vouch for any alibi, no matter how inane; the one who listened to you drone on and on
for days about the love of your life leaving you for the person everyone else knew they
were sleeping with for all those months – that friend sees your car driving away leaving
them stranded in the middle of nowhere. Needless to say, they will add a few more
expletives to his rant when watching the fading taillights, and some of them will include
your mother. This better not be the same small pang of guilt you felt with the stranger.
You just screwed over your best friend. What kind of self-absorbed uncaring piece of
garbage are you? Friends, family, and lovers come with an additional level of moral
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responsibility, an additional level that is not abstract, but which lives in the same world
as your loved one. We can set out the heart of the care-based system in this way:
Care-based Ethics: An act x is morally good if and only if you do x because you
believe that it will help some particular person with whom you have a relationship live a
better life
Moral goodness comes from caring about someone and acting on that care to make their
life a place where they are more likely to flourish.
There is no doubt that the foundational insights here are right on the money. There is a
special ethical obligation that you take on when you are in a caring relationship. But this
ethic of caring cannot be universalized to cover all acts. Unless you are Oprah, you
cannot care about everyone. At some point, your care for others will necessitate
neglecting the well-being of those you began caring about first. If you really care about
someone, it means that you are willing to put her welfare above others. If you try to
elevate everyone to that level, it will quickly become self-defeating. There are – and
must be – people you don’t really care about. That doesn’t mean that you wouldn’t care
about them if you knew them or knew of their plight. If you are a decent, empathetic
person, of course you would.
Not being in a caring relationship with every other person on the planet does not mean
that you do not have an obligation to those other people. You do. That’s why care-based
ethics is by itself – like all the other views – insufficient. At best, it must be a part of the
larger complete system.
Now what?
Ok, so there are five aspects to moral situations and a proposed ethical system
that takes each of them as the single, unique factor that needs to be considered in
making a decision about what is morally necessary.
Aspect of the situation

Ethical System based on it

The person acting

Virtue Ethics

The action itself

Duty Ethics
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The consequences of the action

Utilitarianism

The person the action is done to

Rights-Based Ethics

Special relationships of the person

Care-based Ethics

acting
For each and every one of these systems, there are cases where each hits the nail right
on the head, and for each there are cases where following them is clearly wrong. None of
them is sufficient on its own, but each properly paints part of the picture. The natural
instinct is to say, “Can’t we put them together and get one big system? Can’t we figure
out a way to hook all the boxes together into one big box?”
Well…yes and no. This is where we tun to discourse. We do employ all of these
ethical systems when we think and talk about ethics. Listen closely when you hear those
around you talking bout moral issues, they will use the language of virtue, duty,
consequences, rights, and care. All of these are part of how we think about the hard
moral questions.
What is fortunate for us is that in the overwhelming majority of cases, all five of
these ethical systems point us in the same direction. This is why we have the mistaken
idea that we have some natural intuitive sense that guides us. We have a complex sense
of morality, but in most cases there’s nothing complex happening so it all seems so easy.
Until it doesn’t. In the hard cases, what we see are two different systems giving us
two different prescriptions for ethical action. Take the case of the murderer looking for
the innocent victim. Deontology says to never lie, so tell the murderer where the hiding
spot is. Because the harm of telling the truth in this case outweighs any minor harm
from lying, utilitarianism tells you not to tell the murderer where the victim is hiding.
Which do you listen to? In this case, utilitarianism.
But always? No. If we generate tremendous pleasure by enslaving a small
subpopulation, utilitarianism says you have to do it. Deontology tells you that slavery is
wrong. In this case, deontology wins.
In these two cases, it was easy to pick the winner. But in our hardest cases, it is
not easy at all. That is why the hard moral problems are hard. We have a multifaceted
account of ethics and the persistent problems, the ones that seem like they have no
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solution, are the cases where two or more of our moral systems disagree with one
another concerning what to do and we have strong cases on both sides. It is not that
these cases don’t have solutions. It isn’t that there is not a best answer. It is just that it
is unclear what the best answer is. This is where we need to talk and think. This is
where we need to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the outputs of the different
moral systems and engage in thoughtful, open-minded ethical discourse. These moral
systems will not always determine the answer for us, but they will give us the
comparative grounds upon which to collectively decide.
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Tendentious Jokes are Immoral
Eugenio Zaldivar
What is a tendentious joke? As a first approximation it’s a joke that uses
stereotypes as part of its structure and which is designed to introduce or reinforce a bias.
The stereotype can appear in either the set-up, the punchline or both. If you want a
classic example of a tendentious joke just think of a joke which hinges on the idea that
blonde persons (especially women) are not as smart as everyone else. In its most
common form tendentious jokes use negative stereotypes. There are, of course, many
examples of tendentious humor, as many examples as there are negative stereotypes.18
So, what’s wrong with this kind of humor? Isn’t it, like any other humor, just
using the shared cultural background of the comedian and audience? Don’t all jokes play
on expectations in some way? Can you even tell a joke without using some sort of
stereotype? We don’t have space in this chapter to address the broader questions about
humor, but it will be fruitful to consider the issue briefly, at least as a point of
comparison.
The simplest answer is that not all humor uses stereotypes because humor is
broader than joking. Physical humor and practical jokes, for example, can be performed
without leaning on our shared assumptions about different groups of people. If we
restrict ourselves to verbal humor, we can still find jokes that do not use stereotypes.
Knock knock jokes and observational humor are examples of joke styles that do not rest
on stereotypes:
What did the 0 say to the 8?
Nice belt.19
It is possible, therefore, to be funny without using stereotypes. Does that mean that we
should always avoid using stereotypes? Aren’t there non-harmful stereotypes, even

18
It is possible that a joke can express a bias without resorting to stereotyping. A joke could simply be
insulting, crude or dehumanizing. In this essay, we will focus on the use of stereotypes, however the conclusions
that we draw will hold true for tendentious humor across the board.
19
Share this joke with any male parent, they’ll love it.
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positive ones? If a joke uses the stereotype that isn’t derogatory is that still a problem?
In other words, is it harmful to use any stereotype, full stop, or is it only harmful if we
use negative stereotypes?
Types of Stereotypes
To better answer that question we should consider some examples of stereotypes
that we might use in a joke.
(1) salespersons are mendacious,
(2) Asian people are good at math
(3) men are childish
To begin to see what’s wrong with this sort of humor we can start by looking at the
differences between those three examples. Once we’ve teased them apart we can more
easily consider why stereotype using jokes should be avoided.
To start with we can see that (1) is about a category of persons that is not an
intrinsic property. No one is born working in sales. Anyone who does work in sales can
choose to quit and pursue a different line of work. So, when we make jokes about
salesperson, lawyers, doctors, etc. we are not making fun of a characteristic that a
person has no control over. Indeed, using the name for a job or career is just a
shorthand for a series of actions. They don’t describe inherent characteristics like skin
color, gender, height, etc. If you don’t like having people assume that you are a liar, you
can stop working in sales. You can’t stop being a man or being a person of Asian
ancestry.
Does this make it OK to make jokes that incorporate the sort of stereotypes that
we see in (1)? Maybe. For now, we can note that while it seems right to say that making
fun of what a person does is not as troubling as making fun of who a person is, the
people who are being mocked may not like it very much anyway.
Another important difference between the examples is that (1) and (3) are
negative stereotypes while (2) is, at least on its face, a positive stereotype. It seems likely
that putting someone down in a joke is worse than lifting someone up, and using a
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positive stereotype might be an example of the latter. However, we should note that
people do not always see eye to eye on the issue of whether or not a particular stereotype
is positive. Latines are stereotypically said to have a good sense of rhythm.20 This might
be a positive stereotype, if you’re Latine and looking to find a dance partner. But it can
be a negative stereotype if you are a Latine with two left feet who keeps getting asked to
dance by strangers who just assume that you are good dancer.
Indeed, in some cases, like the example in (2), putatively positive stereotypes are
seen as a bad thing by many persons within the community. Many Asian Americans, for
example, suffer from being used as examples of a “model minority.”21 The stereotype
that they are good at math, and science, is part of that burden. So, we can conclude, that,
at the very least, if you are using a stereotype that you see in a positive light, you cannot
be sure that it will be seen that way by everyone. Furthermore, the use of stereotypes
whether positive or negative will inevitably reinforce biased attitudes toward that group.
If nothing else, this should cause some concern.
One last distinction that we can point to is that (3) refers to a group, men, who
are generally in positions of power in our society. Does this mean that it’s OK to make
fun of them? Many comedians subscribe to the notions that it’s acceptable to punch up,
but not to punch down. Which is to say, it’s acceptable to for someone to make of fun of
people who have more power than the joke-teller or the audience. The idea, in brief, is
that the group that is the butt of the joke, because of its privileged position, cannot
actually be hurt by the joke. It is probably right to say that the ability to be harmed by a
joke, or a stereotype, varies with the amount of privilege a person or group has within
society. More powerful people, whether their power is economic, socio-political or
structural are less likely to be vulnerable to the opinions of others. When you think of
things this way it does seem like punching-up is a victimless crime. We should note,
however, that even if some groups are less harmed than others by tendentious humor,
that doesn’t mean they aren’t harmed at all. And, again, reinforcing biases that make it

20
Latine, pronounced lah*tee*neh, is a newer word that takes the place of latinx. Latine sounds better to
fluent Spanish speakers and can be conjugated, in Spanish, in a natural way: un latine, los latines, etc.
21
https://cmhc.utexas.edu/modelminority.html
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harder to see persons as unique individuals, and not merely tokens of their group, is
something that we should be wary of.
So, we can see that even when we are just discussing tendentious humor and the
use of stereotypes in a general way the whole thing is, at best, a problematic practice.
Even before discussing the sorts of harms tendentious humor can cause we can see that
there is at least a prima-facie case for concern.
Let’s turn to the specific harms that tendentious humor can cause.

The Harm of Tendentious Jokes
In this section we’ll look at three harms that tendentious jokes can inflict. 22 Of
course, this is not an exhaustive catalog of the harms of stereotypes in humor, but, even
this brief list will make a strong case against tendentious humor.
We can start with the observation that individual members of a group, even one
with significant institutional advantages can be hurt by the stereotypes in humor. Many
individual men are no doubt bothered or hurt by the media’s depiction of men as barely
functional, overgrown children. It should be even more obvious that persons who are
not as privileged as cis, straight, middle class men will often be hurt by the stereotypes
used in jokes.
And even in the case of jokes about jobs and not identities, it’s not hard to
imagine that a lawyer being aggravated at the millionth telling of the “good start” joke. It
is true that these jokes are not as damaging as some others, we might think of these
instances as small scale harm, but it is a real harm nonetheless. And yet consider that
tendentious humor isn’t the only way to get a laugh, that the harms just mentioned,
small as they may be, are not tempered by any great need. How can we then justify these
jokes?
Of more concern are jokes that reinforce harmful stereotypes for groups of
persons that are in positions to be harmed. Many racial, religious, ethnic and gender
22

It would be a good exercise for the reader to consider what harms have been left out.
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minorities spend their lives in harms way. They do not have the institutional advantages
to protect them, as a class, from the damage that stereotypes can do. The biases
employed in jokes exposed them to even greater danger.
The most obvious way in which tendentious humor is harmful is in the way that it
can demean entire groups of people by employing negative stereotypes. 23 Anyone with a
minimal awareness of humor and jokes is aware of the many shameful ways in which
minorities can be depicted: Jews are greedy; blondes are dumb; Muslims are hateful;
immigrants can’t be trusted; women are crazy; and fat people have no discipline. To
name just a tiny fraction of the stereotypes that are often used in humor. Consider how
queer men and women might feel when they hear friends casually retelling homophobic
jokes. But there is a different, more subtle, way in which stereotypes used in humor can
be harmful.
One way in which jokes cause harm is via their role in social policing. Social
policing is the use of social cues, such as humor, to reinforce norms. Take, for example,
the social norm that men should be stoic.24 The notion that men are weak or less manly,
if they show almost any emotion25 is enforced by peer groups via jokes at the victim’s
expense and which employ stereotypes to debilitating effect. You can see much the same
effect in the supposedly playful teasing of little girls who don’t express enough interest
in being typically feminine. The girls quickly learn that to the only way to stop the
teasing is to conform to the toxic norms. And, of course, recall that even in the case of
so-called positive stereotypes, like the stereotypes of Asian students, the attitudes
displayed in jokes, and stories, that employ them reinforce biases that place unfair
pressures on the affected groups. Tendentious humor, when deployed in this way, robs
us of individuality and the freedom to be the persons we want to be.
Finally, if we look at the role of stereotypes in reinforcing prejudicial attitudes,
we will see a third type of harm. Jokes that employ stereotypes reinforce biases which
cause fissures within society. The primary mechanism is similar to the what happens in

23
Here we will focus on negative stereotypes, but recall that even seemingly positive stereotypes can be
harmful.
24
Boys don’t cry.
25
Men are allowed to be angry and horny and that’s about it.
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the social policing examples, jokes use stereotypes to reinforce biases, but in this case
the effect is to highlight and harden the differences between groups in society. This type
of humor creates an in-group and an out-group. The out-group is mocked, belittled and
out-right insulted with no particular care given to the effects of these actions. This is
perhaps the most harmful result of tendentious humor.
Recall the example of jokes that make fun of people working in sales. We can now
see why, even though a job is not a central part of a person’s demographic identity, and
so making fun of a lawyer is different from making fun of a black person, lawyer jokes
still encourage us to adopt divisive insider/outsider attitudes.
When we make jokes at the expense of certain groups we set the stage for
thinking of them as fundamentally different from us. This, in turn, makes it easier to
think of the out-groups as alien, as not really belonging, and as inferior. Of course, this
is in itself a bad thing, but it also makes it easier to pass laws and take actions that
directly harm the out-group. There is a direct line between making jokes denigrating a
group and adopting a hateful attitude toward the group. This style of humor drives
wedges between in-groups and out-groups in a way that isn’t just about solidarity or
cultural affirmation, but about hurting the out-group.

Answering the Objections
If tendentious humor supports some of our ugliest tendencies, then why is it so
prevalent? It’s defenders often resort to two defenses:
1) Free Speech
2) It’s just a joke
The free speech defense is insufficient. It is simply not the case that we can say
anything and everything that we wish to say. There are prohibitions against lying on the
witness stand or using racist language at work. It is true that not all forms of insulting or
harmful expression are formally disallowed by law or corporate policy, but simply being
free to say a thing does not make it acceptable to say it. We have a right to express
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ourselves, but this does not give us a right to harm others. If tendentious humor is
harmful, then it ought to be avoided by good people whether or not it is officially
censured.
The more common defense among persons who enjoy this humor is that they’re
just jokes and that the offended group is too thin skinned. In other words, humor is not
able to actually harm you, if you don’t let it. It seems very unlikely that this is true. In
the case of children being shamed into conforming with toxic norms it’s not at all clear
that they can defend themselves from the harm. In the case of out-groups the harm
comes from the in-group’s behavior, as affected by the humor-reinforced biases. How is
a thick skin meant to keep a black person from being denied a promotion because of
their skin color? How is a thick skin meant to keep an immigrant from being denied a
job because of their accent?
Finally, proponents of tendentious humor assert a particularly problematic
attitude. They argue that their preference for a type of humor is more important than
anyone else’s preference to avoid being denigrated and harmed. Is this a reasonable
position for a good person to take? Should it be acceptable, morally or socially, to simply
not care about the effect your words have on other people?
At the very least a person who wants to enjoy tendentious humor about blondes
adopts the attitude that they don’t think blonde women deserve to feel upset. The joketeller also does not care, if blonde women do get upset. Is that an attitude that a good
person would embrace?
Jokes like those we have been discussing are harmful in themselves, but even
more importantly they help to desensitize us to the resulting and related harms that
accompany the humor and makes it easier to do even more and greater harm.
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It Really Is Just a Joke
Jennifer Marra Henrigillis

Jokes are funny things. When I tell a joke, I’m telling it because I think it’s funny,
and I think you’ll think it’s funny too. Or I think it’s funny, and I don’t care if you find it
funny, because I think it’s funny, and telling it will tickle me. Or, I know you won’t find it
funny, which I will find funny.
As philosophers, we want to be very precise about what we mean when we use
words, because the way we define words determines whether you and I can agree, and
whether you and I are even talking about the same thing. Defining our terms assures
both of us that we are talking about the same thing, and mean the same thing, so we can
figure out if agree or disagree about that thing. When I say “jokes are funny things”,
philosophers the world over roll their eyes and demand that I be more specific. But I
don’t really have to be. Jokes are funny things, as I’ll explain, and funny things have no
necessary moral value.
Moral value is a term that indicates that a thing, like punting a baby, can be
judged as either moral (good, ethical, praiseworthy, right, just) or immoral (bad,
unethical, blameworthy, wrong, unjust). When we say something has a moral value, we
mean that it is a thing that we can make moral judgments about. I make a moral
judgment when I say that it is bad, unethical, blameworthy, wrong, and unjust to punt a
baby, no matter how football-shaped that particular baby might be. This is a particular
sort of judgment – a common one, but a specific one.
Another sort of judgment is a judgment of perception, or a conclusion we decide
upon based on sensory evidence. I can judge a chair as green, while you could judge it as
blue. When the room is brightly lit, the chair appears green to me. I judge it, that is,
decide, that it is green. But when you walk into the room, the room is dark. You see a
blue chair. You decide that the chair is blue. We can disagree about our judgments based
on the sense data we collected from our experience of the chair at the time we saw it. We
can disagree about the color of the chair. We won’t know who is right or who is wrong
about the color until we both go back into the room together and turn on the lights and
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look at the chair. Immanuel Kant called these a posteriori judgments26. These
judgments rely on experience to make and disagreements rely on experience or the
senses (called empirical evidence) to resolve. Judgments of perception are amoral. This
means that they have no moral value at all. I can be factually right or wrong when it
comes to the color of the chair, but I’m not morally right or wrong if I see a green chair
and you see a blue chair.
Another sort of judgment are a priori judgments27. These are things we can judge
without having any experience of them. I can judge a triangle to have three sides even if
I’m not looking at a triangle and even if I’ve never seen a triangle. I can make this a
priori judgment because I know that the definition of “triangle” is “a three-sided figure”.
I don’t have to ever see a triangle to know that this is true, because I know what the
word means. I can use the same sort of judgment to conclude that 2 + 2 = 4. I don’t need
to count two things and then two more things to know that the total will be four things;
it is logically, obviously, and automatically true, without empirical verification (or, to
put another way, without having to use my senses to experience it as true). A priori
judgments are amoral. It’s not morally right or wrong for a triangle to have three sides,
it’s simply definitionally true that triangles have three sides.
I can judge, a priori, that jokes are funny things. In order for a joke to be a joke, it
must be funny. If it’s not funny, it’s not a joke. I don’t have to hear a joke to know it
must be funny – funniness is the bare minimum of what a joke has to be in order to be a
joke. It can be defined in more specific ways too, as philosophers of humor do, but the
necessary condition for a joke to be a joke is that it is funny, and I can know this without
ever needing to hear a joke and without ever having to verify it by hearing a joke. This is
why I won’t go further in specifying a definition. Whatever other features you throw in
there – that jokes can be verbal or nonverbal, that jokes are told or performed by
jokesters – it’s an a priori fact that jokes are funny, whether verbal or non, etc.
Whatever jokes are, they’re performed by people. Dogs don’t tell jokes. We can
find a dog funny, but a dog isn’t going to ever say, “Stop me if you’ve heard this one…”.

26
27

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A7/B12
Ibid B4
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Because people are the only things that can be moral or immoral, we assume that all the
things that people do are subject to moral judgement – we don’t say that a tiger is
morally bad for stalking and killing a zebra, but we do say that a human is morally bad if
they stalk and kill another person. Insofar as jokes are performed by people, it’s
common to impose all sorts of moral judgments onto them. But not all the things that
people do are either good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral. The way I tie my
shoes isn’t a moral action, and it doesn’t have moral value, neither does my preference
for purple over pink.
But, some philosophers argue, when you laugh at a joke, or tell one, you are doing
something that has moral value – you’re morally endorsing the ideas of the joke, or
signing off on those ideas, or agreeing with those ideas.28 But that’s just as silly as saying
that I’m morally endorsing the idea of tying my shoes in a certain way. When I tie my
shoes bunny-ears style, I’m not doing it because I think it’s morally right to do so, or
that I’m endorsing it as the way everyone should tie their shoes, or because I’m agreeing
that this is the moral way that shoes should be tied. I’m simply tying my shoes the way
that I prefer. I don’t prescribe that method to you or say you’re bad for not doing it the
same way. I’m not even thinking that it’s the only correct, or morally right, way to tie
shoes. It’s just the way I tie them. If you told me I was doing something morally wrong
in tying my shoes that way, it would be just as absurd as telling me I’m morally wrong
for liking purple more than pink.
Laughing is involuntary.29 It’s a physiological, bodily response to a stimulus. To
say that someone has done something morally wrong by laughing at a joke is as silly as
saying that someone is morally wrong for sneezing. Saying someone is morally wrong
for telling a joke is just as silly as saying that someone is morally wrong for thinking
purple is better than pink. The person tells the joke because she thinks it’s funny. You
might not think it’s funny, but you might not like purple either. You’re not morally
wrong for not liking purple, and you’re not morally right or wrong for thinking the joke
isn’t funny. But it’s not the joke’s fault you don’t like it. It’s yours. You just don’t find it
I’ve even said this before, in Marra 2019 and 2020! I’m not alone though, and a lot of highly respectable
scholars have made similar arguments – see Zaldivar and Julin in this volume, Kramer 2015, and Smuts
2010, among many.
29 See Provine 2000
28
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funny. So, for you, it’s not a joke. And as soon as you decide it’s not a joke, you change
the definition of what you’ve heard from “joke” to “statement” or “claim”, and once you
do that you can, and often will, start to impose moral categories onto it.
Let’s take the following joke as an example:
What do you call a cow on the floor?
Ground beef.
This one kills to an audience of five-year-olds. Little kids love punny jokes about animals
– likely because they are just learning how language works and they’re learning a lot
about the different kinds of animals in the world. This is right in their wheelhouse, and
boy, is it a knee-slapper. If you don’t think the joke is funny but can see why a kid would
find it funny, you will still understand it as a joke, but just not one that hits your gigglebutton. But if you can’t see why a kid, or anyone else, would find it funny, then you
probably don’t think it’s a joke at all.
A vegan or an animal rights activist (yes, these can be different categories even
though they often overlap) might take huge exception to this joke. Not only does he not
think this joke is funny, he doesn’t understand how anyone could find it funny, and
furthermore, he doesn’t think you should find it funny either. As soon as he starts
thinking in terms of “should”s, he’s taken the joke and shoved it into a moral category
and already begun to make moral judgments about it. He does not recognize this as a
joke. He might recognize it as a statement, or a claim, or a sentiment, one that perhaps
undermines the pain of the cows that are farmed under inhumane conditions and
turned into mere products for human consumption.
This practice of making moral judgments about jokes requires two closely related
but distinct moves. First is a category mistake and the second is a mistake in judgment.
Let’s take each one in turn.
A category mistake is when you judge something of one category by the criteria of
a different category. When I take something that has no moral value and act as though it
does have moral value, I’m making a category mistake. I make the same mistake when I
confuse an “is” with an “ought”; when I say that because something is the case, that it
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ought to be the case. For example, if I say, “There’s nothing wrong with lying, people do
it all the time”, I’m confusing categories. What people actually do says nothing about
what people should do. In the case of the vegan, he’s taking something that has no moral
value (a pun) and judging it by the criteria of something that does have moral value (a
statement about the moral permissibility about turning cows into food).
This is precisely the mistake philosophers and non-philosophers make whenever
they make moral judgments about jokes. The above joke is not arguing for the idea that
grinding cows into beef is a good thing, nor is it undermining the pain and suffering of
animals in industrial farming. And I can assure you that that six-year-old who loves that
joke is not trying to slip in any moral implications whatsoever when she tells it. The joke
is simple wordplay. It has meaning insofar as words have meanings that you need to
understand in order to get the wordplay, but there is truly nothing beyond definitions of
words at play here (pun intended).
Because jokes do require understanding of words in order to make sense, some
folks argue that jokes require us to understand norms of cultural morality in order to
get a joke. But this is a category mistake. All I need to understand the joke is to
understand the meanings, or definitions, of words, not tie those words to cultural
morality. I can get a joke and find it funny, or I can get a joke and not find it funny. If I
get the meaning of the words and find it funny, I understand it as a joke. If I understand
the meaning of the words and I don’t find it funny, and don’t understand why you find it
funny, I don’t think it’s a joke. If I understand the meaning of the words and then tie
cultural morality to those words, then I’m making a category mistake, whether or not I
find the joke funny.
As soon as I’ve made the category mistake of applying moral categories to an
amoral joke, I can immediately (or automatically, or simultaneously) make a mistake in
judgment. A mistake in judgment is when I judge something of one kind as if it is of a
different kind. For example, if I refuse to believe that triangles have three sides until I’ve
seen a large sample of triangles and counted the sides, I’m making a mistake in
judgment. I’m using a judgment of perception when I could easily make an a priori
judgment that will give me the right answer. By refusing the believe that triangles have
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three sides until I’ve counted enough of them to prove it, I’ve not only given myself a
whole mess of work to do, but I’ve also given myself an impossible task. I’d have to
count all of the triangles that have existed or could exist if the three-sidedness of
triangles was the sort of thing that could be verified through the senses. No matter how
many I count, I would always have to leave open the possibility that one day I could
come upon a triangle that has more or less than three sides. Even someone like David
Hume, one of the most famous empiricists in the history of philosophy (meaning that he
argued that new knowledge could only be accessed through the senses), would say I’m
making a mistake in judgment if I judge triangles as if they are the sort of things that can
be proven or disproven to have three sides based on empirical evidence.30
When I place a joke within the moral category and then make a moral judgment
about it, I’m making both a category mistake and a mistake in judgment. I’m insisting
that a joke is the sort of thing that has moral value, and then making a judgment about
what that value amounts to – right or wrong, good or bad. But that has everything to do
with me and nothing to do with the joke. I’ve miscategorized the joke, and then I’ve
imposed moral judgments based on that miscategorization. The joke isn’t wrong, I am.
Now of course you’re thinking, “yeah sure, for a joke like that it’s easy to argue
that there’s no moral value. But what about racist or sexist jokes? Those ones definitely
have moral value!”. Challenge accepted, dear reader.
“We like our beer the way we like our violence: domestic.”31
Oooooooo. Uh oh. Is that joke endorsing domestic violence? Is it making fun of people
who are physically assaulted by their partners? Is it undermining the seriousness of
intimate partner violence? Only if you make a category mistake. This joke requires you
to know the meaning of words, but it doesn’t require you to make any moral judgments
about the words. It doesn’t require you to defend the plight of abusers or have a moral
disregard for their victims.

30
31

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 4
This joke is referenced by Bill Burr in his 2014 special “I’m Sorry You Feel That Way”.
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Comedian Bill Burr explains in his set that this joke was written on a sandwich
board outside of a bar. A customer complained, and the manager said that that was just
their sense of humor and to have beer. The customer took a picture of the joke, posted it
on social media, and the subsequent outcry led to the firing of both the waitress who
wrote the joke and the manager that defended her. As someone who understands jokes
as amoral, he argues that firing these employees was completely unjustified. He says
that it is a great joke: “there is zero fat on that – you need every word of that joke. You
take one word out and it doesn’t work, it’s a perfect joke”.32 He goes on to argue that no
one who reads that joke is going to suddenly think it’s morally acceptable to abuse their
partner. “What are you telling me? You’re telling me someone who never hit a woman is
going to come walking in, read that joke, and just be like ‘Wait a minute!’?” 33
You may object that just because the joke wouldn’t necessarily cause someone to
actually abuse another person doesn’t mean the joke isn’t immoral. In other words, your
taking the perspective that there is something beyond the actual consequences of the
joke that determine its moral value, while Burr is arguing from a consequentialist
perspective. Consequentialists argue that the moral value of an action is entirely based
in the outcome of the action; if the action does not lead to negative consequences, like
the abuse of women, then the action is moral. But you’re making a category mistake.
Burr isn’t arguing from a moral position – he’s arguing from the position that jokes have
no moral meaning at all. If someone were to read that joke and derive moral meaning
from it, they would be making a category mistake, just as someone who objects to it on
moral grounds is making a category mistake. Jokes don’t make people abuse people.
When you find a joke to be morally reprehensible, you’re making a category
mistake followed by a moral judgment. But it’s not the joke’s fault that you take moral
exception to it – it’s yours. That doesn’t mean that you are at moral fault for your disgust
or disapproval, it just means that you made a philosophical error in how you understand
jokes. If it’s not funny to you, and you can’t imagine a world in which it is funny to
anyone, then you simply don’t recognize it as a joke. If you don’t recognize it as a joke,
you can make moral judgments about it so long as whatever category you do recognize it
32
33

Burr 2014
Ibid
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as is an expression of a moral category. But you’ll want to be careful when you do that.
Not every expression is an expression of a moral category, and you don’t want to find
yourself making moral judgments about my preference for purple or the three sidedness
of a triangle. You can be philosophically consistent and say that you don’t like the moral
sentiment expressed by a statement, but it would be a mistake to say that you don’t like
the moral sentiment of a joke. Jokes don’t make moral sentiment. They make giggles.
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What’s the Punch Line?: Punching Up and Down in the Comic Thuderdome
Grant Julin
During the 2016 Golden Globes, British comic Ricky Gervais told a joke so
appalling that the world collectively gasped:
I’ve changed. Not as much as Bruce Jenner. Now Caitlin Jenner, of course,
and what a year she’s had. Became a role model for trans people
everywhere, bravely breaking down barriers and destroying stereotypes.
She didn’t do a lot for women drivers. But you can’t have everything, can
ya? Not at the same time.34
Referencing a fatal automobile accident involving Olympian Caitlin Jenner prior to her
gender transition surgery, Gervais’s joke pokes fun at the tragic death of another, “deadnames” a transgendered person, while perpetuating trite and misogynistic stereotypes.
Ricky Gervais is known for his abrasive comedy, but the widespread backlash from all
sides of the cultural and political divide indicated that this joke had crossed a line. For
most, Gervais’ joke was a classic example of “punching down”—i.e., when humor
functions by “making fun of” a socially marginalized or vulnerable party. In recent years,
the punch up/punch down framework has dominated popular discourse regarding what
constitutes ethical comedy, and perhaps in no small part for its ability to make simple
comedy’s complex terrain. According to this framework, humor that punches up is not
only ethical, but an act of social justice; humor that punches down, based on cheap and
easy laughs of an already marginalized group, is considered bullying. Yet, is this
framework too simple? This chapter examines the ethics of punching up (and down) and
its suitability for assessing the ethics of humor in popular discourse.

Fighting with Humor
Comedy’s pugilistic character is embedded in the violent language we use to talk
about humor. A comedian “kills,” “murders,” “slaughters” and “slays” on stage … if not,

34

https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/full-transcript-ricky-gervais-golden-854126
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they “die”! Humor is biting, searing, and burning. Comics rip, roast, and tear into their
targets in the punchline—a word with its origins in Mr. Punch’s “playful” pummeling of
wife Judy in the Punch and Judy puppet plays of the 19 th century. The ferocious and
aggressive nature of comedy’s violent comic spirit manifests most explicitly in 20 th
century slapstick, a very physical comedic performance entailing a litany of violent
comedic pratfalls—face slapping, eye-poking, nose turning, nose pulling, board
thwacking, bowling-ball-head-hitting—to the uproarious amusement of its audience.
Hence, on the surface it does not seem altogether misguided that we should discuss
comedy with regard to throwing and receiving punches. Further, everyone has
experience in comedic violence. Everyone has thrown a comic punch; everyone has been
the butt of a joke. Yet, most fail to cultivate their comic sensibility so that they may
harness its unruly spirit and reap the full potential for personal and social flourishing.
Like the philosopher Spiderman once said, “with great power comes great
responsibility,” and like all powers, it must be used with great concern and care.

Punching up at Goliath: Comedy as a Defensive Strategy
In the realm of comic sparring, punching up is typically presumptive of a
defensive (rather than offensive) attack. Presumably derivative of the expression
“punching above one’s weight” in boxing where one scraps against a far more powerful
adversary, punching up indicates a David and Goliath battle where one of its combatants
is an underdog. In most instances of punching up the target is perceived as physically
stronger, but morally inferior. Such a comic jab is reactive and retaliatory—a form of
self-defense against a bully or aggressor. When Michelle Brown, an African-American
comic, joked at the 2018 White House Correspondence dinner that president Donald
Trump is “the one pussy you’re not allowed to grab,” her joke threw a counter-punch
against the president’s own words that one should just “Grab ’em by the pussy … You
can do anything.”35 As both a woman and person of color, Brown’s target punches up,
from a marginalized position, at an individual who is perceived as a bully by multiple

35

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html

144

parties—not just to minorities and women, but to all victims of sexual harassment and
assault.

The Power of the Comic Punch as Self-Defense
In the hands of a skilled wit, humor packs a powerful punch. Ancient Roman
orator and rhetorician Cicero argued that humor is more effective than rational dispute
in “break[ing] the force of offensive remarks (II.LVIII),” stating that “all admire wit . . .
because it overthrows the adversary, or hampers him, or makes light of him, or
discourages, or refutes him (II.LVIII).” As a means of self-defense, the searing retort of a
skilled wit not only shields her from the cruel words a verbal assault, but temporarily
strips one’s aggressor of their privileged status through laughter’s debasing ridicule. No
one is fully protected from humor’s eviscerating force—not even the Gods! When ancient
Greek drama introduced comic elements into depiction of Gods and religious themes in
their performances, German philosopher G.W. F. Hegel argued that the Gods become
indistinguishable from humans because “the religious consciousness no longer
distinguishes between the divine and itself.” (Hegel, 450, 452-3) While many comic
“Davids” have long praised humor as a great political equalizer, many political Goliaths,
seeking to preserve their power and control, have loathed its debasing and destabilizing
force. As John Lennon succinctly stated from his week-long “Bed In for Peace” in 1969,
“The only thing they [the establishment] don’t know how to handle is non-violence and
humor.”36

Comedy as A Preemptive Power
An essential presumption of the punch up/punch down framework is the idea
that a joke or comedic piece’s normative (ethical) value is located in the power structure
between the humorist and its target, and not its content. On the surface, this framework
36

“When it gets down to having to use violence, then you are playing the system’s game. The establishment will
irritate you – pull your beard, flick your face – to make you fight. Because once they’ve got you violent, then they
know how to handle you. The only thing they don’t know how to handle is non-violence and humor.”
During the Bed-In for Peace in Montreal, Canada (1 June 1969)
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seems far superior than attempts to view humor from the vague “offensiveness
standard,” which suggests a joke is wrong if one has taken offense. Because
offensiveness is an elusive quality varying from person to person and culture to culture,
the mere feeling of being offended offers little ethical guidance in thinking about the
ethics of humor. Such a consequentialist ethical framework, which reduces the
normative value of comedy to matters of personal and cultural attitudinal tolerance, not
only muddies the waters of ethical comedy but offers no consistent framework to think
about one’s target prior to potentially degrading them. In addition, in instances where
offense is taken, the joker can always shirk responsibility for the insult on the basis that
one was “only joking” or unaware of one’s threshold for offense, which is of little
comfort to the scorned victim of a painful insult. However, the punching up/punching
down distinction does offer a consistent framework for thinking about humor before one
tells the joke. Prior to hurling a potentially incendiary remark, one can ask, “does this
joke harm someone or a class of people who are vulnerable? If so, I should probably
hold this one back.” With these preliminary remarks in mind, let us examine the
primary arguments in favor of punching up in comedy.

Arguments for Punching Up
(1) Punching up Levels Social Inequities
The primary justification for punch-up humor is the argument that punching up
levels inequities, while punching down exacerbates them. In the 1883 satirical print
cartoon “The Protectors of our Industries,” robber barons Vanderbilt, Gould, Field, and
Sage lethargically rest on bags of gold while patting their bloated bellies with dollar
signs bursting through their opulent suits.37 As the reader’s gaze drifts from the gluttony
depicted at the top of the picture to the bottom of the cartoon’s panel, the true source of
their wealth is revealed to be the exploited 19th century industrial workers whose backs
strenuously toil to support the greedy oligarchs for slave wages. Contrary to the selfmade “titans of industry” (or in more current language “job creators”) to be most
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esteemed for their bootstrap-pulling grit and determination, the cartoon depicts the
robber barons as greedy, lazy, lecherous scoundrels who keep their bellies and coffers fat
off the backs of exploitative wage labor. The cartoon not only directly attacks specific
people, but the idea of capitalism as a whole. The cartoon “levels” the power structures
by stripping the “titans” of their perceived greatness while empowering those who are
the true wealth generators of the world—the nation of factory workers and laborers who
toil daily for meager pay. On the other hand, political humor debasing a marginalized
group with a history of oppression—as was the case in Charlie Hebdo’s racist depiction
of Muslims as violent terrorists—further divide existing power structures in ways that
only perpetuate present inequities with no vision for resolution.

(2) Punching up has an Ethical Foundation
Further, because the idea of punching-up is an idea with its foundation in an
ethical purpose—namely righting some larger social injustice—it encourages people to
approach humor in relation to right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust, while
simultaneously placing serious demands on wielders of weaponized comedy to take deep
responsibility for the consequences of their words in the free play of comedic jousting.
Long before the phrase “punch up comedy” came into vogue, satire from its earliest days
has always punched up. From Aristophanes to Swift, the greatest satirists aim to
instigate social change for the common good. In the previous example, the political
cartoon’s attack is not, as some would argue, a spiteful reaction to the success of the
affluent, but an earnest hope for a more equitable world. While not all punching up
functions to bring about social reform, the fact that punching up has baked into it a
social aim offers a far more fruitful framework for navigating comedy’s complex ethical
terrain than critics allow.
(3) Punching Up is Non-Violent Political Participation
Finally, the force of laughter’s power is as close you can get to violence, without
actually committing real physical violence. To quote a T-Shirt I once saw at an
amusement park: “I love sarcasm … It's like punching people in the face, but with
words.” Comic burns sting and fester in one’s psyche, sometimes for years after the
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punch was thrown. However, while it is not impossible die from laughter,38 no one has
been physically murdered by a joke. In addition, like other forms of non-violent protest
and political engagement, late night satirical news programs have become an integral
component of contemporary political discourse in recent decades and continues to drive
public discussion on important social issues of the day. Of course, there will always be
those who abuse the free space of humor without concern for ethics, and sometimes
such reckless use of the comic results in real physical violence, as was the case on
January 7, 2015 when two hooded gunmen forced their way into the Paris offices of
Charlie Hebdo and committed France’s deadliest terrorist attack—killing 12 of the
Hebdo staff. However, such examples only demonstrate the need for a preemptive
ethical framework. If one were to consider the power dynamics of any social conflict
prior to attacking it and any potential consequences that might arise when anger,
offense, and resentment foment into real violence—rather than recklessly abusing the
free frivolity of humor by lobbing comic haymakers from protected walls of power and
privilege—such tragedies would likely never happen.
Consequently, there is good reason to consider the punching up framework as a
general tool for thinking about comedy. Where punching up is based in an earnest
concern for justice and comes to the issue through lenses of social reform, punching
down recklessly abuses the free space of the comic in order to further assert power over
already vulnerable and oppressed groups in ways that only further exacerbate inequities
their oppressors enable. Yet, the idea of punching up is not without its critics. Let us
now examine some of its major challenges.
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Though incredibly rare, with nearly all instances of death laughter sourced from classical and medieval
commentators, there have been but two recorded instances of death laughter in the 20th century, with none since
March 24, 1975 when Alex Mitchell was said to have laughed himself into cardiac arrest while watching an episode
of The Goodies entitled "Kung Fu Kapers" starring a Scottish "Eckythump" ninja who is “armed with a black
pudding.” His widow is said to written the show to thank them for making her husband’s final breaths so happy.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/9344957/Man-who-died-laughing-at-Goodies-had-Long-QTsyndrome.html
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Arguments Against Punching Up
Criticism 1: Comedy Trivializes Important Social Matters and Problems
From satire’s early origins, adherents of punching up have faced a recurrent attack from
critics on both sides of the political divide. If the purpose of punch-up comedy is to right
a wrong or achieve major social, political or economic reform, humor seems a poor
rhetorical device to reach such a goal. Not only does the ambiguity of comedy afford a
real danger for misinterpretation,39 but, even when understood, a piece of satire always
risks diluting and (even worse) devaluing its message in the playful levity of humor’s
frivolity. Satirical attempts at addressing institutional misogyny or racism, even in good
faith, have been attacked for trivializing important social issues that, critics argue,
should be treated with sober and earnest concern. More recent attacks correlate political
apathy to the “memeification” of culture that transforms every important social,
cultural, and political event into a viral meme. For these critics, because everything
becomes a joke, so does civic and political engagement. While some argue that these
memes give light to important social issues, many question the ability of memes to have
any lasting impact on the short-term memory of a social consciousness so easily
distracted by the shared social seduction of meme culture’s latest obsession.40
Some critics see a far sinister consequence of using comedy to address social
issues—nihilism. Thinkers from Plato to Baudrillard have bemoaned the apathy that
results from devaluing and debasing important ideals, values and social problems.
Lamenting the post-irony of contemporary culture long before it would become
memeified, American author David Foster Wallace (1962 - 2008) attacked his
generation’s apathetic insincerity.41 For such critics, when all is suitable in comic jesting

39

In a 1974 research case study on public perceptions of Norman Lear’s satirical program “All in the Family,” it was
revealed that many had simply misunderstood Lear’s satirical aim, instead viewing the bigoted patriarch in a
likeable and comical way. (see Vidmar and Rokeach 1974)
40 While the viral Kony meme remains a mainstay in meme culture, the “invisible children” were forgotten when
the internet became obsessed with the death of a 17-year-old Gorilla at the Cincinnati zoo, which was shot by a
zoo worker to protect a 3-year-old who climbed into the gorilla’s habitat. Today few would recall what either viral
meme was about, but both Kony and Harambi remain comedic pillars of meme culture.
41 In Wallace’s "E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction" (1993), he calls for a new genre of literature that is
based in a sincerity, not apathetic post ironic posturing. This theory would be developed in his 1996 novel, “Infinite
Jest.”
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nothing is taken seriously and everything becomes a joke. It is for this reason that
thinkers like Plato place strict regulations on the use of humor against the state and its
institutions. For Plato, joking about important ideas runs the risk of devaluing essential
religious, ethical, and political structures that society is based upon. Since Plato, many
critics have expressed similar concern regarding the use of humor as a means for
achieving social reform. Instead of social change, these critics argue that jesting about
important social issues is more likely to result in skepticism and nihilism—a far sinister
threat to society.

Criticism 2: Only the Marginalized Can Joke
Other critics argue that punching up places burdensome and unnecessary limits
on the free play of comedy, absurdly restricting humor to the marginalized and
oppressed. From this interpretation, a person in power who unjustly falls victim to mob
rule (as happens when one is called out or “cancelled” online) seems to prohibit
retaliation given their placement in the social hierarchy. Nearly all agree that jesting is
an acceptable means of self-defense, and it seems contradictory to allow for humor in
the name of equality while placing restrictions on who can joke about what and why.
These attacks typically result in arguments over the importance of free speech and the
need for ideas and jokes to play out in the cultural (rather than political) marketplace. In
short, even in the name of social justice, most democratic societies would find
implausible the idea that humor should be regulated by one’s social hierarchical
position.

Criticism 3: Which Way is Up?
Finally, and most importantly, who or what party determines the direction of a
joke’s punch? In examining Gervais’ Golden Globes’ joke about Caitlyn Jenner, the
majority of his critics perceived it as a clear instance of “punching down.” Yet, from
Gervais’ perspective, he was punching up. In his comedy special “Humanity” (2018)
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released two years after the Golden Globes’ backlash, the British comic had this to say of
his joke:
I'm playing with the notion of stereotypes. I start off saying she's a real
woman... and I go, 'Oh, well, she's a real woman, I hit them with the oldfashioned reactionary stereotype: She must be a bad driver then. The
target of the joke is a celebrity killing someone in their car … Let's not
forget that, shall we? A celebrity killing someone in their car, running
home and popping on a dress — that's the target of the joke, just so we're
clear.42
In Gervais’ mind, the joke intended to draw attention to the fact that a powerful
celebrity got away with murder.43 For him, the joke’s target is not the transgender
community, but rich and powerful celebrities who use their position of power to cheat
the system. Even though Caitlyn Jenner is a member of the most marginalized group in
the LGBTQ community,44 Gervais insists his target was not the transgender community.
Regardless, it cannot be denied that Caitlyn Jenner, as a member of one of the most
visible and powerful families (the Kardashians), is seated in a far higher position of
social power with far greater global presence and power than Gervais.
Gervais’ joke reveals a major problem in the punch-up model that defenders must
address. As the previous example illustrates, the simplicity of punching up or down
posits a Manichean moral perspective where one party is evil, the other good—when in
reality all relationships are based in a very complicated web of power structures with its
own unique set of ethical challenges. In most conflicts, rarely is a singular oppressor
outed as a Machiavellian Goliath universally recognizable to all. In short, identifying and
objectifying power structures in the complicated power dynamics of society, culture,
government, politics and religion is an incredibly difficult task, especially when each
party perceives its adversary as the oppressor (as is certainly the case in many
longstanding political, religious, and cultural conflicts). Regardless of who is in power,
all parties see themselves as the oppressed, and some argue that examining comedy
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43 While prosecutors did not charge her criminally, three civil suits were filed against Jenner which reached out of
court settlements of an undisclosed amount.
44 The transgender community has the highest rates of mental illness, homelessness and drug abuse. See Kattari
and Begun (2017).
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through the lenses of social hierarchy only further obfuscates already complex social
conflicts.

Responses to Criticisms
If true, the above challenges reveal some major flaws in the punch up framework.
Yet, I think these attacks assume a weak version of the position uncharitable to the spirit
of the model, whose flexible framework seems to facilitate (not obstruct) the free flow of
public discourse between power structures in conflict with one another. Let us address
these attacks so that we can come to see why such a framework is more productive than
critics suggest.

Response to Criticism 1: “Comedy Trivializes Important Social Matters and
Problems”
The claim that punch-up comedy trivializes and ultimately devalues the issues it
aims to remedy is a concern for all who wield comic power on the battlefield of social
reform. Yet, while it is true that the playful levity of comic sphere affords a freer means
of discourse for addressing important social issues, to suggest that satire universally and
consistently devalues the social problems it aims to remedy overlooks the presence and
importance of art (and comedy in particular) throughout the major cultural and political
shifts since antiquity. Political and social change is inseparable from the art and comedy
that emerges within its unrest. Satire has long been utilized as a weapon against political
oppressors to not only degrade their adversary, but to also inform and illuminate social
conscious as a whole on important political, ethical, religious and social problems apart
from the establishment’s account. In short, comedic aesthetics will always be a voice of
the oppressed in their fight for social reform. While it is true that research suggests that
satire has little impact on changing people’s mind (only emboldening pre-existing
attitudes),45 any piece of political art provides an opportunity for discussion, reflection
and sometimes action. While memes, as with any comic rhetorical device, always run
45

See Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis (2017) and Boukes, Marjolein Moorman, & de Vreese (2015).
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the risk of relegating important matters to a punchline or ironic hashtag, the playful
realm of humor offers a less belligerent space to illuminate and discuss complicated
social issues in ways that can foster meaningful discussion in hopes of working towards
a peaceful resolution.
In short, to blame the crass nihilism of modernity on grumpy cat memes—and
not the structural problems that enable oppression—seems to misunderstand the
realities of class conflict and how democratic political systems operate. While comedy
can debase and devalue targets, such debasing can be good if it draws attention to
important social issues that some may be otherwise oblivious to. While there will always
be causalities that lay in the battlefield of comedy’s vicious assaults, the potential that
comedy holds for furthering public and social discourse on important political issues
seems to far outweigh any potential harms it might cause on the way to social reform.

Response to Criticism 2: “Only the Marginalized Can Joke”
The challenge from critics that punch-up comedy denies non-marginalized
parties from using humor in public discourse seems to straw man the position into a
framework few would defend. A more charitable interpretation would never deny or
limit specific voices from engaging in public discourse within the comic thunderdome—
especially if speech is the only legal means of retaliation in a democratic society. In all,
those in favor of punching up for social reform would surely want to advocate for the
free use of humor. However, this charitable framework would oblige people to consider
the direction of their verbal attacks and thereby assume responsibility for harms beyond
its initial sting, including the values and voices that are raised up and devalued in the
process. Consequently, the retweeting of a degrading meme targeting an AfricanAmerican football player for his refusal to stand for the national anthem by the
President of the United States to his hundreds of millions of followers worldwide is not
only outright bullying, but immoral.
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Response to Criticism 3: “Which Way is Up?”
The most compelling critique of punch up comedy is that it lacks a clear indicator
for identifying unjust power structures. If true, weaponized comedy on the battlefield
would offer little guidance when each combatant views its adversary as the morally
inferior party. Without a God’s-eye battlefield perspective to designate who is the
oppressed and oppressor in each conflict, it is unclear how such a framework could be
used for facilitating social progress. In response to this criticism, this problem would be
less of an issue if all parties adopted the punch up framework, including the comic
Goliaths of the world who abuse their power to silence others. The punch up framework
is a preemptive battle strategy that forces people to consider the context of the situation,
the historical relationship leading up to the conflict, and the weight and meaning of
words as they relate to these historical and material forces. Although this framework
would not expect to eliminate bias from the conflict, it does seem to offer a space for
each party to think through the various power dynamics that may otherwise be
concealed by power and privilege.
This interpretation seems to also address attacks that the punching up/punching
down dichotomy oversimplifies the complex nuances of contemporary humor. To the
contrary, viewing comedy from the perspective of power seems to allow for far greater
nuance than its critics allow. Those who come to the comic battlefield with an eye to
complex web of power structures and cultural forces in play with have a better strategy
for navigating and battling through the complicated debate that confronts them and the
issues and values at stake for all involved.
For those who remain unconvinced of the viability of an ethics of humor that is
based on righting unjust power structures, it must be reiterated that the entire system is
based in an ethical foundation of justice that obliges all to take responsibility for their
comic assaults—especially for the marginalized who are calling out and publically
berating their presumed oppressors. Those who challenge authority with weaponized
humor must see it as their obligation—as it is with all who challenge authority and status
quo—to establish the burden of proof that the standards, values, and ideals in question
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are indeed in need of reform. Such comic warriors will have to carry out their fight with
unrelenting political vigilance both in and out of the comic thunderdome.
Conclusion
To summarize, the punching up framework deserves continued consideration as
a means for navigating the complex and chaotic battlefield of weaponized humor. While
some critics challenge that the ambiguity and frivolity of humor muddles and ultimately
counteracts the problems satirists address, such a position overlooks the value of using
the free space of the comic to play with and think through complex ideas in a way that
facilitates, and often furthers, public discourse on important social matters. Until a
better model is offered by its critics, and given the increasing role of humor in political
discourse, it seems we must learn to punch up.
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Aesthetics
Many philosophers believe that there is a distinction between two types of
sentence: sentences of fact and sentences of value. Fact sentences or descriptive
sentences say how things are. The sky is blue. I am hungry. Value sentences, prescriptive
or normative sentences, on the other hand, don’t tell us how things are, but how they
ought to be. One sort of value sentence concerns how humans ought to act. That is the
purview of ethics, our last chapter. But there is another sort of value sentence that we
need to discuss – aesthetic claims. Aesthetics is the study of value judgments
concerning art and beauty.
“Does this soup need more barley?” That is an aesthetic question. Would the
addition make this object, intentionally created by a human for the sake of artistic
appreciation, something that inspires a greater sense of quality? The answer could be
yes or no, but either way the person responding would have a reason for it. “The texture
is great, adding more would soak up more liquid and it would be too thick. It would feel
funny in your mouth.” So, how do we determine what sorts of arguments work and
which ones don’t in this kind of matter?
Leo Tolstoy famously drew a distinction between two distinct distinctions
concerning art. On the one hand, there is the distinction between art and non-art. On
the other hand, there is the distinction between good art and bad art. The first
distinction draws the line between those acts which we will consider artistic and those
which we do not. This became an important question in the 20 th century when modern
art was often self-reflexive, that is the subject of much art became art itself. Artists
pushed the boundaries, challenging artistic norms and historically accepted rules, trying
to force the community to grapple with the boundary between art and non-art.
The French artist, Marcel Duchamp, for example, took mass produced objects,
what he called “Readymades,” and displayed them out of context in galleries. His most
famous work, “Fountain,” was a urinal displayed as a sculpture. Another, “In Advance of
the Broken Arm,” was a snow shovel. These were objects that we had seen many times
and not thought about. But now, displayed out of place, they seemed weird. When
looking at them, you see them differently. “Why is this here? Really, a urinal?” is where
the internal monologue starts. “What could he be saying with this?” it continues, “Is it a
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political statement about how modern life makes us pissed off? Is it that this is
something we do in private and now the thing is displayed publicly, so he’s saying the
job of art is to bring the personal out in the open? Is it just a gag? Is he messing with us?
Is this even art? I mean, I could place random things around, does that make me an
artist? But why this thing?” Art challenges what art is, but what exactly is it? That is a
philosophical question.
But it is only one philosophical question. Once we can distinguish art from nonart, we need to think about how we judge art. What makes one piece of art better than
another? What makes one thing more beautiful than another?
The temptation is to wave these questions off, to remove them from philosophical
discussion by saying that it is all just a matter of taste. It’s subjective. Aesthetic
subjectivism is the view that the quality of a work of art is a function of each person
and determined only by how much that person likes it. It is absolutely true that there is
taste, that is, every person likes different things to different degrees. One need not have
any intellectual justification for one’s taste. If chocolate ice cream tastes better to you
than vanilla, then it just does. There is no rational argument that can change your mind.
It tastes as it does and you just prefer one to the other. End of story.
While there is an instinct to go immediately to that position, it has deep flaws. It
is true that we have different tastes, but we also have guilty pleasures. Have you ever
liked something, say a television program, that you know is bad? “I know this not good
writing, terrible acting, and cheesy special effects, but I just love it.” We all have
something that we enjoy, yet know it is of inferior quality. In the other direction, we can
admire the artistry of something we don’t enjoy. “I don’t like this kind of music, but I
can really hear how good she is with tone, rhythm, and depth of lyrics. I’d never listen to
it, but that’s a quality song.” These sorts of claims, of course, only makes sense if we also
believe in a distinction between taste (what we like) and quality (what is good).
So, if we want to try to figure out what makes a piece of art good art, the challenge
is “who’s to say?” The answer, of course, is we are. You, me, philosophers, people who
think hard about these questions.
Some have placed the determination of the quality of the art within the piece
itself. Formalism is the view that the aesthetic quality of the work is a function of the
formal properties of work. In visual art, the eye prefers symmetry, so questions of
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balance and geometric structure would be relevant to determining the quality of a
painting. Complexity impresses us. If something is intricate and clearly difficult to do,
then we elevate the work. Similarly, if the artist misses the mark, we condemn it. If you
are listening to a pop song and the drummer is off rhythm or the singer is
unintentionally off-key, these would be formal flaws that would make the song lower
quality. “That was a terrible rendition of the national anthem, she was flat on some
notes and completely missed others. She screeched on the high notes. Oooof. It was
terrible.” This is more than “I didn’t like it,” it is justifying panning that performance
with reasons that refer to internal elements of the performance itself.
Intentionalism is the view that we cannot judge the quality of the work by only
looking at the elements of the work itself, but need to also consider the intention of the
artist in creating it. Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is horribly ugly. But that is what makes it
such a great work of art. It is meant as a response to the needless killing during World
War II. It is intended to illustrate the ugliness we have shown toward fellow humans. If
you didn’t know that this was Picasso’s intention, you could not properly appreciate the
work.
Of course, the obvious problem is that art is out there in display. We see it, we
hear it, we taste it (culinary art only – don’t try licking paintings in the art museum,
please). But artist’s intentions are not on display. They are in the head of the artist. We
cannot know what was intended. The artist herself may not even know. And if the artist
is dead…now we have no chance of legitimately gaining access to this information.
So, formalism puts the important aspects of judgment in the work and
intentionalism puts it in the mind of the artist, there is one more place it could be – in
the experience of the audience. Aesthetic expressivism is the view that the job of art
is to express and evoke human emotion. If a sad song makes you cry, it was a good song.
If a movie leaves you uplifted and inspired, it was a quality film. The work of art is
meant to move the audience and if the audience is moved, then it did its job.
A competing view that looks at the reaction of the audience to the work is
aesthetic cognitivism. Aesthetic cognitivism is the view that works of art make us
think, they convey ideas. The more intellectually affective a piece is, the better it is.
Immanuel Kant famously distinguished between two sorts of reaction we can have to
art. On the one hand, we can think it beautiful. Beauty is when we lose ourselves within
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the qualities of the work. “Oh my gosh, this is so delicious, I can’t stop eating it. I’m
completely stuffed, but I still want more.” A work is beautiful when we appreciate it fully
for what it is. It draws us in and we want to stay focused on it. “That is so beautiful, I
can’t look away.”
On the other hand, Kant argues, some art is sublime. Something is sublime when
it takes us beyond it and beyond ourselves. The beautiful allows us to get drawn in and
appreciate thing itself, the sublime blows everything up and puts us in touch with
something higher, bigger than ourselves, beyond our own limited perspective. Religious
art is intended to take us beyond our own mind to a sense of awe associated with the
Divine.
Let’s turn our gaze from religious art to ethnic and dirty jokes. We will consider a
question in humor aesthetics – what makes a joke a good joke. Comic moralism is the
view that jokes with morally problematic elements are less funny for being immoral.
Comic immoralism is the view that immoral content makes a joke funnier. Comic
amoralism contends that the quality of a joke is irrelevant to the moral status of its
content. Does the ethical status of the content of the joke matter?
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Comic Moralism: Why Moral Failure Leads to Comic Failure
Ya’er Kahn
Comic moralism is the view that morally problematic content in a joke decreases
the funniness of the joke. It will be assumed for the sake of the argument that jokes can
have immoral content and we will ignore the resultant ethical questions about whether
it is morally right or wrong to tell such ethically problematic jokes. The claim here is that
even if you have no problem delivering these sorts of jokes, you shouldn’t tell them – not
for moral reasons, but for artistic ones. They are less effective jokes.
Humor is a particular type of art form, it is “teleological.” The word “teleology”
comes from the Greek words “telos” which means aim or goal. Something is teleological
if it has something it is seeking to accomplish.
Some art is teleological and some art is not. Non-teleological art is creative work
for its own sake. Consider miniatures, that is, tiny replicas of large-scale objects, like
doll furniture. There was a movement wherein artists created incredibly intricate copies
of ornate furniture using all the actual materials but they would be three inches high.
The talent and patience required was incredible. These pieces are stunning. But there is
no purpose beyond themselves that they serve.
Think of art as creating relationships. In the case of non-teleological art, the only
important relationship is between (1) the artist and (2) the artwork. Whether you see it,
whether you are impressed by it, whether you like it is irrelevant. The goal was simply
for the artist to make it. Non-teleological art has a two-place relationship at its heart.
Teleological art is intended by the artist to do something, to be a tool for some
goal beyond the work. That goal could be of one of two types: external or internal.
External teleological art is art that is meant to give rise to an impulse in the viewer to act
in the world. Pete Seeger’s folk songs, for example, were intended to inspire political
activity that would benefit workers, the poor, world peace, and the environment. He
wrote and performed his songs with the intention of creating in his audience a feeling
that would then be translated into action beyond the concert venue.
In the case of external teleological art, the relationship is four-part (like Pete
Seeger’s harmonies). There is (1) the artist who created (2) the artwork that is then
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viewed by (3) the viewer who is then inspired to change (4) some element of the wider
world. The fourth element in the relation is the externality.
Internal teleological art is art that has a goal, but the goal is simply to create some
sort of response within the viewer. Consider a horror film. The goal is to scare the
viewer. It is teleological – if you are not scared by the horror film then it failed for not
achieving its goal. But while it is teleological, the goal has nothing to do with the broader
world beyond the engagement of the viewer with the artwork. That fright is not meant to
lead you to do anything after you are done watching. The telos is not external to the
viewer, but internal. As such, internal teleological art has only a three-place relationship
at its core: (1) The artist creates (2) the artwork to give rise to some affective state within
(3) the viewer.
Jokes are internal teleological works of art. There is a goal to telling a joke, but it
is not something beyond (1) the teller, (2) the joke and (3) the audience. The goal of
telling a joke is a particular affective state of the audience, comic amusement. Maybe
that comic amusement generates a laugh, maybe a smirk, if it is a bad pun an eyeroll, if
it is a really bad pun a slap upside the head. But the point of the joke is to generate
within the listener a particular emotional state.
What is fascinating about comic amusement is its complexity. It is generated in a
two-step cognitive process. First you have to get a joke, then you have to appreciate it.
Both of these are cognitive acts. Both require neurological processing. But they are
distinct. You can do the first without doing the second.
This is not universally true for internal teleological artforms. In the case of the
horror film, we also have an internal teleological artform, but the scare is (usually) a
one-step neurological process. The music slowly swells, the character creeps slowly
toward the curtain, pulls it back nervously to see nothing behind it, they (and you) let
out a deep breath and relax. They turn around to see THE KILLER IS RIGHT BEHIND
THEM WITH HIS KNIFE READY TO STRIKE! You scream, your heart races, your
breathing stops and then quickens. It all happens in an instant. It is a one-step mental
process that gives rise to this immediate reaction. Yes, there are psychological thrillers
that function more like jokes with a two-step process to give rise to a deep sort of fear,
but the standard shock-based horror effect is a one-step process (despite the significant
psychological priming it takes to set it up well).
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Jokes, however, have a two-step process: getting the joke and appreciating the
joke. A joke that fails to meet the first goal is what comedians call a joke that “does not
land,” that is, it goes over the audience’s head. Have you ever said something jokingly
and the person you said it to didn’t even realize it was a joke? That is a failed joke of the
first kind.
A failed joke of the second kind is a joke that lands, but does not succeed in
generating comic amusement. “No, I get the joke. It just isn’t funny.”
Failed jokes should be distinguished from bad jokes because the term “bad joke”
has a different meaning when we use it in conversation. Dad jokes are corny, clean, punbased jokes. By virtue of their corniness they are bad, but they can be effective,
especially when delivered at an unexpected time. Kids, in spite of themselves, smirk at
the joke while saying, “Daaaaaad.” Alternatively, many a comedian has been highly
successful by pretending to be an incompetent comedian and getting us to laugh at
flawed jokes (poorly constructed or intentionally badly delivered). These are bad jokes,
but they are still successful jokes because they created comic amusement in their
audience. We are not interested in such bad jokes, we are only concerned with the
distinction between successful jokes and failed jokes.
So, to take stock of where we are, jokes are works of art. Further, they are
teleological works of art, they have a goal. That goal is an internal goal, that is, it
involves an emotional state of the audience and need not go any further. That emotional
state is complex in having two parts – landing and appreciation. A joke is successful if
and only if the teller tells the joke, the audience hears the joke, gets the joke, and
appreciates the joke thereby ending up in a state of comic amusement.
We need to focus on success and failure in the second part of the processes. Once
the audience gets the joke, what is it to find yourself in a state of comic amusement?
The first thing to notice is that comic amusement is a totalizing emotional state.
When you are really laughing hard at something, that is the only thing you can think
about. Full-on hilarity takes over your body and your mind completely. You double over,
your sides hurt, you can’t catch your breath, as much as you try to stop laughing, you
can’t. And just when you think you have yourself settled down and under control, it
starts again and off you go. Laughter forces everything else out of your mind for the
period of amusement.
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This is why we take someone who is in pain (physical or emotional) and try to
cheer them up by making them laugh. If you can get the person laughing, then, at least
for the brief moment when they are laughing, they stop feeling the pain. Henri Bergson,
in his classic book On Laughter, says that comic amusement creates “a temporary
anesthesia of the heart.”
But it is hard to get someone in pain to laugh, certainly harder than it is to get a
person not in pain to laugh. And the easiest thing is to get people already laughing to
keep laughing. If you are around friends, you are relaxed and laughs come easily.
Comedy clubs have opening acts for their main attraction because if the earlier comic
already has you chuckling, the headliner will have an easier time making you guffaw.
The two-drink minimum at these clubs help, too. Alcohol relaxes you and lowers
inhibitions (like laughing loudly in public) and increases the likelihood of comic
amusement.
But the person in pain has to overcome the pain to get to where they are capable
of laughter. If, say, someone is mourning the loss of a loved one, their mind will be so
focused on the grief, their memories, and the loss that the ability to totalize their
emotional state with something humorous will be extremely difficult.
In cases like this, there is a competition between affective states. The person is in
an emotional tug-of-war. Grief and comic amusement are both totalizing emotional
states and so the person can only be in one at a time. They may alternate. This is what
often happens at a funeral when endearingly funny stories are told about the departed.
For a brief moment we are joyful transporting ourselves mentally back to that time the
funny thing happened. It allows us to escape our sadness for that moment. But when the
moment is over, the sorrow returns. With grief and comic amusement it is one or the
other, not both.
Moral indignation is another totalizing emotional state. When we see something
that is truly ethically problematic – not some minor, using the wrong fork on your saladtype breach of etiquette, but a really morally despicable act – it has an effect on us
mentally and physically. There is outrage. There is the desire to have it stopped. There is
the urge to see if the victims can be helped. There is a yearning for revenge against the
perpetrator in the name of justice. All sorts of cognitive elements bounce off of each
other, as the body reflects the state. Your heart rate increases, blood flow makes your
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cheeks and the back of your neck flush, eyes open widely. We react to immoral acts in a
totalizing way.
Sometimes we just pretend. We feign moral outrage when something challenges a
political view we hold, or when we want others around us to think we agree with them,
or want them to think us as high-horse moral authorities. But these are not the cases we
are talking about. We are dealing with the reaction when confronting authentically
morally problematic actions. These have an effect on us, not because we choose to act as
if we are offended, but because we really are. And in these cases, we should be. When
you see something immoral, you ought to be upset by it.
And again, that upset is totalizing. It demands our full attention. It dominates our
emotional being.
So, what happens when we put the Mentos of immorality in the Diet Coke of
humor, that is, what if there is morally reprehensible content in a joke? It may well pass
the first test and land. The audience may understand that it was a joke. But in trying to
appreciate the joke, the mind will focus on the immoral content. The tug-of-war is on.
The joke is demanding full control of the mind because the comic amusement it is trying
to create is totalizing. On the other hand, the mind will find itself focusing on the harm
and injustice associated with the immoral content. The moral disgust will demand the
resources of the full mind as it, too, is a totalizing emotional state. The comic
amusement and moral disgust will refuse to compromise, they cannot share the mind.
Their nature is totalization.
There are three possibilities. Either one of them wins or it is a tie. If the moral
indignation wins, then the joke is deemed inappropriate and dismissed. If it is a tie, then
just like the funeral story, there will be alternation between the two and comic
amusement will only get half of its time, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of the joke.
If the comic amusement wins, then the utterance is deemed a successful joke, but
emerges like a heavyweight champion boxer who just won a title bout: bruised, bloody,
with a swollen eye. The joke may be recognized as funny, but because of the tug-of-war it
used up much of its energy that it was going to use generating laughs. So, no matter
which of the three it is, the joke has lost some of its artistic capital, the immoral content
had the effect of rendering the joke either unfunny or less funny.
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It is important to note two things about this conclusion. First, note that this is not
an all or nothing proposition. The claim is not that immoral jokes can never be funny at
all. The claim is that the immoral content necessarily decreases the joke’s effectiveness.
An immoral joke may or may not be funny, but it is less funny for being immoral. The
ethically troublesome content acts like an anchor, a drag that drains at least some (and
sometimes all) of the artistic/emotional energy out of the joke.
Second, comic moralism is not the ethical view that you should not laugh at jokes
with immoral content. Remember that comic moralism is an aesthetic view, not a moral
one. It is a question of the joke’s effectiveness. The joke had a job to do, an artistic job,
and the only thing we are concerned with in this argument is how well it does that job,
not whether it is a morally acceptable tool to use in doing the job. It may not be, but that
is a different question for a different philosophical discussion.
What has been argued for here is that immoral content in a joke diminishes the
jokes funniness. That is what is called “comic immoralism” and it is true.
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It’s Still Funny Though: A Defense of Moderate Comic Immoralism46
Connor K. Kianpour

“If you lose one sense, your other senses are enhanced. That’s why people with no sense
of humor have a heightened sense of self-importance.”47

A joke that is morally repugnant can still be funny. In fact, some jokes are funny
precisely because they are morally repugnant. It doesn’t take being a philosopher to
understand this. All it takes is a visit to the comedy club, or a night out with some
jokesters. Still, philosophers have taken this belief that appears fairly obvious and
argued that it is untrue because, well, that is precisely what philosophers do. In response
to these challenges, I will do what any sensible person would and dedicate an entire
textbook chapter to the vindication of a claim that is indisputable: Jokes can be funny
because they are immoral.
Before I dive into my argument, allow me to make some distinctions as any good
philosopher would. One could argue every joke that contains immoral content is made
funnier in virtue of its immorality. This view is called strong comic immoralism. I do
not defend this view, not least of all because it is indefensible. In the words of Noël
Carroll, “no one on this side of Satan” endorses strong comic immoralism (Carroll,
48).48 All it takes to show that strong comic immoralism is wrong is one immoral joke
that is either made less amusing – or at least, is not made more amusing – because of its
immorality. Clearly, there are some immoral jokes that are made less funny because of
how distasteful they are. Perhaps you have been the butt of such a joke. (Lord knows I
have been). The mean-spiritedness, lewdness, or insensitivity of these jokes at least
sometimes make them less amusing.

I would like to thank this textbook chapter’s most formidable and constructive hecklers: Andrew I. Cohen, Vanessa
Voss, and David Simpson.
47
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In this chapter, I defend a version of moderate comic immoralism. According to
this view, sometimes jokes are made funnier because they are immoral. Moderate comic
immoralism, on its face, is much more plausible, intuitive, and defensible than strong
comic immoralism. All that is required to show that moderate comic immoralism is true
is a single instance in which a joke is made funnier because it is immoral. Since I am an
overachiever, I will provide two examples in which jokes are made more amusing
because they are immoral and explain why their amusement is enhanced specifically by
their immorality. In due course, I anticipate some objections to moderate comic
immoralism and put them to rest. By the end of this chapter, you will be able to justify
your belief in what you already knew to be true about the relationship between
immorality and funniness. You’re welcome.
Racism and Cannibalism and Pedophilia, Oh My!
When I refer to an “immoral joke,” I do not mean that the joke itself has done
something blameworthy, like murder someone or make out with her best friend’s
brother. All I mean, as most people do when they call a joke immoral, is that the joke
contains immoral content. Another way of putting this is that immoral jokes are not
themselves immoral, but are about immoral things which elicit visceral reactions from
us much of the time. If an example of such a joke does not readily come to mind, you’re
in luck. Feast your eyes on this:
Picky Eater
Q: What is a racist cannibal’s favorite food?
A: Crackers.
Hopefully, we all accept that racism – i.e. arbitrarily privileging members of one’s own
race – is morally reprehensible. Likewise, I hope we all accept that cannibalism – i.e.
eating members of one’s own species – is unacceptable, at least in those cases involving
homo sapiens who have not consented to being eaten. (Yes, I had to make that
clarification. Remember that this is a publication for those who are or aspire to be
pedantic, philosophical types). Picky Eater is, therefore, immoral in the sense that it
relies on racism and cannibalism – two immoral things – to make sense.
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Is Picky Eater funny, though? And if it is, to what extent is it funny because it is
immoral? In response to the first question, I am fairly confident that Picky Eater is
funny. After all, I included it in this chapter. Allow me to now unfunnily explain why you
find this joke funny. You might latch onto the incongruity of a racy pejorative being used
in the punchline of the joke that doubles both as a word for a kind of food and a word for
white people. Maybe you find it particularly amusing that a racist is so committed to
prejudicially favoring white people over other races that he or she makes a fuss about
killing and eating anyone who isn’t white. Or you might think highly of yourself for
being neither a cannibal nor a racist, and delight in the fact that you are morally
superior to the joke’s subject in this respect. Perhaps thinking of cannibalism or racism
makes you uncomfortable, and you find amusement in the joke to help alleviate some of
your discomfort.49
In any case, you will find Picky Eater funny in large part because it is immoral. At
the very least, you will find the joke funnier than it would be sans immorality. To really
drive this point home, let’s rewrite the joke so it contains no immoral content and see
what happens:
Salt Lover
Q: What is a salt lover’s favorite food?
A: Crackers.
Picky Eater has been purged of its immorality in Salt Lover, but so too has the joke been
absolved of much of what makes it funny. If you did find this sad excuse for a joke
somewhat amusing, it is likely because “it’s so bad that it’s funny.” Barring some sort of
extraordinary delivery, Salt Lover does not have a strong punchline that subverts
expectations and tickles the funny bone. And I suspect that the only way to revise the
joke so that it is recognizable but funnier is by introducing immoral content. Though
morally unproblematic, Salt Lover is not really that funny. When we revise it so that it
produces notes of racism and cannibalism, though, it becomes funnier, as evidenced by
Picky Eater. Thus, jokes can be made more amusing at least in part because they rely on
moral transgressions.

49

Consult the earlier chapters of this book to find sustained articulations and defenses of different theories of humor,
such as incongruity theory, superiority theory, and relief theory.
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At this point, someone might wonder whether it makes sense at all to think that
people can truly find immorality amusing. After all, we lament and condemn immoral
actions… So why would we find jokes that rely on immorality funny rather than
disappointing? Well, it’s because forbidden fruit is sometimes the sweetest. Everyone
knows this. Tell children that they are not allowed to press the big, red button, and their
temptation to press it will skyrocket. Knowing that something is off-limits can
sometimes make that very same thing more attractive to us. Surely, you have found
yourself at a funeral or some comparably grave occasion where someone in attendance
does something foolish and you find it difficult to restrain your laughter precisely
because you know you shouldn’t laugh. This is why, I suspect, we find some immoral
jokes so funny – they rely on taboos, which make them seductive and amusing. Consider
the following joke:
The Nun
Q: How do you get a nun to lose her virginity?
A: Dress her up as an altar boy.
This joke is more, shall we say, provocative than Picky Eater. Among other problematic
things, it relies on sexual violence and the insidious social contagion that has infamously
plagued the Catholic Church – two indisputably egregious atrocities – to make sense.
You might especially take issue with The Nun because it seems to make light of rape and
pedophilia, and for this reason lacks taste. And it could be argued that jokes like The
Nun, especially when delivered in a certain way, are particularly harmful to those who
have survived sexual violence, molestation, and spiritual abuse. Provided that The Nun
is the type of joke that wrongly harms others and is indicative of insensitivity toward
vulnerable people, you might even believe that it is wrong to tell it or to laugh at it. But
does this mean that the joke isn’t funny?
Two Things Can Be True at Once
For some reason, the era of YouTube and social media has welcomed the
popularization of prank videos. In particular, people like making and watching videos
where practical jokes are played on fast food employees. Take, for example, the coning
phenomenon. Coning happens when someone orders an ice cream cone at a drivethrough restaurant and picks up the ice cream cone from its top rather than its base.
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Workers at the drive-through window have, historically, reacted amusingly to “being
coned.” Thousands of people have made videos documenting a variation on this prank
to much positive reception on the internet. Others have made videos where they prank
fast food workers by pretending to faint at the drive-through window, or by snatching
food away from employees without paying them.
Some will leave comments on these prank videos saying something to the effect
of, “This isn’t funny,” probably because fast food employees work very hard for little pay
and regularly deal with difficult customers. Pranking them for clout on the internet
seems to add insult to injury. Despite this, declaring that these videos aren’t funny
seems dishonest at best and aesthetically authoritarian at worst. The fact of the matter is
that these videos accrue tens of millions of views and hundreds of thousands of likes.
People clearly find these types of pranks funny, and it at least seems conceivable that
they’re not mistaken to believe that they actually are. Whether or not people should find
amusement in a prank or joke is distinct from whether or not people actually do. It is
entirely consistent to claim that people find prank videos of the kind mentioned above
funny and that it is regrettable that they do.
All of this is to say that two things can be true at once. A joke like The Nun might
be wildly inappropriate, crass, and harmful. We might have grounds to sanction
someone who makes such a joke, and appropriately demand an apology from them for
making it. We might even hold people accountable for laughing at such a joke. But
people might still find the joke to be funny. Someone can rightfully acknowledge that
Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita – a novel about a “love affair” between a thirty-somethingyear-old man and a child – is salacious, vile, and oftentimes downright obscene, but still
a triumphant literary masterpiece.
Jokes that make light of serious issues like racism, sexism, or pedophilia are
uncontroversially controversial. Antisemitic jokes are similarly contentious. Ted Cohen,
a Jewish philosopher, once said that he has “come to realize that if there is a problem
with such jokes, the problem is compounded exactly by the fact that they are funny.
Face that fact. And then let us talk about it.”50 To accept that a joke is funny is not to
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concede that it is without fault. According to Cohen, the opposite might be true. By
having an honest discussion about what makes immoral jokes so funny, we might be
able to move ourselves toward mitigating the regrettable harms engendered by them.
Perhaps those who immoral jokes are about will toughen up, or those who think they are
without fault for making them will thaw their icy hearts. Either way, productive
conversations about the ethics of laughter and amusement rely on recognizing that some
immoral jokes are just funny.
Jokes like The Nun, even if we have reasons against saying or enjoying them, can
still be funny precisely because they are immoral. Rob the joke of its immoral features
and you sap it of at least some of what makes it funny, much like what happened in the
case of Picky Eater once it was rewritten to be Salt Lover. Moderate comic immoralism
is, thus, as obvious as the fact that we cannot live without oxygen, or that I am writing
what you are reading in a haze of procrastination. Even if moderate comic immoralism
is true (which it is), there are separate questions to answer about the morality of telling
jokes. For instance, whether or not depriving a joke of its amusement value in the
interest of showing consideration for others is right or wrong, praiseworthy or
blameworthy is a distinct, though perhaps related, issue.
Moderate Comic Immoralism is True (Reprise)
I have – to my mind, convincingly – argued that moderate comic immoralism is
true. This position does not commit us to the view that immorality always makes jokes
funnier, but more modestly claims that immorality can make jokes funnier. We see this
not only in Picky Eater and The Nun, but in much of the world of humor. Racist, sexist,
homophobic, transphobic, ageist, ableist, classist, and xenophobic jokes are everywhere,
whether we like it or not. And they can be funny specifically because they are racist,
sexist, homophobic, transphobic, ageist, ableist, classist, or xenophobic, whether we like
it or not. Granted, that a joke is, for instance, sexist is not alone what it takes to make it
funny. Perhaps this is because such a joke does not appropriately subvert expectations,
or it is delivered with malice that renders it sinister rather than jovial. But the sexism on
which a misogynistic joke depends can, and often does, contribute to its funniness.
Moderate comic immoralism makes a lot of good sense. In addition to possessing
much intuitive plausibility on its own, it has the benefit of being consistent with other
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philosophical views in the study of humor. For example, moderate comic immoralism is
consistent with moderate comic moralism, or the view that immoral content sometimes
makes jokes less funny. Caustically directing racially charged epithets at specific people
during a stand-up comedy set may, but does not always, represent such an instance. It is
also consistent with moderate comic amoralism, or the view that immoral content
sometimes has no bearing on whether a joke is amusing or not. You might hear a joke
that is laced with foul language and realize that you can tell it, while preserving the
amusement value of the joke, to your younger sibling once you omit the vulgarities.
Moreover, a moderate comic immoralist can subscribe to any of the available theories of
humor: Superiority theory, relief theory, incongruity theory, cleverness theory, or antitheory. It neither requires nor forbids adherence to any of these theories. All it requires
is the possession of two senses: common sense, and a sense of humor.
In conclusion, moderate comic immoralism is right and people who deny this are
wrong. And they’re probably humorless jerks, too.
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Form and Funny: Formalism in Humor Aesthetics
Steven Gimbel
Aristotle argued that everything is a combination of both matter and form.
Consider Michelangelo’s famous statue of David. What makes it the statue it is?
Aristotle says that there are two answers. On the one hand, there’s the marble out of
which he carved it. Take away the marble of a marble statue and what is left? Nothing.
So, the material from which it is made is one of its causes. On the other hand, what
makes it a statue of David, King of the Jews and not a statue of Davie, the weird guy who
catches squid with his bare hands and then celebrates by making farting noises with his
underarms? It is the form, the shape of the marble, is what makes it the statue it is.
Combine the stuff and the shape and you get the statue.
But the question here is aesthetic value. Michelangelo’s statue is one of the great
works in the history of art. Why?
The answer is not the material. I am not a sculptor. I have never even held a
chisel. Give me a piece of marble the same size and quality and let me at it. The result?
Not a great work of art. Same material, not the same aesthetic outcome.
Now, suppose scientists decide to bring a mass spectrometer into the Galleria
dell’Accademia and discover that David is not actually made of marble, but rather
alabaster, paper mâché, or some other substance. The world would marvel. “It just
shows Michelangelo’s genius that he could take such a humble substance and make it so
resemble marble in the creation of this masterwork.” What makes the statue such an
incredible work is the detail, the grandeur, the feeling of awe it creates in the viewer. All
of this is the result of its shape. The beauty, the aesthetic value is a matter of form, not
content.
The same is true, I claim, with respect to jokes. Humor is an art form just as
much as sculpture. As a largely linguistic art form, the content is language and the ideas
and concepts the language represents. (Sure, there is slapstick and the like which are not
linguistic, but we can make similar arguments for them.) Comic moralists argue that
funniness is decreased because of immoral content. Comic immoralists argue that
funniness is increased because of immoral content. They are both wrong. The funniness
of a joke is completely a function of its form. The moral content of the joke is irrelevant
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to its funniness, that is, to its aesthetic quality. The content is only relevant in as far as it
is a functional formal element. We appreciate the joke for its tightness, its cleverness, its
rhythm – the formal elements – not because of its content, moral or otherwise. The
content is just there to allow for the formal elements to appear.
If comic moralism or immoralism were true, then changing the content of an
effective joke in such a way as to make it more or less immoral should have an effect on
the joke’s quality. If comic moralism were true, dialing up the ethically problematic
content should decrease its funniness; whereas if the comic immoralist is right, then the
result should be a funnier joke. Similarly, decreasing the ethically concerning aspects
should increase the funniness if the comic moralist is correct, and decrease it if the
comic immoralist is correct. Either way, it is an empirical result. That means that we can
do some experiments. It’s time to step into the philosophical laboratory.
We need a subject to operate upon. Let’s take a joke with moderately ethically
problematic content, an ethnic joke that makes use of a stereotype, but not that bad of
one.
(1) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a lightbulb? None. It’s fine.
I’ll just sit here in the dark. Don’t worry about me. You should be happy, that
all I care about.
This joke plays upon the stereotype of the Jewish mother as someone who is willing to
suffer as long as it means that she can make her children feel guilty. She will make it
seem as if she is the martyr, but really it is a passive-aggressive attack camouflaged as
other-directed care. The joke is not difficult to analyze, although the children may be in
analysis for years.
So, we have our baseline with this joke. Funny? Meh, a bit. A legit joke. Now, let’s
work on it, increasing and decreasing the offensive content and see if it gets more or less
funny.
Start by making it less offensive. Clearly, the element of the content that contains
the moral concern is the use of the stereotype of the Jewish mother. We can change that
in two ways. Let’s start by stripping out the content of the stereotype.
(2) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a lightbulb? The same
number it would take mothers of any other ethnicity, creed, or religious
background.
175

Did that increase or decrease the funniness? Clearly, decrease. In fact, now it isn’t even a
joke. What made (1) a joke is that it gave a response to an ordinary question in a way
that is unusual, yet makes sense in terms of a specific element in the set up. In other
words, when you get asked how many of something, we usually answer with a number.
When we are asked how many people it takes to do a simple task, the expected answer is
one. (1) is a joke because it gives an answer that is simultaneously unexpected and
expected. In (2), by removing the stereotype, we also removed the expected part. We no
longer have the contrast that makes (1) a joke at all.
So, let’s try to decrease the immoral content of (1) while maintaining its status as
a joke. We need to neutralize the stereotype, but keep the mechanism in place that gives
the punchline the expected/unexpected dichotomy. We can do this by replacing the
stereotype with the personality trait the stereotype employs. There are people who are
both mothers and passive-aggressive. Some are Jewish, some are not. What was
operative in the joke was the association of passive-aggressiveness with Jewish mothers,
so we can simply replace the stereotype in the set up with the operative content of the
stereotype. That should give us a morally less objectionable version that is still a joke.
(3) How many passive-aggressive people does it take to change a lightbulb? None.
It’s fine. I’ll just sit here in the dark. Don’t worry about me. You should be
happy, that all I care about.
So, now we have a joke that plays on the same mechanism, but without the stereotype.
More or less funny? Again, less funny. It is still a joke. In important ways, it is still the
same joke. Yet, it does not seem to be as funny.
The comic immoralist at this point claims victory. “See,” the immoralist will
argue, “the stereotype did comedic work. The immoral element is responsible for the
funniness.” At first glance, this seems to be correct. But if it is, then we ought to see a
commensurate change when we ramp up the immoral content, instead of down.
So, let’s do that. Let’s dial up the immorality of the joke.
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(4) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a lightbulb? It wouldn’t take
any if Hitler had succeeded.
Whoa. O.k., that elevated quickly. Is it a joke? Yes, it plays on the same
unexpected/expected type of mechanism. Structurally, it is a joke. But certainly not as
good of a joke as (1).
It may have gotten a shock laugh. We laugh for a whole range of reasons. When
we suffer cognitive overload, a common reaction is laughter. If you laughed at (4), it
does not mean you harbor anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi sympathies. (It also doesn’t mean you
don’t – I’m watching you.) It was an unexpected punchline, so creates a common sort of
incongruity.
But our question is aesthetic value. Compare (1) and (4). Which is the better joke?
Which is the more artistically successful humorous utterance? For a range of reasons we
will discuss below, the answer is (8). See what I did there? Unexpected/expected. The
answer, of course, is (1).
Let’s dial the increase back some. Let’s increase the immoral content, but not
quite so much.
(5) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a lightbulb? None. Jews are too
weak to do it themselves and too cheap to hire someone else to do it for them.
Twice the antisemitism. Twice the funny? Twice as good of a joke? No.
But maybe that changed the joke to a different joke and that accounts for it. Let’s
ratchet up the ethical problem while maintaining the same stereotypical element.

(6) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a lightbulb? None. I’ll just sit
here in the dark thinking of how much I wish you had become a doctor. A real
doctor, not a philosophy doctor. You remember Mildred Himmelfarb, down at
the club? Her son is a real doctor. A cardiologist. He’s the one with the skinny
wife with the fake blonde hair and the BMW. You met them at Sophie’s bat
mitzvah last October. They were two tables over. She was the one with the red
dress…like that was an appropriate dress with children in the room. So, anyway, I
was playing mahjong with Mildred and with Rachel and Susan. Susan’s son David
just got out of the hospital. He’s fine…baruch hashem. Did I tell you he was in the
hospital? Gall stone. He’s young for a gall stone, but what do I know? Anyway, so
Mildred says to Rachel that her son, the cardiologist, just traded in his BMW for a
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Mercedes. A Mercedes? After what they did during the war. Oy. I could have
plotzed. But did I say anything? Of course, not. I’m never one to say anything. But
what could I say? My son is a philosophy doctor, not a real doctor, driving around
in that old Toyota that’s twenty years old and falling apart. It makes me nervous
to have you driving that thing. Like a tin can. If you get into an accident. It keeps
me up nights worrying that you’ll get in an accident with that old car of yours.
So, we have an even more stereotypical treatment. Again, let’s compare the artistic
quality of (1) and (6). For a little while, (6) was rolling. It was funny. But it got to be too
much. In comic terms, extending a joke to get more laughs off a single punchline is
called “milking” a joke. If you try to get to much milk, it runs dry.
So, now we have increased the immoral content of (1) and whether we dialed it up
a lot or a little, the joke still becomes lower quality. The comic moralist seems to feel
vindicated. By making the joke more immoral, you did not increase the funniness. So,
the comic immoralist must be wrong.
What these cases show is that both the comic moralist and the comic immoralist
are wrong. Tampering with the joke in either direction undermines the artistic quality.
The moral content of the joke is not important except in as far as it creates the
expectations in the mind of the listener that can then be manipulated by the punchline.
But that expectation is completely independent of the moral content of the joke.
None of this, of course, is to say that we cannot judge the artistic quality of a joke.
We can – indeed, we have been. The question is on what basis? Just like with
Michelangelo’s sculptures, it is based on the artistry of the form.
All jokes have a form, that is, an internal structure that makes it a joke. There are
a range of these structures. One joke form is exaggeration.
(7) When I was a kid I was so skinny that when the doctor wanted x-rays, he just held
me up in front of the window.
Another joke form is the false contrast. In this form, you take two things that are
different and show that they have something unexpected in common. Possibly the
greatest joke of this form comes from the comedian Gallagher:
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(8) Why do we drive on a parkway and park on a driveway?
On a car’s gear shift, “park” makes the car stop and “drive” makes the car go. These are
opposites. Yet, when we add the same suffix to each, the suffix “way,” it turns the gears
into a place where we do the opposite of that particular gear. On a driveway we stop, not
drive. On a parkway we go, not park. If just half of this joke were true, it would be an
amazingly strong joke, but having it work in both directions makes it truly epic.
This joke possesses the virtues of “sharpness” and “tightness.” A false contrast
joke is “sharp” if the two things contrasted are closely related and truly opposites of each
other. “Park” and “drive” are both. A joke is “tight” if it is worded very economically.
Timing is crucial in humor and a joke is loosely constructed if there is a lot of extra,
unnecessary linguistic muddling around. A tight joke is worded so crisply that it pops.
This joke is a model of both sharpness and tightness.
Now, compare (8) to the following false contrast joke from Demetri Martin.
(9) I love the living room. The name is so positive. Whenever I go into it, I feel so
alive. “What are you doing in there?” “I’m living, dude; c’mon in here and stop
dining.”
In delivering the joke, Martin stresses the first syllable in “dining,” creating the false
contrast between living and dying. Alive and dead are closely-related and opposites, so it
is sharp, but Martin has to do some work to pull out the contrast (getting “dying” from
“dining”…eh….) making it not as sharp as (8). It is also not nearly as tight. The joke is
forced to wander a bit to get to its ultimate punchline. (9) is a fine joke, but it is not of
the quality of (8).
Notice how we judge the quality of the joke – purely on form. This goes as well for
off-color jokes. Consider the following false contrast joke:

(10)

Knock, knock.
Who’s there?
Fornication.
Fornication, who?
For an occasion like this, black tie is optional.
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The false contrast here is sexual/non-sexual. It is a clean, dirty joke. The set up leads
you to think it is going to be a dirty joke because the set up explicitly references a term
related to sexuality, but it turns out not to be. (10) is a good joke, but it is good because
it works structurally. That part of the contrast may be morally suspect is irrelevant in
terms of the quality of the joke.
And that is the point. The content of the joke is irrelevant to the quality of the
joke. The content of the joke only functions to allow the form to work.1 The joke needs
for the listener to think one thing and then realize another. The joke is about the switch,
not the thing that causes the switch. Both the comic moralist and the comic immoralist
require the content to do the humorous work that is actually done completely by the
form. But it doesn’t. The content does not amplify or decrease the effectiveness. The
content, immoral or otherwise, is irrelevant to the artistic quality of the joke. Hence,
comic amoralism, the view that unethical content makes no difference to the ultimate
funniness of the joke must be the case.
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1

There is one type of joke that does depend solely on the content, an inside joke. An inside joke is when someone
makes a reference that she knows only a small group will understand. Inside jokes lack structure, depending
entirely on exclusive group membership to do the humorous work. As such, they lay outside the scope of this
argument.
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